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PREFACE 
This dissertation consists of an introduction followed by four papers on issues related 
to the choice of entry timing and entry mode in transition economies. Below is a list of the papers 
that is included in the dissertation with information about their current publication status and co-
authorships1. 
 
• Jakobsen, K. 2007. First mover advantages in Central and Eastern Europe: A comparative 
analysis of performance measures, Journal of East-West Business, 13(1), 35-61. 
 
• Jakobsen, K. 2008. Competition for Markets in the Brewing Industry in Central and Eastern 
Europe. In J. Larimo (Ed.) Perspectives on Internationalization and International 
Management, Vassan Yliopiston Julkaisuja, p. 299-316. ISBN 978-952-476-228-1 
 
• Jakobsen, K., & Meyer, K. E. 2008. Partial Acquisition: The overlooked entry mode. In J. 
H. Dunning and P. Gugler (eds.) Progress in International Business Research 2, Elsevier 
Science, p. 203-226. ISBN  978-0-7623-1475-1. 
 
• Jakobsen, K., & Meyer, K. E. 2007. Negotiating entry modes: Partial acquisitions in 
transition economies. Revise and resubmit at International Business Review 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The paper “Competition for Markets in the Brewing Industry in Central and Eastern Europe” has been renamed 
“Competition for markets vs. competition in markets: The case of the brewing industry in Central and Eastern Europe” 
in the dissertation. 
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1. Foreign Direct Investment Entry in Transition Economies 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The broader theme of this dissertation is market entry by foreign firms into transition 
economies. Transition economies are interesting not necessarily because they offer a large market 
per se, but often the long run perspectives are promising (Nakata & Sivakumar, 1997). Many 
transition economies will tend to be smaller, China of course being a very noticeable exception, and 
consumers have less purchasing power. The business environment in transition economies also tend 
to suffer from numerous maladies ranging from poor infrastructure, weak or arbitrary law 
enforcement, discrimination, corruption, lack of qualified suppliers, high political and economic 
uncertainty etc. In short, transition economies pose many challenges for the multinational enterprise 
(MNE), but they also offer growth opportunities and above all else a more conducive competitive 
environment than what is available in mature economies. A testament to the potential rewards of 
emerging markets is offered by Christos Pantzalis (2001) who found that MNE’s with activities in 
developing markets on average outperformed MNE’s without developing market exposure, 
suggesting that it is the market failures of developing economies that allows the MNE to capitalize 
on its firm specific assets. 
It is particularly the competitive environment that characterizes the attractiveness of 
transition economies. Some firms do supply every, or nearly every, mature economy in the world 
and for those transition economies may offer what is essentially the last opportunity for growth 
available. However, the majority of firms that invest in transition economies could still expand their 
reach by investing in other mature economies. In my view, what prompt them to prefer transition 
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economies is by and large lower competitive pressure from established rivals and the promises of a 
solid competitive position in a growing market. 
While there are many aspects to the study of foreign direct investments (FDI) the primary 
focus of this dissertation is on the decisions related to market entry; when and how to establish a 
subsidiary. These tend to be the big decisions that will shape the development and competitive 
position of the subsidiary for years to come and are thus some of the most fundamental strategic 
choices. Moreover, they will often be interrelated as early moves are faced with restrictions on the 
mode choices (Larimo, Marinov & Marinova, 2006) or seek to build a market position faster 
through acquisitions or Joint Ventures rather than greenfields (Meyer, 2008; Gil et al., 2006). 
As such, both areas have attracted strong academic interest, although entry timing in foreign 
markets haven’t received nearly as much attention as entry timing decisions per se. Nonetheless the 
broader body of first mover related papers is large enough that it has been able to support several 
Meta analyses during the 90ies including VanderWerf and Mahon (1997); Szymanski, Troy and 
Bharadwaj (1995). Similarly, a review of the mode choice literature was published in 2007 by 
Brouthers and Hennart which suggest the area has reached a certain stage of maturity. 
However, despite a generally strong academic interest in the field(s) there are key aspects of 
the entry timing and mode choice decisions that remain under explored. In the following sections I 
will address these shortcomings and how this dissertation aim to contribute to the existing body of 
literature. I will also discuss the choice of the geographical area, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), 
and how it affects the underlying assumptions of the study. 
 
FIRSTMOVER ADVANTAGES 
In this section I will present an overview of the components that make up the first mover 
advantage field and the focus/contributions of this dissertation. The study of first mover advantages 
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can be roughly divided into two primary components; the sources of first mover 
advantages/disadvantages and the study of the performance effect. 
The sources of first mover advantages (and disadvantages), basically answers the question 
why we expect entry timing to affect a firms performance in the first place. The second and perhaps 
the most prominent part of the first mover research deals with the ability of first movers to 
outperform followers. One of the key issues within this performance literature is how competition 
for first mover advantages affects the ability of first movers to benefit from the advantages. 
In this dissertation I focus primarily on later. Hence, I am concerned with the ability of firms 
to derive performance advantages from the entry timing decision and how competition for first 
mover advantages moderates the relationship. 
Sources of first mover advantages and disadvantages 
The basis for first mover advantages is of course the sources. These are the theoretical 
foundation from which we infer a possible performance effect from the entry timing choice. 
In Lieberman and Montgomery’s (1988) framework, these first mover advantages can arise 
from either technological leadership, pre-emption of scarce assets or buyer switching costs. 
Technological leadership are the self generated advantages arising from investments in 
development and learning that leads to proprietary rights, cost benefits or qualitative advantages. 
Hence, patent rights and experience effect from moving down the learning curve are good examples 
of self generated technological advantages that foster and sustain a first mover’s advantage over 
followers. Pre-emption of scarce assets are the potential advantages that arises from locking 
competitors out off input sources, market segments, restraining competitors sales growth or even  
deterring entry all together through capacity investments. Good examples of this type of first mover 
advantages are gaining control over natural resources and distribution networks. Advantages 
associated with buyer switching costs are derived from the consumers need to spend resources to 
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learn how to use a new product, lack of compatibility with existing systems and processes and 
contractual limitations or restrictions. Also the consumer’s uncertainty about the performance of the 
follower’s product compared to the tried and tested brand of the first mover creates a buyer 
switching cost that adversely affects followers. 
On the other hand followers may experience advantages from the ability to free ride on the 
first mover’s investments, resolution of technological and market uncertainties, technological 
discontinuities and incumbent inertia (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1998; Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 1988).  
Kerin, Varadarajan and Peterson (1992) advanced an expanded framework encompassing 
economic, pre-emptive, technological and behavioural factors that leads to first mover advantages. 
This framework also encompasses the moderating role of firm strategy and economic factors on the 
overall first mover advantage. In other words, firms can actively pursue strategies that enhance the 
original first mover advantages.  
From an emerging market perspective Nakatar and Sivakumar (1997) offers a framework 
building on Kerin, Varadarajan and Peterson (1992). The model considers how economic, 
political/legal, socio/cultural and technological factors in emerging markets moderate the original 
sources of first mover advantages. Of particular note is their finding that specific emerging market 
conditions can have both a positive and a negative effect on the original sources of FMA thus 
creating an uncertain net effect. 
For foreign markets, transition economies in particular, macro economic and political 
uncertainty may be quite strong first mover disadvantages in the sense that followers may wait for 
the development in the economic and political institutions to become clearer. Followers may also 
learn from the mistakes of the first mover in dealing with local institutions and can thus avoid some 
of the pitfalls. On the other hand, the first mover may have an opportunity to build strong 
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relationships with local institutions, trade associations etc that secure a lasting advantage in dealing 
with these. 
The existence of both first mover advantages and first mover disadvantages are well 
documented both in theoretically and empirically studies. There is clearly enough evidence to 
support a basic assumption that entry timing affect performance for better or for worse. However, 
while more advantages and disadvantages will no doubt come to light over time, it is my view that 
the opportunities for advancing our knowledge of the relationship between entry timing and 
performance is relatively limited in this sphere.  
A general performance advantage; the empirical question 
If we know that there are first mover advantages and we also know that there are first mover 
disadvantages then all else being equal the primary empirical question is whether or not the sum of 
all first mover advantages (X) outweighs the sum of all first mover disadvantages (Y) on average 
thus establishing a “general” first mover performance advantage (VanderWerf & Mahon, 1997).  
 
∑ (X1 + X2 ….Xn) > ∑ (Y1 + Y2 ….Yn) 
 
All theory aside, it is perhaps not surprising that the empirical research question that attracts 
the greatest interest within the entry timing field is the extent to which the act of moving first into 
new markets produces higher economic rent than following. What we are thus concerned with is 
whether or not the advantages on average outweigh the disadvantages. 
The implication of such an advantage is quite compelling from a strategic view point, in the 
sense that it is an “easily” actionable move. Hence, in its crudest form we might be tempted to 
describe the first mover literature as the strategy literatures equivalent to speculating in firms with 
low market to book value on the stock market. The foremost question that much of the empirical 
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part of the first mover literature seeks to answer is essentially if a market imperfection exists that 
allows a specific strategic choice, in this case moving first, to consistently outperform its 
alternatives? 
The most comprehensive answer to this question available today is probably the Meta 
analysis produced by VanderWerf and Mahon (1997). Ultimately they found overwhelming support 
that first movers enjoy a general market share advantage. On the other hand they found no support 
that first movers are inclined to enjoy superior financial returns raising a fundamental question 
whether entering first implies a trade off. In a study of FDI carried out by Japanese firms Delios and 
Makino (2003) indeed found that early entry entailed greater firm size (measure of success) but at 
the cost of an increased exit risk.  
However there are still room to refine the study of timing and performance. Two of the key 
areas of interest in this respect are how competition for first mover advantages affects the ability to 
profit from these advantages and how we strengthen the measure of performance in general. I will 
cover these in the two subsequent sections. 
Endogeneity, competition and the market clearing mechanisms 
An important issue that arises from the literature is whether or not first mover opportunities 
are endogenous. The prevailing view from the strategic and marketing literature tends to favour 
treating first mover opportunities arises as an endogenous process (Kerin, Varadarajan & Peterson, 
1992; Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988). These frameworks suggest that first mover opportunities 
arise from the proficiency of the firm and at times basic luck. A related issue is whether the 
resource and competencies of the firm essentially dictates its choice of entry order. E.g. early 
movers are more innovative whereas late movers tend to be heavily marketing oriented (Robinson, 
Fornell & Sullivan, 1992). Hence, one type of firm may be more able to create first mover 
opportunities and willing to take the risks associated with early entry, whereas another type of firm 
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might be less inclined to take risks, but better at penetrating an established market. Consequently, 
the relative resource configuration of the firm and its competitors may force it into adopting a 
specific order of entry behaviour. 
In a real asset option terminology, the option to enter a given market as the first mover, if 
held exclusively by a single firm, is consequently a proprietary right (Miller & Folta, 2002). The 
option might be proprietary as a result of a legally generated right e.g. a patent right or a license, it 
could also be a right generated by superior skill, market knowledge or even luck (Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 1988). In effect the proprietary right can be viewed as a window of opportunity in 
which a single firm is the only possible candidate to enter a given market. The order of entry is 
effectively fixed in the sense that the right holder would always get to move first and at a time that 
would be at its own discretion; at least within the window of opportunity. The holder of this 
proprietary option is in effect granted the rights to the first mover advantages and the associated 
profits which could effectively be viewed as a Ricardian rent. 
However, the value of the proprietary option is dependent naturally on whether or not the 
first mover advantages outweigh the follower advantages. But it also depends on the ability of the 
right holder to actually choose whether to move first or to follow. Hence; 
• If the proprietary right holder has a choice between entering first or not, the right holder 
would move first only if the sum of the first mover advantages ∑ (X1 + X2 ….Xn) outweigh 
the sum of follower advantages ∑ (Y1 + Y2 ….Yn) otherwise it would choose to wait. In this 
case this proprietary right would be uniformly good. 
• However, if the proprietary right holder does not have a choice between entering first or not, 
i.e. his resource configuration dictates that he must move first, the right would only be 
positive as long as ∑ (X1 + X2 ….Xn) ≥ ∑ (Y1 + Y2 ….Yn) otherwise he would be worse off 
than the follower since he is forced to move first (or stay out) regardless. 
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Thus, even without adding an element of competitive pressure the endogenously generated 
right to move first isn’t necessarily uniformly good. 
Competition is likely to erode some of the advantage of moving first for instance; 
• By compelling firms that lack firm specific advantages to speed to market (Rivoli & Salorio, 
1996) 
• Or by compelling firms to adopt order of entry strategies that are inconsistent with their type 
(Narashiram & Zhang, 2001) 
Consequently, even if first mover advantages, on average, outweigh follower advantages it 
is by no means assured that first movers can appropriate the rent associated with these advantages. 
The way firms compete for these advantages will crucially affect the first mover’s ability to 
appropriate rent. 
Measurement problems 
Some of the key empirical issues with the general first mover performance advantage are 
largely related to the measurement. There are three main sources of contamination that may 
frustrate attempts to measure the relationship between entry timing and performance; survival 
biases, resource biases and strategic biases. 
• Survival bias. This is mostly tied closely to the primary follower advantages; the 
information advantage. First movers make the entry decision at a time where uncertainties 
have yet to be resolved and as a consequence they may be more liable to exit the market 
should the conditions prove unfavourable. Followers on the other hand can wait for the 
uncertainties to be resolved and again should the market conditions prove unfavourable they 
can exercise the option not to enter. Failed firms will typically be difficult to integrate 
effectively in a sample. The consequence of the survival bias problem is that the advantage 
of moving first may be systematically overestimated. 
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• Resource bias. Entry timing may be linked directly to the overall quality of the entrant’s 
resources either positively or negatively (Figure 1.1). Lieberman & Montgomery (1988) 
suggest that what determines who gets to the market first may primarily be driven by which 
firm has the stronger resources, proficiency or even who is luckier. On the other hand, 
Narashiram and Zhang (2001) suggest that comparatively resource weak firms may be 
forced to move first to attain first mover advantages that can offset their comparative 
resource disadvantage. As a consequence, first mover advantages could be either 
systematically over or underestimated. Although the analysis by Robinson, Fornell and 
Sullivan (1992) didn’t find a general resource advantage to either first movers or followers, 
but rather suggest the possibility that first movers and followers have inherently different 
strengths and weaknesses. 
• Strategic and sample timing bias. The most typical performance measure applied to first 
mover studies is market share followed by other financial profit measures (VanderWerf & 
Mahorn, 1997). While past literature (Capon, Farley & Hoenig, 1990) has provided evidence 
of their mutual association, the link is not without problem. A key issue is that firms may 
Figure 1.1 Resources, entry timing and performance 
Entry timing 
Resources  Performance 
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pursue marketing strategies that systematically erodes one in favour of the other. First 
movers may systematically pursue a strategy that favours strengthening their local market 
position at the expense of short term profitability. A consequence of this type of strategic 
behaviour would be over or underestimation of first mover advantages depending on 
whether the performance measure used is market share or financial performance. 
Alternatively first mover may engage in profit skimming allowing a slow erosion of market 
share in return for higher short term profits. In general the timing of the sampling of profit 
data has a known effect on the results, in a survey of empirical studies Robinson, 
Kalyanaram and Urban (1994) found that early movers typically experience lower operating 
profits in the early years of operation compared to followers. Similarly, Luo (1998) found 
that early entrants experienced lower ROI but higher sales growth compared to followers 
when investing in China. 
The general performance advantage question is largely an empirical one, which means the 
key source of advancement is through overcoming some of the limitations of past studies. Even if it 
would appear to be a fairly straightforward question, whether or not first movers outperform 
followers, is in fact quite complicated to get right. 
Central and Eastern Europe, geographic considerations 
The choice to use the CEE setting for this study is directly linked to the key research interest 
in this dissertation. From a transition/emerging market perspective the area generally offered the 
same kind of opportunities as other transition/emerging economies; growth potential and limited 
existing competition. And on the other hand the challenges are similar to those of other 
transition/emerging economies; corruption, weak institutions, poor infrastructure etc. hence, in 
general these countries are largely similar to other transition/emerging economies. However, the 
area also offers some very interesting unique features.  
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• Proximity, CEE is geographically and culturally close to Western Europe, which encourages 
entry particularly from these countries and consequently ensures a large pool of potential 
entrants. 
• Clear cut off date, the opening for FDI came after the system change before which there was 
virtually no FDI from Western countries. It is thus considerably easier to establish accurate 
order of entry information. 
• Broad sample, the opening for FDI in CEE was a comprehensive one affecting a very broad 
range of production and service industries. The area thus, offers an excellent opportunity to 
establish a broadly representative sample of industries within a specific time period. Sample 
representativeness is a very important issue in the study of timing and performance, since 
the sources and strength of first mover advantages/disadvantages may vary considerably 
from industry to industry.  
• Level playing field, the local industries were largely run down after decades of 
mismanagement. Consequently, foreign investors were not faced with effective entry 
barriers erected by local competitors and the order of foreign entry consequently takes on a 
more absolute form. 
Hence, the Central and Eastern European setting for this study offers some powerful 
advantages both in terms of the business environment and the sampling possibilities. In my view it 
offers a unique opportunity to study the relationship between entry timing and performance in a 
competitive setting. Moreover, because of the comprehensiveness of the system change the area 
probably offers the best possibility ever to study the timing issue on such a broad range of 
industries. 
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Conclusion/research agenda 
Whereas the drivers for first mover rights may appear reasonable enough for market entry 
into a new product market it is less obvious that the same would prevail for entry into foreign 
markets. While first movers in emerging markets may have a technological leadership as noted by 
Nakatar and Sivakumar (1997), this is chiefly against local rivals, not against other foreign 
contenders. Usually, firms entering new foreign markets will seek to extend their existing 
technologies to these markets, rather than develop new technology for the purpose. Hence, rival 
firms are likely to have similar levels of technology available and they are also likely to face the 
same restriction on growth in their domestic markets. The likelihood that an entry option is shared, 
that is more than one firm has the capability and the interest to enter a given market, is therefore 
potentially much greater for foreign market entry. 
Therefore, my main research question is the following: 
 
Do first movers generate superior returns from competitive entry into new geographical markets 
relative to followers? 
 
I pursue two approaches to answer the question. In chapter two I use a general empirical 
study bases on a survey of foreign subsidiaries in Hungary, Poland and Lithuania. In this study I 
attempt to account for some of the core measurement issues through the use of multiple 
performance measures and timing constructs. 
I seek to account for resource and firm strategy biases through the use of “self correcting” 
performance measures. Rather than using financial performance measures I use two performance 
constructs based on Likert scale variables. One of these measures the subsidiaries performance 
relative to that of its competitors and the other measures it relative to the expectations of the firm. 
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Using these subjective measures has the advantage that the respondent can take the specific strategy 
of the firm into account (Lou & Peng, 1998). Moreover, measuring performance both relative to 
competitors and own expectations, effectively allow us to account for differences in resource levels. 
Furthermore, the study separates the order of entry effect from the length of time the firms have 
been in the market. The primary conclusion of the study is that order of entry positively affects 
market share, but not the overall performance of the subsidiary. As opposed to order of entry, 
support is found that firms are generally rewarded for early entry into these markets. This effect is 
particularly strong for partial acquisitions suggesting that partial acquisitions may be a mode choice 
that is primarily suitable for acquiring resources in the early stage of the market development. 
The second paper in chapter three is based on a study of entry by foreign brewers into 
Central and Eastern Europe. The empirical data used in this paper was primarily gathered through 
the databases Amadeus and Zephyr. The paper has two central aims: One is to address how multiple 
market opportunities can act as a market clearing mechanism, effectively allowing first movers to 
outperform rivals even in a highly competitive oligopolistic business environment. The other aim of 
the paper is to address the survival bias issue. 
The core conclusion of the paper is that the availability of multiple market opportunities 
creates an environment where firms compete for markets rather than in markets. Competition in the 
individual markets is consequently blunted allowing first movers to retain strong performance 
advantages over followers.  
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ENTRY MODE CHOICES IN FOREIGN MARKETS: ENTRY THROUGH 
THE PARTIAL ACQUISITION OF A LOCAL FIRM 
 
The second part of this dissertation is devoted to the study of entry mode choices in foreign 
markets, with a particular focus on the use of partial acquisitions. My focus on partial acquisitions is 
based on several factors. The first is that the area is exceedingly under researched in comparison to 
the main modes; full acquisitions, joint ventures and greenfields. The second reason is that past 
literature has suggested a positive association between riskier foreign markets and the use of partial 
acquisitions (Duarte & Garcia-Canal, 2004; Barkema & Vermuelen, 1998), suggesting that 
emerging/transition market factors could promote the use of PAs. Finally, part of the motivation to 
study partial acquisitions comes from my study of first mover advantages. For instance, partial or 
staged acquisitions are quite commonly used in the brewing industry to enter new markets (Meyer 
& Tran, 2006). Moreover, in the study of comparative performance measures in chapter (2) I also 
found a strong interaction effects between the use of partial acquisitions, entry timing and 
performance. In fact, by using only the sub-sample of partial acquisitions (table 1.1) from the data 
set, we can see that the age and performance of partial acquisitions are very strongly related. Hence, 
the use of partial acquisitions does appear to be a mean to achieve early mover advantages. 
In the following sections I will discuss the position of partial acquisitions in the literature, 
what the main theoretical issues are and how this dissertation propose to contribute to this field. 
Partial acquisitions 
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The study of partial acquisitions isn’t a uniform field; there are a few finance oriented 
papers (Roy, 1988; Roy, 1985) which view a partial acquisition as a mean to internalise 
resources/synergies without carrying the full capital burden of fully acquiring a firm. The subject 
has also received some attention from a corporate governance perspective (Akhigbe, Martin & 
Whyte, 2007; Akhigbe, Madura & Spencer, 2004). 
Though, in terms of the strategy and international entry mode literature, the treatment of 
partial acquisitions has been quite lacking and partially contradicting. For instance in the Meta 
analysis by Brouthers and Hennart (2007) partial acquisitions are effectively rejected as an 
independent type of entry mode; by virtue of how the input holders are remunerated Brouthers and 
Hennart (2007) argue that they are in effect similar to joint ventures. In contrast Duarte and Garcia-
Canal (2004) concludes that the Partial Acquisitions are essentially similar to full acquisitions. 
A select few studies have empirically studied the use of partial acquisitions in foreign entry. 
Among these, Duarte and Garcia-Canal (2004); Barkema and Vermuelen (1998) find some support 
that this type of entry mode may be preferred in riskier markets. Duarte and Garcia-Canal (2004) 
argues that the use of partial acquisitions in this capacity may be a mean to reduce capital 
commitments and accordingly the risk of entry. Chen and Hennart (2004) offer an alternative 
explanation based on a hostage theory. Their argument relies heavily on asymmetric information 
between the acquiring firm and the seller of the partially acquired firm, resulting in an initial 
Table 1.1 Age and performance of partial acquisitions 
 Performance Satisfaction F test 
0,192 Affiliate age 20,150*** (0,043) 
N 54  
*** p<0,01. ** p<0,05. * p<0,1. 
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valuation problem. 
Hence, there is a somewhat limited supply of theories trying to explain the use of partial 
acquisitions. Moreover, it is not altogether clear that the arguments advanced are particularly 
compelling. For one, the observed positive relationship between emerging markets/riskier markets 
could possibly be grounded in other arguments than a preference for risk sharing. It is true that the 
foreign investor would limit the capital commitment through a partial acquisition, rather than a full 
acquisition. However, it is in no way clear that a local partner would be more capable of carrying 
the risk than the foreign investor. 
Moreover, high uncertainty environments increase the likelihood and the frequency of 
partner realignments leading to increased transaction costs (Williamson, 1975); suggesting that 
there would be a trade off between capital commitment and governance costs. 
A similar problem could arise from applying a real option lens to the partial ownership 
context. Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994) correctly assess that multi-nationality could give rise to 
flexibility advantages in cross-border production. However, their assessment that the same logic 
might similarly apply to acquisition decisions is in my view less straight forward. In their model the 
option contract is effectively signed against “nature”. A critically important difference between the 
context specified by Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994) and the partial acquisition context is that the buy-
out option is signed against a “third person”. Hence, it takes on the properties of a contractual or 
financial option. An immediate implication thereof is that it implies the payment of an option 
premium adequately reflecting the “if things go well we buy - if not you keep” nature of the 
contract. Hence, in order for the option lens to work in the given context we would essentially have 
to assume that either: 
1. A systematic market failure exists that allows the foreign acquirer to obtain buy out 
options at prices below their real value 
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2. The local partner is better able to carry the risk than a “diversified” multinational 
enterprise 
Evidence tends to suggest that, perhaps for this very reason, explicit buy-out options are 
virtually non-existent (Reuer & Tong, 2005). 
It is possible that a partial acquisition could be considered an implicit buy-out option; this 
would go well with our argument that partial acquisitions might be a means to postpone “tricky” 
negotiations to a future point. However, I would be wary of claiming a true real option connection 
in such a watered down form.  
 
Incentives or influence 
I feel that one of the core issues in terms of how we explain the purpose of partial 
acquisitions is the role that ownership plays. To Brouthers and Hennart (2007) the defining 
characteristic of shared ownership is that all partners share in the return on the assets. In their view 
the problem is how to create incentives that will encourage the partners to act in the best interest of 
the business unit; and this is solved through aligning the interest of the partners by creating a mutual 
interest in the success of the business unit. The control rights bestowed through ownership is thus a 
secondary characteristic insofar as it effectively only serves a mechanism to solve disputes when the 
partners disagree on how to advance the success of the business venture. 
The focus of the remuneration perspective is clearly on the efficiency of the business unit. 
This view provides a reasonable explanation for the use of shared ownership structures as long as 
e.g. opportunistic free riding by the parties to the contract is the primary problem.  
However, it fails to adequately explain the use of partial ownership structures, when the 
business unit actually has the ability to adversely affect one or more of the input holders vertically 
related assets. 
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Figure 1.2 Vertical disentanglement with monopsony 
power
MC 
Let me use a simple example to illustrate this problem. Consider a case of a foreign investor 
acquiring a local firm from its employee owners. Suppose further, this firm is the only provider of a 
product which requires specially trained workers to produce. By acquiring the local firm from its 
employees the foreign investor may effectively gain monopsony power over the employees’ main 
source of revenue, their labour. The profit maximizing equilibrium for the firm is at [W, L] leading 
to an effective revenue loss for the employees represented by the red square in figure 1.2. 
Moreover, a general deadweight loss is created equal to the triangle [a, b, c] resulting in an overall 
loss of revenues to the group [employees and owners] as a whole, compared to the jointly optimal 
equilibrium at [W’, L’]. 
Therefore, while the equilibrium [W, L] is Pareto optimal it is not jointly optimal. Moreover, 
how the residual claims are distributed would not affect the equilibrium choice. In other words, how 
the residual claims are distributed does nothing to promote jointly optimal solutions! 
What is missing from this picture is the notion of cooperative adaptation (Williamson, 
1975). Ownership is not just about aligning the interests of the parties, but also a mean to influence 
S
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the operational decisions towards mutually desirable outcomes and avoid or reduce the effect of 
harmful unilateral adaptations.  
Conclusion/research agenda 
Though, the literature on partial acquisitions is limited we do observe some general 
tendencies. Firstly, the mode choice tends to be viewed exclusively from the perspective of the 
acquirer. Hence, in Duarte and Garcia-Canal (2004) the local owner is required to hold some of the 
risk and in Chen and Hennart (2004) the local owner is required to provide a hostage to support the 
exchange. The second tendency is to view shared ownership decision from an incentives 
perspective alone (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007; Chen & Hennart, 2004).  
What is missing is clearly to see partial acquisitions from a broader perspective, including 
the local owners and the role of control rights. Hence, the perspective that I adopt is to view the 
decision to partially acquire or divest a firm as the mutually agreed outcome of negotiations 
between the parties. 
The main research question I seek to address is the following: 
 
What is the role of partial acquisitions in transition economies and what are the factors that 
encourage the use of partial acquisitions? 
 
In chapter four I provide a thorough discussion on the nature of partial acquisitions and how 
this mode choice distinguish it self from the traditional modes. Using two sets of data on foreign 
subsidiaries in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe and Asia, I also provide 
some general empirical evidence on key aspects including; how frequently used partial acquisitions 
are, the size of partial acquisitions, the efficiency of resource transfers between the parent and the 
subsidiary and job creation/destruction tendencies. This chapter also provide an overview of the 
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advantages and disadvantages associated with the use of partial acquisitions seen both from the 
perspective of both acquirer and sellers. 
In chapter five I examine the determinants of mode choice using a Multi nominal logistic 
regression based on a sample of foreign subsidiaries in Central and Eastern Europe. In the chapter a 
broader stakeholder perspective on partial acquisitions is advanced. I suggest that the larger the firm 
the greater the likelihood that outside stakeholders will interfere in the negotiation process with the 
aim to secure special concessions. Consequently, to avoid costly and prolonged ex ante 
negotiations, foreign investors may chose to enter by acquiring a partial stake. In the chapter I also 
advance a reverse asymmetric information argument suggesting that acquirer’s would often 
understand the value of the target better than its current owners. Support is provided for both 
hypotheses. 
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2. First Mover Advantages in Central and Eastern Europe: A 
Comparative Analysis of Performance Measures 
 
 
ABSTRACT. Businesses entering early into new markets are believed to attain crucial competitive 
advantages over later entrants. However, this contention receives only mixed support in the 
empirical literature, in part because performance is measured in different ways. We reexamine the 
performance difference between early movers and followers entering new geographical markets 
based on a sample of foreign entrants in Poland, Hungary and Lithuania. We contrast market share 
with two other measures of firm performance that are based on the managers’ perception of their 
own performance relative to own prior expectations and relative to industry standards. We find that 
market share is strongly related to order of entry, but we did not find a positive relationship between 
order of entry and perceived performance. We found general support for early mover advantages in 
Hungary and Poland but a strongly negative relationship for Lithuania suggesting that early entry is 
a trade off between risk and return. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The fairly extensive literature demonstrating the existence of first mover advantages (FMA) 
(Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988; Gal-Or, 1985) has in recent years been rivaled by a considerable 
literature on follower or late mover advantages (Narasimham & Zhang, 2000; Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 1998; Rivoli & Salorio, 1996). Crucial trade-offs have been shown with respect to the 
costs of waiting or the benefit of accepting more uncertainty by entering early. However, it is as yet 
unclear whether there is a general advantage to moving first (VanderWerf & Mahon, 1997). In a 
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Meta analysis of 90 empirical studies2 VanderWerf and Mahon (1997) studied the likelihood of 
finding first mover advantage. After correcting for the use of market share as a performance 
measure, a possible self-selection bias and survival bias, they did not find support for a general 
FMA. 
A unique opportunity to investigate FMA has arisen in the transition economies in Eastern 
Europe and Asia. Over the past two decades they have opened up and embraced foreign direct 
investment (FDI) as a mean to rebuild their economies (Marinova, Marinov & Yaprak, 2004). This 
has created new opportunities for multinational enterprises (MNEs) to sell their products in new 
markets and streamline their global production systems. 
Thus, the societal quasi-experiment unfolding in transition economies provides an 
opportunity to investigate change processes in business strategies (Meyer & Peng, 2005). In 
particular, a fairly large number of firms were simultaneously considering the timing of an entry, 
which provides a large set of firms on which to investigate a phenomenon that often only can be 
investigated on specific industries with small numbers of players. 
Our empirical analysis is based on a sample of foreign investors in Poland, Hungary and 
Lithuania. FMA research has primarily been conducted either on product markets in America 
(Lieberman & Montgomery, 1998) or for transition economies primarily on China. China is still 
geographically and culturally very distant for Western firms which may suggest a selection bias, 
furthermore most entry timing research has been conducted on Japanese firms (Delios & Makino, 
2003) which may have different entry strategies than western firms (Chang, 1995). We believe the 
use of a Central and Eastern European (CEE) sample complements the timing literature by testing 
the first mover advantage in a different economic, institutional and developmental setting. Unlike 
China, where the process of opening up for FDI has been slow and incremental, the process 
                                                 
2 From 22 different articles 
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proceeded very rapidly in CEE. The rapid opening to FDI and the close proximity to Western 
markets ensured a large number of potential entrants. Freedom in the choice of entry mode was also 
available from relatively early on. Consequently, we can proceed under the assumption that the 
entry decision has largely been strategic and competitive. It is therefore our view that the sample 
offers the best opportunity to date to study competitive entry timing decisions.    
This paper contributes to the literature on timing and performance in four ways. First, we 
employ two unique measures for perceived performance and find that the choice of performance 
measure crucially influences, if first mover advantages are identified empirically. Secondly, our 
paper contributes to the growing body of literature on entry timing and performance in emerging 
and transition economies (Sui & Lui, 2005; Delios & Makino, 2003; Isobe, Makino & 
Montgomery, 2000; Pan, Li & Tse, 1999; Luo & Peng, 1998; Rivoli & Salorio, 1996). Thirdly, 
based on two unique performance measures, we identify the influence of endogenous firm specific 
advantages. Finally, we broaden the scope of the timing literature by studying the performance 
implications of early mover advantages in new markets. 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
A core argument in first mover literature is that first movers are able to preempt late movers 
by taking control of scarce assets (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988 & 1998). Typical examples of 
local resources that can offer an advantage to first movers are the acquisition of a local distribution 
network, local brands and natural resources. In some industries the acquisition of production 
facilities can also be a source of FMA, Rockwool - a Danish producer of isolation material - 
primarily enter new foreign markets through acquisitions, because of the high costs of establishing 
new production facilities.  
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In the late 70’s and early 80’s many studies adopted a game theoretical approach to the role 
of entry timing and performance. Entry deterrence played a preeminent role in the first mover 
advantage literature. There is a long held belief dating back to Stackelberg (1934) that the first 
mover can capture the lion share of a market through his output decision provided that the decision 
is irreversible. This is generally the case if output is directly linked to investments in capacity and if 
these investments are sunk (Judd, 1985). Fudenberg and Tirole (1983); Spence (1979) suggest that 
through their investment decision first movers can prevent followers from growing.  Investments in 
capacity may even be so large that they effectively make any subsequent entry unprofitable (Eaton 
& Ware, 1987; Gilbert & Harris, 1981; Dixit, 1980; Spence, 1977).  However, there is little 
empirical evidence that first movers have actually been successful at preempting entry by rivals 
(Glazer, 1985; Johnson & Parkman, 1983). Later studies have increasingly adopted a resource based 
perspective on FMA (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1998). 
Spatial preemption in geographic or product space has also been suggested as a source of 
FMA (Schmalensee, 1978). Robinson and Fornell (1985) found that pioneers typically have broader 
product range than followers. 
Other sources of first mover advantages have been suggested, for instance, in the marketing 
literature. Schmalensee (1982) suggests that the rational consumer, having ascertained the merits of 
the first mover’s product, will be hesitant to switch to a different and as yet untried brand. One 
study even found FMA derived from the consumers desire to link the pioneering brand image to 
their individual self-image (Alpert & Kamins, 1995). Brand names may even become synonymous 
with a specific type of product, for instance in Bulgaria instant coffee is referred to as Nescafé. 
Moreover, consumers may experience switching cost between products from different suppliers 
(Lieberman & Montgomery, 1998). This will typically be the case when the customers must spend 
resources to learn how to use a product. There may even be network effects that prevent customers 
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from switching to another supplier (Katz & Shapiro, 1994). An example of this is the compatibility 
problems between Microsoft Word and competing products, which has largely insulated Microsoft 
from competition. 
Recently the relationship between timing and performance in international market entries 
has received increasing attention. A number of articles have focused specifically on the relationship 
between FMA and environmental conditions specific to emerging and transition economies. Doh 
(2000) suggests that strong FMA could be derived from participating in the privatization process. 
Nakata and Sivakumar (1997) compiled a list of factors that could potentially moderate the role of 
FMA in emerging markets both positively and negatively. In recent years many studies have been 
conducted using Chinese data. Isobe, Makino and Montgomery (2000) found a positive link 
between early entry, technology leadership and performance in China.  A study by Li, Lam, 
Karakowsky and Qian (2003) showed no significant FMA for international entry into China in the 
telecommunication equipments industry. In fact they found considerable first mover disadvantages 
for overseas Chinese investing in China. Delios and Makino (2003) found that early entrants in 
China had larger sales but also a smaller survival rate. Luo (1998) found that early entrants tend to 
have higher sales, but later entrants have lower risk and greater accounting profit from the first 
years. 
Hypothesis 1a: The order of firms’ entry into new markets is positively associated with market 
share. 
 
Concerns have been raised both in theoretical and empirical studies about firms’ ability to 
exploit FMA. First, some critics assert that if FMA exist, then competition to enter first would erode 
all associated profits from early entry (Mills, 1988; Glazer, 1985; Gilbert & Harris, 1984). In a two 
stage, two player model Hirokawa and Sasaki (2001) find that a Stackelberg (1934) outcome is 
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Figure 2.1 Entry timing and payoff in a two player game 
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possible even with two initially homogeneous players if one player commit to a sticky output and in 
return takes on a prediction risk. Empirically in their meta analysis VanderWerf and Mahon (1997) 
found no support that early movers enjoy better performance, other than higher market share, over 
later entrants. In a recent study Boulding and Christen (2003) found support for a lasting market 
share advantage to the first mover, but also a long term cost disadvantage. 
Based on three assumptions, that rivals are alert, homogenous and that uncertainty is 
resolved gradually over time, we propose a simple relationship between FMA, general business risk 
and performance in emerging/transition economies. The general business risk in CEE was 
characterized by high degree of macro economic and demand uncertainty in the first years. These 
uncertainties have then gradually been resolved over time so it is reasonable to infer that the risk 
function would be hyperbolic in nature 
)(ts
ar = . The discount factor for NPV would be brI +=  
where b is the risk free rate. Emerging markets are generally associated with high growth potential 
which makes it reasonable to assume that the total market dividends D increases at, for simplicity, a 
steady rate of G. Further, we can include a basic assumption that the first mover gains an advantage 
over the second mover which we model as X, the share of the total attributable to the first mover 
through the order of entry effect. We get that the PV of entry at any given time for the second 
mover would be: 
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The model has some simple reasonable predictions, that the higher the initial risk (a) the 
later the second mover would choose to enter. Similarly, the faster the rate of uncertainty resolution 
s(t), the sooner would the second mover enter. In a two-player game the second mover does not face 
further competition on entry; consequently he will choose the (t) that maximizes PV independently 
of the first mover’s entry decision! However, for the first mover the equilibrium entry time t will be 
associated with a PV equal to the expected present value for the second mover. Figure 2.1 
graphically illustrates that at any t greater than Tf but lower than Tl the present value for the first 
mover is higher than the present value of the optimal for the second mover in Tl. This will 
automatically induce one of the entrants to enter at Tf. Consequently, with alert rivals we get the 
proposition that the first mover gain a larger share of the revenues (market share), but have to enter 
earlier and take on more risk in return. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: The order of firms’ entry into new markets is not associated with better perceived 
performance. 
 
A common property for all first mover advantages is that they contain an element of 
exclusivity, the action of the first player dictate or constrain the followers’ strategic opportunities. 
We adapt a rather stringent definition of FMA. In essence a first mover advantage is either acquired 
or created at the moment of the investment. However, this may not always be the case. Some 
advantages associated with early entry are unrelated to order of entry but instead are related to how 
long the firm has been in the market. Firms may experience learning effects that build up over time. 
Many emerging and transition economies offered various forms of concessions on among other 
taxes to induce early entry. Political goodwill, association with the local business community, 
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financial institutions etc are not linked to order of entry, but to how long the firm has been in the 
local market. The same may hold true for some location advantages and the availability of skilled 
local workforce. The order of entry within a given industry is unable to affect the market for either, 
but the accumulated entry over time of a larger body of foreign firms will affect the relative scarcity 
of these resources. We shall refer to this type of advantages as early mover advantages rather than 
first mover advantages. These factors may be particularly important in emerging and transition 
economies where markets tend to be inefficient and personal relationships more important. 
 
Hypothesis 1c: The age of the affiliate is positively associated with performance. 
 
An endogeneity issue has also been raised. Our assumption is that the independent variable 
‘entry timing’ explains the dependent variable ‘performance’. But it is quite possible that the 
causality go both ways. Lieberman and Montgomery (1988-98) suggest that first movers may be 
first because they are inherently stronger. Consequently performance differentials between first 
movers and late mover may be attributed to skill rather than entry timing. Narasimham and Zhang 
(2000) on the other hand suggest that first movers are weaker firms that attempt to avoid late mover 
disadvantages. Rivoli and Salorio (1996) suggest that firm with strong ownership advantages will 
seek to defer entry when uncertainty is high. Delios and Makino (2003) suggest that the fungibility 
of entrants’ resources determine whether they will enter early or late. Boulding and Christen (2003) 
found strong support that order of entry should be treated as endogeneous. 
Market size. In a case study of the Wal-Mart chain, Ghemawat (1986) showed that Wal-Mart 
deliberately targeted smaller southern towns that Wal-Mart’s competitors found uninteresting. Wal-
Mart would then enter with such a scale and product scope that effectively insulated Wal-Mart from 
competition. It is thus possible that first movers may derive superior performance not from gaining 
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an early foothold in large and profitable geographical or product markets, but rather from secondary 
markets where preemption through scale is more likely (Ghemawat, 1986; Robinson & Fornell, 
1985). Small markets will be associated with larger MES; consequently, a first mover is more likely 
to preempt entry in a small market. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The effect of first mover advantages will be stronger in small markets than in large 
markets. 
 
Interaction effects. In recent years authors have adapted a contingent approach that includes 
interactions between entry timing and moderating variables (Cui & Lui, 2005). The choice of entry 
mode may be motivated by different preferences for risk, the industry structure or even government 
regulations. Previous literature has primarily focused on the difference between non-equity entry 
modes/equity based entry modes and timing/performance (Li, Lam, Karakowsky & Qian, 2003; 
Pan, Li & Tse, 1999; Luo, 1998). We examine the performance implications of different equity 
based entry modes. A partial acquisition may be a mean to acquire an option on important strategic 
assets early, while maintaining limited financial commitment. The choice of entry by a greenfield 
operation may result from the lack of sufficient quality takeover targets. This could mean that early 
mover advantages are more limited for firms or industries where greenfield operations are the 
predominant entry mode. 
VanderWerf and Mahon (1997) suggested that research on FMA might suffer from a 
selection bias; ergo we cannot necessarily expect early mover advantages to be consistent across 
industries. Further, a part of the theoretical argument for FMA relies on preemption, which again is 
dependent on entry and exit barriers in the market. Since entry and exit barriers tend to differ from 
industry to industry it is therefore also likely that the advantage to early movers will differ. Finally, 
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firms from different countries are likely to have different entry strategies (Chang, 1995), cultural 
influence (Li, Lam, Karakowsky & Qian, 2003) or even political good will (Chen & Pereira, 1999). 
Each of these factors may affect the firm’s ability to capitalize on early mover advantages. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The effect of timing varies across firms depending on the choice of entry mode, the 
industry and home country of the entrant. 
 
THE SURVEY AND METHODOLOGY 
The testing of early mover advantages requires a context in which new markets with distinct 
sub-market emerged roughly simultaneously, such that a fairly large number of firms would 
(potentially) enter this market – thus enabling the creation of a large dataset of early and late 
movers. Our analysis is based on such data, collected with a questionnaire survey of foreign owned 
firms in three CEE countries, Poland, Hungary and Lithuania.  
The survey was conducted as a joint project in cooperation with a team of researchers in 
each of the three countries. The survey was administered by the local research teams in 2003. 
Where appropriate the survey was translated into local languages. The base population was derived 
from multiple local databases and surveys were then sent to the chief executive of firms where 
contact information was available. In most cases, this was followed up by phone contact and 
personal interviews to achieve a desired rate of response. Relative to the base population of all 
foreign investors identified through the local databases, the response rate was approximately 10 
percent for Poland, 11% for Hungary and 22% for Lithuania.  
The firms included were primarily established during the period 1990-2000 and had at least 
10 employees and a foreign ownership participation of no less than 10%. This criterion was selected 
to eliminate administrative or representation offices and ensure that only fully operating firms are in 
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the sample. The majority, 62 percent of the firms had reported that they had less than 100 
employees in 2001, 31 percent reported between 100 and 1000 and the remaining 7 percent reported 
that they had more than 1000 employees. Our sample thus represents both smaller and larger firms. 
Previous studies utilizing the PIMS database have primarily captured larger firms(Szymanski, Troy 
& Bharadwaj, 1995). 
We had 528 firms respond to the questionnaire. Of these 170 reported that their main 
activity is manufacturing, 49 financial services, 129 trade and distribution, 160 other services, 1 
mining & extraction and 13 utilities. Segmented on host country, the sample includes 224 firms 
from Hungary, 200 firms from Poland and 104 firms from Lithuania. Of the firms in the sample 141 
reported that the home country of the primary foreign investor was Germany, 80 from the Nordic 
countries, 60 from North America, 25 came from Central and Eastern European countries, 176 from 
other Western European countries, 22 from Asia and other countries, and 24 did not report the home 
country of the primary foreign investor.  
The survey is cross-sectional and by nature contains only data on firms that were operating 
at the time of the survey. It is, therefore, not possible to control for survival bias, however in their 
Meta analysis VanderWerf and Mahon (1997) did not find that controlling for survival bias would 
change the likelihood of finding FMA. Others, however, retain the expectation that survival plays 
an important role for entry timing, Lieberman and Montgomery (1998) and Delios and Makino 
(2003) did find that being first increased the likelihood of exit. Consequently survival bias remains 
a limitation on our findings. With multiple countries in the sample, albeit geographically and 
culturally fairly close, we can test for or rule out any country specific relationship between entry 
timing and performance, thus allowing for a larger degree of generalization than most studies in the 
field. 
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Table 2.1 Average market share distributed on host country 
Country Average market share 
Hungary 31,01 
Poland 24,81 
Lithuania 55,90 
All Countries 31,50 
Dependent variables 
Marketshare. As our dependent variable we will use the market share for 2001 for our first model. 
The market share measure is a percent measure where the range of observations is between 
0<Y≤100. The market share is reported by the respondents3 which mean we do see a tendency 
towards approximations e.g. 50% so there is some loss of accuracy. 
However, for cross-sectional data with many industries/products it is most practical to rely 
on respondent supplied information. The average market shares (table 2.1) are considerably larger 
than what Pan, Li and Tse (1999) and other China based studies report, which would be largely due 
to their decision to use the aggregated market share for all of China rather than the market share for 
the regions that the firms actually operate in. 
Industry performance. The industry performance measure is a unique construct based on five 
different performance indicators of how the firm compares to its rivals. The scale for each of the 
performance indicators is a 5-point scale, where one indicates that the firm is among the weakest 
20% in the industry and five that it is among the strongest. We use the average of the five items 
(table 2.2) as our dependent variable. The construct has a Cronbach’s Alfa of 0.9, suggesting the 
aggregation is reasonable. The advantage of the construct is that it will automatically weed out the 
                                                 
3 The question asked was “Market share of the foreign investment in its main domestic market, in percent” 
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Table 2.2 Variables included in Industry performance 
Variable N Mean 
After tax return on total assets 420 3,41 
After tax return on total sales 421 3,41 
Firm total sales growth 428 3,62 
Productivity 410 3,76 
Overall performance 426 3,70 
part of performance that is attributable to differences across industries. We are then able to measure 
whether timing is related to perceived successful firms without the need for an excessive number of 
industry dummies. A potential problem is that there may not be at least five firms in the industry 
and therefore the respondents have some discretion in the choice of category. Another possible 
problem is that there may be a tendency to overrate own performance relative to rivals4; however, if 
this occurs consistently then it should only affect the level not the direction of a relationship. 
Performance satisfaction. The last performance measure we will employ is a measure of the firms 
satisfaction with their performance compared to their original objectives. The variable is 
constructed from the average of three 7-point Likert scale items (table 2.3), satisfaction with 
respectively productivity, profitability and revenue growth. A Cronbach’s Alfa of 0.83 suggests that 
it is reasonable to aggregate the three items. Like the industry performance measure this measure is 
also comparable across industries and it has the added advantage that it should control for the 
relative inherent strength of the entrants. Stronger firms will have higher expectations and firms that 
are inherently weaker will adjust their expectations accordingly. Ideally this measure captures what 
is important to managers, the fulfillment of objectives.  
                                                 
4 The average is higher than the expected 3, which might suggest systematic overestimation. It is quite 
possible that the exclusion of locally owned firms can account for the upward bias (Sinani, 2004) 
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Table 2.3 Variables included in Performance satisfaction 
Variable N Mean 
Productivity 479 5,15 
Profitability 497 4,87 
Revenue growth 493 5,11 
Independent variables 
Timing. We use an order of entry construct to determine whether first movers have an advantage 
ble measure to capture the exclusive opportunities that the first movers 
ubtracting it from 2004 so we get the affiliates age. As a result a positive sign 
imply t
all markets. Our expectations are that early movers 
over followers. It is a sensi
possess. By his choice the first mover denies a choice to the follower regardless of how soon or late 
the follower moves. The surveyed firms were asked to state how many competitors were present in 
the market at the time of entry. The measure is a 5 point-scale where one is no competitors (first 
movers) and five is more than 10 competitors (late movers). The measure is cognitive neutral unlike 
PIMS based studies (Gaba, Pan & Ungson, 2002) consequently we find a much smaller ratio of first 
movers. We capture the order of entry effect by including dummies for category one to four leaving 
five as the base.  
To test for early mover advantage we used the year of entry reported by the respondent, 
converted it by s
he existence of early mover advantages. 
Small market. To test H2 that small markets should be more favorable for early movers, we use a 
country dummy for Lithuanian as a proxy for sm
are more likely to preempt entry by rivals due to the limited market size. To capture this effect we 
include an interaction link between market time and the Lithuanian dummy. 
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Interaction effects. To test our hypothesis on the consistency of first mover advantages across 
groups, we use interaction links between the affiliate’s age and the set of dummies for entry mode, 
Description 
industry and the investor’s home country. 
Table 2.4 Control variables 
Group     Variable name 
Investment Low cost labo
motives 
 
r 
Skilled labor 
 
How important access to the before mentioned was for the 
investment decision. The variables are 5 point Likert scales 
where 1 is not at all and 5 is very important. 
Resources Human resources 
d on a number of 7 point Likert scale 
response variables. Human resources capture efforts expended 
s 
m. 
ry Mode reenfield, Acquisition, Partial acquisition, Joint 
xport intensity 
 Manuf*export 
nvironment cal 
try at the time of entry compared 
mmy for no local 
ic, Other W. 
European, North American, mpany’s home country. 
espondent Employed 
he 
e use three dummies. Whether the respondent is 
 is an 
d by the 
Source of s 
Industry services, Manufacturing, 
 & Extraction, 
 Tech 
Factor outputs, base
on training and upgrading personnel in the host country. Tech i
the availability of technological resources from the parent fir
Ent
 
G
Venture 
Dummies for the entry mode. 
Export in percent of total sales for the first year of operation for 
the manufacturing sector. 
E
Competitive 
E
 
ome country 
Local industry 
Dumnolo
The strength of the local indus
to the respondent. Dumnolocal is a du
competitors 
Dummies for the parent co
H
dummies 
 
Germany, Nord
CEEC, Asia 
R
dummies 
 
CEO, Expatriate, 
with the parent company 
before current assignment. 
To control for a possible bias derived from the status of t
respondent w
the CEO of the subsidiary. Whether the respondent
expatriate and whether the respondent was employe
parent company before his current position. 
A 0-100 % scale for to what extent the 3 most critical resource
for the firm were obtained from a local partner. Critical resources 
Local resources 
Financial Services, Other 
dummies Utilities, Mining
Trade 
Dummies for the industry type. 
 
Controls. In addi ummarized in table 2.4. 
The Model 
We use an OLS regression analysis to estimate the relationship between the dependent 
variable and the independent variables. We then ran regressions for each of the dependent variables 
a number of times to systematically exclude insignificant control variables and get the best model 
tion, we include a number of control variables that are s
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fit. This was necessary to reduce the number of observations lost due to missing values in 
insigni
5 s + β local 
industry + β no local industry + β host country dummies + β industry dummies + β home country dummies + 
β CEO + ε. 
 
Our sample contains both firms that mainly supply the local market, but also a reasonably 
share is an irrelevant performance measure ms we have decided to exclude them from 
the analysis for market share. We have also excluded them from the analysis for industry 
perform
                                                
ficant control variables. We found a best fit for each of the three dependent variables and for 
contrast we ran each of the three models with the three dependent variables. The base model for 
market share, industry performance and performance satisfaction are as follows: 
 
Y = β intercept + β order of entry + β age + β Lithuania*age + β first affiliate + β host market 
knowledge + β market knowledge Eastern Europe + β entry mode dummies + β low cost labor + β skilled 
labor + β tech + β human resources+ β manufacturing*export intensity  + β local resource
large number of firms that focus mainly or even entirely on export markets. Since local market 
for these fir
ance because of uncertainties in terms of which industry they compare themselves to. Pan, 
Li and Tse (1999) corrected for the problem by excluding 22 export oriented industries. We have 
retained all firms which reported that they exported less than 90 percent of their total sales6. For the 
model for performance satisfaction we found that the variance tended to be larger for smaller firms 
and decreasing with firm size. To correct for this we ran the model as a WLS with the natural log of 
the number of employees as the weight. The results are reported in table 2.6. 
Interaction effects. We introduce one set of interaction links into the three basic models at a time. 
We do this so we are able to report the impact on the explanatory power, adjusted R square, of the 
 
5 As export intensity is highest amongst manufacturing firms we include it as an interaction link 
6 At this level we feel the answers should be acceptable, the remaining part of the export bias is eliminated by 
including a control 
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model when controlling for cross group differences. Furthermore this procedure limits a possible 
problem with multi-collinearity where too many variables attempt to explain the same thing, thus 
 with three regressions for each dependent 
ariable for a total of 9 regressions. The results from the interaction links in model I, II and III 
indicate the rom 
the base group. 
Missin
mited sample the results were not materially different from the full sample. The 
2.5. 
creating computational problems. The model design is, 
 
Dependent variable(Y1,Y2,Y3) = β intercept + base model(x1,x2,x3) + β dum(1)*age + β 
dum(2)*age… β dum(n)*age + ε 
The results are reported separately in table 2.7
v
extent to which the relationship between affiliate age and a given group departs f
g values and multi-collinarity. We do experience a problem with missing values 
particularly for market share. In order to test whether there was an underlying response bias, we 
limited the samples for the other performance measures to the firms that actually reported market 
share. For the li
models joint explanatory power (adjusted R square) did not change materially nor did the direction 
and significance level of the independent variables. Consequently we decided to report the results 
for the full sample.  
The level of multi-colliniarity is generally within acceptable bounds, however, the variables 
Lowcost labor and skilled labor do cause a colliniarity problem and subsequently only one of the 
variables are used in each regression. The Pearson correlations between the independent variables 
are reported in table 
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Pearson Correlations 
   
X1 
X2 
X3 
X4 
X5 
X6 
X7 
X8 
X9 
X10 
X11 
X12 
X13 
X14 
X15 
X16 
X17 
X18 
X19 
X20 
X1 Orderofentry 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X2 Age 
-,063 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X3 Firstaffiliate 
-,089* 
,123** 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X4 Hostmarketknowledge 
,083 
-,047 
-,451** 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X5 MarketknowledgeEE 
,081 
-,112* 
-,099* 
,050 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X6 Greenfield 
,011 
-,014 
,119** 
-,054 
,008 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X7 Acquisition 
-,019 
-,051 
-,165** 
,074 
-,011 
-,487** 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X8 JV 
-,047 
,093* 
,052 
-,100* 
-,042 
-,456** 
-,287** 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X9 Part_Acq 
,062 
-,030 
-,039 
,107* 
,056 
-,321** 
-,202** 
-,189** 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X10 Lowcostlabor 
-,168** 
-,053 
,059 
-,006 
-,092* 
-,017 
,033 
,071 
-,113* 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X11 Skilledlabor 
-,049 
-,005 
,050 
,016 
,023 
-,037 
,029 
,031 
-,022 
,317** 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X12 Tech 
-,041 
,010 
,043 
,060 
,079 
,132** 
,009 
-,079 
-,112* 
-,028 
-,047 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X13 Humanresources 
-,038 
,084 
-,001 
,101* 
,148** 
,070 
,017 
-,046 
-,071 
-,063 
,087 
,370** 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X14 % exp_fy 
-,196** 
-,121** 
,056 
-,026 
-,140** 
,025 
,067 
-,030 
-,101* 
,414** 
,128** 
,012 
-,097* 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X15 Localindustry 
,254** 
-,043 
-,134** 
,099* 
,101* 
-,117** 
,093* 
,024 
,027 
-,094* 
-,078 
-,160** 
-,104* 
-,086 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
X16 dumnoLocal 
-,197** 
-,013 
,093* 
-,045 
-,152** 
,050 
-,049 
,001 
-,018 
,078 
,038 
,108* 
,027 
,145** 
-,748** 
1 
 
 
 
 
X17 Localresources 
,066 
-,012 
-,114* 
,063 
,069 
-,430** 
,268** 
,130** 
,155** 
,010 
,075 
,017 
-,023 
-,074 
,067 
-,012 
1 
 
 
 
X18 Poland 
,012 
,083 
-,043 
,081 
,022 
,032 
-,070 
-,018 
,071 
-,103* 
-,175** 
,173** 
,188** 
-,151** 
,022 
-,093* 
-,022 
1 
 
 
X19 Lithuania 
-,051 
-,256** 
-,059 
-,206** 
,131** 
-,040 
,064 
-,012 
-,003 
,030 
,162** 
-,112* 
-,240** 
,105* 
-,005 
-,099* 
-,019 
-,387** 
1 
 
X20 Hungary 
,029 
,124** 
,090* 
,087* 
-,127** 
,001 
,017 
,028 
-,067 
,076 
,040 
-,080 
,007 
,061 
-,018 
,170** 
,037 
-,670** 
-,425** 
1 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.
(2-tailed). **  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table 2.5 Bivariate correlations matrix 
05 level 
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Table 2.6 Regression results for the 3 models 
 Model market share Model industry Model performance 
 Marketshare Industry Performance Marketshare Industry Performance Marketshare Industry Performance 
(Constant) -4,053 (10,627) 
3,373*** 
(0,306) 
4,488*** 
(0,420) 
-5,876 
(14,563) 
3,276*** 
(0,350) 
3,774*** 
(0,507) 
-32,003*** 
(12,150) 
3,091*** 
(0,323) 
3,156*** 
(0,416) 
Order 1 31,313*** (6,322) 
0,249 
(0,180) 
-0,142 
(0,242) 
24,680*** 
(7,250) 
0,151 
(0,169) 
-0,544** 
(0,244) 
23,284*** 
(6,176) 
0,418*** 
(0,158) 
0,095 
(0,196) 
Order 2 26,116*** (5,648) 
0,056 
(0,159) 
0,183 
(0,221) 
24,764*** 
(5,822) 
-0,013 
(0,141) 
-0,006 
(0,207) 
23,593*** 
(5,725) 
0,141 
(0,143) 
0,230 
(0,189) 
Order 3 19,844*** (5,131) 
0,267* 
(0,150) 
0,394* 
(0,208) 
15,768*** 
(5,333) 
0,111 
(0,131) 
0,207 
(0,195) 
11,015** 
(5,275) 
0,160 
(0,138) 
0,473*** 
(0,182) 
Order 4 13,785** (5,891) 
0,012 
(0,168) 
0,075 
(0,227) 
9,721 
(6,273) 
-0,191 
(0,147) 
-0,077 
(0,212) 
7,514 
(6,370) 
-0,019 
(0,152) 
0,014 
(0,205) 
Age -0,506 (0,675) 
0,035* 
(0,020) 
0,096** 
(0,026) 
-0,400 
(0,752) 
0,006 
(0,018) 
0,067*** 
(0,025) 
0,585 
(0,644) 
0,032* 
(0,017) 
0,072** 
(0,022) 
Lithuania*age 0,919 (2,057) 
-0,120** 
(0,048) 
-0,167** 
(0,067) 
2,169 
(2,260) 
-0,088** 
(0,044) 
-0,126* 
(0,065) 
2,450 
(2,072) 
-0,095** 
(0,044) 
-0,153*** 
(0,059) 
First affiliate 21,584*** (4,938) 
0,201 
(0,140) 
0,075 
(0,199) 
21,072*** 
(5,091) 
0,029 
(0,128) 
-0,096 
(0,187) 
23,937*** 
(5,021) 
0,002 
(0,129) 
0,116 
(0,167) 
Hostmarket 
knowledge 
9,672** 
(4,467) 
0,046 
(0,130) 
0,092 
(0,180) 
11,199** 
(4,731) 
-0,044 
(0,119) 
-0,050 
(0,171) 
16,367*** 
(4,572) 
-0,120 
(0,120) 
0,051 
(0,152) 
Market 
knowledge EE 
-1,355 
(3,614) 
0,031 
(0,103) 
0,072 
(0,144) 
-2,350 
(3,998) 
-0,068 
(0,095) 
-0,010 
(0,140) 
-1,424 
(3,712) 
-0,033 
(0,094) 
0,007 
(0,125) 
Acquisition 11,955** (5,249) 
0,008 
(0,141) 
-0,108 
(0,199) 
8,616 
(5,499) 
0,098 
(0,124) 
-0,163 
(0,184) 
6,632 
(4,824) 
-0,189 
(0,121) 
-0,230 
(0,161) 
JV 6,519 5,105) 
-0,134 
(0,145) 
0,316 
(0,203) 
3,583 
(5,190) 
-0,014 
(0,127) 
0,340* 
(0,187) 
9,392* 
(5,167) 
-0,167 
(0,130) 
0,210 
(0,173) 
Part_Acq 8,357 (5,912) 
-0,082 
(0,175) 
-0,472** 
(0,240) 
0,744 
(6,483) 
0,099 
(0,155) 
-0,341 
(0,225) 
9,843* 
(5,659) 
-0,008 
(0,148) 
-0,160 
(0,190) 
Lowcostlabor 14,029*** (4,146) 
-0,071 
(0,116) 
-0,164 
(0,163)       
Skilled labor       3,618* (2,164) 
0,023 
(0,056) 
0,187*** 
(0,073) 
Tech    0,739 (1,214) 
0,086*** 
(0,029) 
0,112*** 
(0,041) 
5,053 
(4,108) 
0,309*** 
(0,110) 
0,593*** 
(0,141) 
Human 
resources    
1,844 
(1,763) 
0,109*** 
(0,040) 
0,139** 
(0,057) 
3,040 
(2,194) 
0,237*** 
(0,055) 
0,183*** 
(0,070) 
Manuf*export -0,288*** (0,096) 
0,000 
(0,003) 
0,003 
(0,004)       
Localresources -0,138*** (0,046) 
-0,001 
(0,001) 
-0,001 
(0,002)       
Local industry    -1,420 (1,009) 
-0,103*** 
(0,025) 
-0,039 
(0,037)    
dumNolocal    -4,441 (9,456) 
-0,735*** 
(0,234) 
0,211 
(0,320)    
Lithuania 29,317* (15,278) 
0,498 
(0,368) 
0,870* 
(0,507) 
19,614 
(16,633) 
0,293 
(0,341) 
0,592 
(0,493) 
13,550 
(16,590) 
0,527 
(0,347) 
0,886* 
(0,460) 
Hungary 8,690** (4,199) 
0,017 
(0,125) 
0,206 
(0,173) 
5,664 
(4,791) 
0,165 
(0,117) 
0,038 
(0,171) 
0,826 
(4,357) 
0,128 
(0,113) 
0,249* 
(0,150) 
Industry 
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Homecountry 
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Respondent 
dummy    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 219 282 314 215 281 313 235 302 343 
F test of joint 
sig. 4,833*** 1,600** 1,799*** 3,182*** 3,827*** 3,330*** 4,340*** 3,453*** 4,907*** 
Adjusted R 
square 0,330 0,056 0,067 0,234 0,232 0,183 0,293 0,191 0,249 
*** p<0, . ** p<0,05. * p<0,1. 01
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RESULTS AND HYPOTHESES TESTS 
In table 2.6 we report the results of the three basic models. We find that Order of entry is 
ly and significa so ith t s rst s e ro ly 
t point  market share te mo whe rly ers c xpec erce
higher har
These effects are considerably stronger than wh cial Chin d st epo
This difference is likely ttri  to a ncy ds i iona et se atio
ng  all ons f  acc  the on th er e re ct fir
in ot gion rke er o y d ot a to b ngly ted 
odels suggests first ers e nce tical
nificantly s r pe ance n w perf ce s tion end riab
the relationsh ally ars lose  inv U s Thus an s t bo
s 1a a d 1b. We found no support th influence marke re, t
lts were also very weak for indu ry perf ce in of th els and insigni in th
od eve re w positi icant relationship betwee
Hypothesis 1c is thus partially supported. 
portant for acquiring market share, but order of 
s such elate  prof ty, p ivity reve rowth en corrected f
 quality und  evidence of early mover advantages. This may st th tenc
over advantages. Our findings suggest that early movers on average are more satisfied 
ir results, but they do not feel they do tively better than other firm n their pectiv
. Th  su at ove EE ee ntl r. ha
d that weaker firms would tend to move early to overcome “laggard” 
disadvantages. Rivoli and Salorio (1996) also suggested that firms with strong firm specific 
positive ntly as ciated w marke hare. Fi  mover njoy app ximate 31 
percen higher than la vers, reas ea follow ould e t 26 p nt 
point market s e. 
at espe ly the a base udies r rt. 
 to be a butable  tende  towar nternat l mark gment n. 
Aggregati sales on  regi ail to ount for  opti at lat ntrants a in fa st 
movers her re al ma ts. Ord f entr oes n ppear e stro  rela to 
performance, only one of the three m  that  mov xperie statis ly 
sig uperio rform . Whe e use orman atisfac as dep ent va le 
ip actu  appe to be c r to an erted hape.  we c uppor th 
hypothese n   at affiliate age should t sha he 
resu st orman  two e mod ficant e 
primary m el. How r the as a ve and statistically signif n 
affiliate age and performance satisfaction. 
Our results suggest that order of entry is im
entry a  is unr d to itabili roduct  and nue g . Wh or 
entrant  we fo  some  sugge e exis e  
of early m
with the  rela s i  res e 
industries is may ggest th  early m rs in C  have b n inhere y weake Narasim m 
and Zhang (2000) suggeste
 49
resources, when faced w o be resolved. Here we 
would 
ave encouraged a host of resource weaker firms that have had little 
previou
tion was not as 
predict
ith uncertainty, would tend to wait for uncertainty t
like to stress the geographical influence of our results though. It is possible that such a 
relationship is specific to CEE rather than a general rule. The OLI paradigm suggests that only 
firms with strong ownership advantages will internationalize in the first place. It is possible that the 
opening of CEE to FDI h
s international experience to enter. The opening of CEE has propelled firms with little 
internationalization experience to re-evaluate their “lack” of international commitment. In CEE, 
European companies in particular, have seen an opportunity to expand in less congested market that 
are still geographically and culturally close and, in no small part due to these countries’ close 
association with the European Union, with-in an acceptable risk range. It is possible that the greater 
geographical and cultural distance that Western firms face when investing in Asia would naturally 
weed out resource-weak firms. 
Our small market test between the Lithuanian dummy and market time was statistically 
insignificant though positive for market share. However, the interaction link was negative and 
significant for both industry performance and performance satisfaction in all the regressions 
indicating that the effect of timing is different for firms in Lithuania, though the direc
ed. We can thus reject hypothesis two that timing related advantages are stronger in smaller 
markets. Our results may suggest that firms investing early in Lithuania are likely to have suffered 
comparatively more during the Russian crisis in the late 90’s than early movers in Hungary and 
Poland. Liu (2005) suggest that FMA exist only when realized demand is close to expected demand. 
To test the contingent approach on early mover advantage we ran a number of regressions 
including interaction links between affiliate age and entry mode, industry group and home country 
(table 2.7). For market share we found no statistically significant differences between any of the 
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groups. Consequently there appears to be neither a general nor a conditional effect of affiliate age 
for market share. 
Table 2.7 Regressions including interaction links 
  Performance Industry performance Market share 
 I II III I II III I II III 
      Acq. -0,506 0,070 16,968 
  (0,606)   (0,426)   (17,517)   
 -0,416   -1,876**   -24,633  
 (0,505)   (0,412)   (17,765)  
 -0,647   -0,259   -6,185  
  (0,557)   (0,442)   (18,619) 
  -0,657   0,093   21,634 
  (0,698)   (0,511)   (21,801) 
1,311   0,726   39,904 
(0,905)   (0,713)   (24,394) 
0,042 0,060* 0,104*** -0,003 0,001 0,090*** -0,539 -0,543 -0,061 Age 
Lithuania*age (0,059) (0,059) (0,065) (0,044) (0,044) (0,050) (2,081) (2,195) (2,361) 
0,033   0,003   -0,555   
(0,056)   (0,051)   (1,936)   
 -0,024   -0,117**   1,671  
 (0,062)   (0,048)   (1,747)  
  -0,193*   -0,134   -4,390 
  (0,120)   (0,098)   (3,809) 
  -0,067   -0,141***   0,242 OtherWE*age 
  
NorthA*ag
    (0,073)   (0,054)   (2,279) 
F test of joint 
square 
  (0,434)   (0,333)   (13,752)   
      JV 0,660 -0,303 -1,210 
      Part_Acq. -1,132** (0,488)   
-0,070 
(0,420)   
4,246 
(16,727)   
Utilities  (0,997)   (0,775)   (33,059)  
 0,815   1,113***   -35,020*  Fin serv. 
 0,410   -0,432   -3,852  Trade  (0,555)   (0,424)   (16,006)  
Other serv.  (0,474)   (0,354)   (15,883)  
  0,109   0,237   -1,424 Nordic 
  0,669   1,179***   4,358 Other W. 
Europe   (0,453)   (0,377)   (14,515) 
CEEC   (0,886)   (0,661)   (26,595) 
  0,036   0,685   11,792 North A 
  Asia and Other   
(0,037) (0,032) (0,038) (0,027) (0,029) (0,033) (1,097) (1,136) (1,176) 
-0,165*** -0,159*** -0,153** -0,088** -0,096** -0,115** 1,057 0,441 1,617 
-0,049   0,034   0,910   JV*age (0,068)   (0,048)   (1,961)   
Acq*age (0,050)   (0,038)   (1,506)   
0,121**   0,022   0,541   Part_acq*age 
 -0,014   0,189*   1,496  Utilities*age  (0,121)   (0,100)   (3,873)  
Finserv*age  (0,056)   (0,049)   (1,899)  
 -0,028   0,051   -0,699  Trade*age 
 0,094*   0,031   -0,442  Otherserv*age  (0,053)   (0,040)   (1,724)  
AsiaAO*age   (0,104)   (0,082)   (2,773) 
  0,089   -0,041   -3,450 CEEC*age 
  -0,047   -0,058   -0,296 Nordic*age   (0,066)   (0,052)   (2,191) 
  (0,051)   (0,043)   (1,614) 
  0,046   -0,087   -1,467 e 
           
N 342 343 343 281 281 281 219 219 219 
sig. 4,737*** 4,477*** 4,437*** 3,465*** 4,014*** 3,709*** 4,332*** 4,239*** 4,197*** 
Adjusted R 0,260 0,251 0,255 0,225 0,268 0,253 0,321 0,322 0,326 
*** p<0,01. ** p<0,05. * p<0,1. Base Greenfield, Manufacturing, Germany. 
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For industry performance we found a considerable change in the explanatory power of the 
model when we included links between home countries and age, and especially for the links 
for the utility industry early entry appears to be 
ely assoc ted ry an oes not pers us he 
rected per easure. Th  sugge t the bserved lationship is primarily related to 
tive q f earl  entrants n the at 
well endowed firms would give up the option to wait when the country specific early m ver 
ntages are gh. Si ilities end to be associated with natural or legal lim s on e try 
and the potential numb irms in the industry, th  exp the ob
f the int rnational expans  the t lecom in ustry Cavusgil and Aulakh (1999) 
found strong evidence that firms engage in a pursuit to preempt ts. 
ly m mong financial service firms on the other hand seem to be associated with 
lower perfo c  t ind Again when corrected for entrant quality the 
nship d ot pe ist. This may b lained by great difficulties in estimating credit 
worthiness, considerable amounts of bad debt to state owned a d form te ow ed firms and 
n unw llingne the ho tries to re h the option to interfere in strategically 
important industries. Consequently, uncertainty was high and preemption tends to be difficult for 
al ser ice ind sugge ing that rms with strong ownership advantages would choose 
to postpone entr  until un ertaint e bee  resolved Conclusively, the advantage to enter early 
fairly g neral, bu  the quality of early entrants will vary considerably depending on the 
ities of he indus y. 
We tested whether entry m  was a ciated h perf ance, but our results where not 
ve. We found a tendency for greenfield operations to have lower market share, but the 
between industry group and age. Most markedly 
positiv ia  with ndust i  perform ce. This re tionshipla  d ist wh n we e e t
cor fo nce mrma is sts tha o re
the rela u oality y  i utility industry. Rivoli and Salorio (1996) suggested th
o
adva hi nce ut t  itation n
er f fo is may lain served relationship. In a 
study o e  ion of e d  S , akar
 m eark
Ear overs a
rmance ompared o the ustry. 
relatio oes n rs  e exp
n er sta n
possibly a i ss by st coun linquis
the financi v ustry, st fi
y c i ves ha n . 
may be e t
particular  t tr
ode sso  wit orm
conclusi
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relation
hat are associated with the 
acquisi
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
rowing evidence that these results can be generalized.  We did find a 
positiv
benefit from incomplete markets for factor inputs such as, labor, location, assets etc and 
consequently gain Ricardian rent. However early movers are punished when faced with adverse 
ship was statistically weak across the models. Finally, we found some indication that the 
interaction between affiliate age and entry mode is associated with performance satisfaction.  
Our results indicate that early movers amongst joint ventures tended to under perform 
compared to late movers. A likely explanation is that the use of the joint venture entry mode in the 
early 90´s was motivated primarily by political or regulatory considerations. Consequently, these 
early movers are likely to have experienced considerable control problems due to incompatible 
partners. The joint ventures established later in the period are more likely to be motivated by 
resource/competency complementarities and the entry mode may then have a value adding property. 
In the other end of the scale we have acquisitions and in particular partial acquisitions for 
which moving early is more strongly positively associated with performance. So we do observe a 
pattern between entry mode, affiliate age and performance. Entry modes t
tion/preemption of local assets are more sensitive to entry timing than other entry modes. 
 
In line with previous research we find a positive relationship between order of entry and 
market share (VanderWerf & Mahon 1997). However, we did not find a positive relationship 
between order of entry and performance. The results suggest that order of entry is likely to be a 
tradeoff between greater market share and risk or costs. In the most recent comparative study of 
performance measures, Cui and Lui (2005) found similar results based on a sample of Chinese 
firms. Consequently there is g
e relationship between the affiliate’s age and performance satisfaction. Our findings suggest 
the existence of early mover advantages. Early movers in emerging/transitional economies may 
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economic conditions. This suggests that entry timing remains largely a tradeoff between risk and 
return. We also found that entry mode had a considerable moderating effect on the likelihood of 
finding
perform
rve 
timing related advantages. It is therefore clear that any attempt to control for the inherent strength of 
the entrants would also be a fruitful addition to FMA literature. It is possible that more studies that 
take account of survival would be a valuable addition to the field. However, exit is not necessarily 
failure 
 an early mover advantage. 
Overall our results suggest that the factors that explain performance vary considerably 
depending on how we measure performance. Order of entry, previous market knowledge and 
market size are all useful for explaining market share, but they are not very useful for explaining 
other measures for performance. Rather we found that the length of time the firm has been in the 
market, the firm’s human resource activities and transfer of technology were determinants of firm 
ance. 
Our findings suggest that more empirical studies on timing and performance is warranted, 
but with other performance measures than market share. Previous literature and the empirical results 
in this article suggest that endogeneity has a significant impact on the extent to which we obse
and the magnitude of failure associated with exit is not always the same. The challenge will 
be to find a way to measure failure that takes account of these factors. There has only been a few 
attempt to study FMA and multiple international market entry (Mascarenhas, 1992 & 1997), this is 
clearly an important aspect for the MNE and worthy of more studies. Finally, a key factor in 
empirical research is often to find an environment that is conducive to studying a specific 
relationship. We believe the environment and development of CEE are particularly conducive for 
FMA studies. We would like to urge others to take advantage of this opportunity, ideally by using a 
contingency approach that can tell us more about the link between firm strategy and FMA.  
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The managerial implication of our study is that managers should not rush to market in the 
hope of achieving advantages that may not materialize. Management should carefully consider 
whether the potential advantages are enduring. Evidence of superior market share for first movers is 
very s
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3. Competition for Markets vs. Competition in Markets: The 
Case of the Brewing Industry in Central and Eastern 
ABSTRACT.  interdependent competitive market entry behavior in multiple 
etition in the brewing 
that moving first is associated with strong perf  
markets to enter. These perform  
ultiple geographical markets. Hence, sustainable first mover 
advantages (FMA) in foreign entry may lead to a competitive behavior akin to “competition for 
markets” rather than “competition for market share”. Nevertheless, rivals frequently challenge 
incumbents by following into their markets. We suggest, that these follower investments may be 
made primarily for the purpose of tying up the incumbent’s resources rather than actually 
challenging its position. Furthermore, we suggest that, in spite of high exit rates, foreign market 
entry by small players may be motivated by comparatively low exit barriers brought on by 
acquisition based industry consolidation processes. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
As we have observed with the opening of CEE and many markets in Asia to foreign direct 
investment (FDI), new market opportunities can arise in short spurts rather than in slow incremental 
Europe 
 
This study explores
geographical markets. In an explorative study of the dynamics of comp
industry in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) we establish stylized facts of this industry, including 
ormance advantages. On this basis we develop a
theoretical analysis of the interaction between multiple potential entrants considering multiple 
ance advantages suggest that firms may compete to obtain first
mover opportunities across m
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step r 
market opportunities in a range of new prom  
dominance in multiple local markets, getting to the market first may play a pre-eminent strategic 
role. 
Much of the first mover literature, empiric dies in particular, has focused on bringing to 
 study for several reasons. 1) 
olistic structure with a few active large international players 
suggesting interdependence between these players. 2) The industry players faced stagnant or 
declining demand in the major mark rn Europe compelling them to seek 
growth
s. Consequently, multinational enterprises (MNE) may often find themselves competing fo
ising international markets. In this pursuit for
al stu
light the preconditions for first mover advantages and the extent to which first movers generally 
enjoy greater returns than followers. On the other hand, few studies actually try to answer the 
question; how might the existence of first advantages affect firms’ strategic behavior? 
 We develop the paper as an explorative study of multi-market entry competition, utilizing 
data on entry timing, performance and acquisition activities of foreign entrants in the brewing 
industry for 9 Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. Using the emerging industry structure 
of CEE, we seek to explore the strategic aspects of first mover advantages and their role in shaping 
entry patterns across international markets. We then develop propositions that seek to account for 
these dynamics between the pursuit of market leadership through early entry, competitive 
interaction and ultimately performance. Our methodology is thus to use mix of quantitative and 
qualitative evidence to indicate relationships between entry timing and performance in a multi-
market competitive setting. As argued by Eisenhardt (1989) this type of methodology is well suited 
to explore areas of research that is insufficiently accounted for by existing theories.  
The brewing industry in CEE is particularly interesting for this
The industry has a typically oligop
ets particularly in Weste
 opportunities in less contested markets. 3) The prevalence of acquisition type market entries 
and the fact that, typically, only a few of the large international players are represented in the 
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individual national markets points towards the existence of barriers to entry and accordingly 
potential first mover advantages. 4) The relevant major players all entered CEE fairly early and 
today account for the lion share of the production and sale of beer in the region which should 
largely rule out or minimize the role of path dependent or other gradual evolution oriented 
explana
ollowers it is 
importa
 a new entry is 
underta
tions. 
Moreover in our view, international market entry in emerging or transition economies is an 
excellent point of departure for studies on entry timing competition. While for instance Nakata and 
Sivakumar (1997) argue that first movers may enjoy technological leadership over f
nt to note that this leadership will predominantly exist in relation to potential local 
competitors. Quite often, especially in oligopolistic industries, potential entrants will compete over 
who gets to the market first against other foreign rivals with the same level of technology, capital 
resources and capabilities. The entry option is thus likely to take on the characteristics of what 
Miller and Folta (2002) refers to as “shared entry options”. That is, usually more than one firm has 
the ability, resources and interest in exercising the option to enter a given market. The entry 
decision of any given firm is thus not taken in isolation, but rather it is part of a competitive process 
within a group of firms that share this option. 
The core issue is thus how FMA can be obtained under entry competition? In this respect 
two previous entry studies are particularly interesting. Mills (1988) found that when
ken through a series of sequential investment steps, what might qualify as a compound 
option, a first mover advantage could potentially be secured with an infinitely small resource 
commitment. Similarly, in an empirical study of international market entry in the offshore drilling 
product market Mascarenhas (1997) found that the initial resource commitment of the entrant was 
of less importance than moving first per se. Hence, these studies challenge a long held belief dating 
back to Stackelberg (1934) that first mover advantages are derived primarily from large irreversible 
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investments in capacity. The potential implications of these studies are interesting in the context of 
the brewing industry since the study by Meyer and Tran (2006) provides evidence suggesting a 
sequential or staged entry process. It is thus possible that firms advantageously pursue a strategy of 
multiple low commitment entries over a strategy of fewer high commitment entries. 
Therefore, in this paper we examine the influence of potential FMA on firm strategies. In 
particu
arkets. 
lar we explore the effect of market opportunities in multiple markets on the entry decisions 
of firms. Initially, we argue that given strong first mover advantages, firms have an incentive to 
avoid following other competitors and would rather pursue first mover opportunities of their own in 
other markets. Extending this logic we would thus expect that oligopolistic competition leads to 
perfect market division along geographical lines; or in other words “competition for markets”. 
However, we rarely observe an industry with perfect market division, the brewing industry 
included, and hence late entry in a new geographical market could be grounded in strategic 
advantages derived in other markets. Miller and Folta (2002) argue that firms may undertake or 
threaten to undertake investments in order to force competitors to prematurely exercising their 
options. Consequently follower investments may be strategically exercised in order to gain a 
competitive advantage in the competition for m
Moreover, we examine the role of smaller foreign entrants and observe that these tend to 
have considerably higher exit rates. We proceed to argue that small firm entry may be economically 
sensible to the extent that the player can assume that an implicit buyout option exists. In effect, in 
industries where new market entry and consolidation is acquisition driven the investment made by a 
small foreign entrant may not be particularly sunk. 
We develop our argument as follows. In the next section we review the literature on first 
mover advantages. We then present empirical evidence from the brewing industry which raises 
puzzles that existing theory does not adequately explain. On this basis, we discuss and develop 
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propositions on the competition for first mover advantages in multiple international markets. In 
section five we address the role of small MNEs entry. Finally, in section six we discuss the results 
in the broader context of the literature. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
on & 
Ware, 
, for instance Schmalensee (1982) found that 
search 
The nature and sources of first mover advantages 
First mover advantages have been associated with a wide range of business characteristics. 
First movers can gain an advantage over followers through preemptive investments in capacity 
(Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988), either deterring followers from entering all together (Eat
1987), capturing the lion share of a market (Stackelberg, 1934) or limiting the growth 
potential of followers (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1983). 
Pioneers may also seek to preempt the product space by providing a broad product line 
hence limiting follower ability to capture product niches (Robinson & Fornell, 1985). Or preempt 
the geographical space through carefully targeting regions that cannot support competition 
(Ghemawat, 1986). 
Pre-emption of local resources is another potentially important source of FMA (Lieberman 
& Montgomery, 1988). First movers may have the chance to secure access to or acquire certain 
local resources that are essential to conduct business in a market. These could potentially include 
business licenses, natural resources, distribution networks or even production facilities. 
Brand perception can form a strong FMA
and trial costs could lead buyers to stick with the first product that they find to perform 
adequately, i.e. the first movers brand. Another study by Alpert and Kamins (1995) even suggest 
that pioneering per see may create additional brand value as consumers link their self-image to the 
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pioneering brand. Moreover, tie-in’s with end users or distributors can be a source of advantage to 
the first mover, particularly when there are costs involved in switching to another product (Katz & 
Shapiro, 1994). 
Nevertheless, despite a fairly large body of research on market entry timing and 
performance the question whether first movers are able to extract superior rent compared to 
followers has produced mixed results. In a Meta analysis by VanderWerf and Mahon (1997) a 
s documented. Market share in turn has 
been p
f literature has emerged that seek to explain the 
apparen
hat followers may be able to free ride on the first mover, that followers may 
gain an
d territory. 
Hence,
strong positive link between early entry and market share wa
ositively linked to other measures of performance (Capon, Farley & Hoenig, 1990). 
However, less consistent results, even to the point of suggesting a possible negative relationship has 
been derived from studies attempting to link order of entry directly to financial performance 
measures (VanderWerf & Mahon, 1997). 
Perhaps as a consequence of this a stream o
t lack of connection between moving first and superior performance. Lieberman and 
Montgomery (1998) for instance suggest that firms may simply be subject to a number of first 
mover disadvantages that could erode or even supersede the advantage of moving first. Among 
other, they suggest t
 advantage from entering after technological or market uncertainties have been resolved or 
even that followers can overtake the first mover as a result of incumbent inertia. 
Another line of inquiry suggest that relatively advantaged firms might deliberately postpone 
entry to avoid some of the market risks associated with moving first into unexplore
 Nashiram and Zhang (2000); Rivoli and Salorio (1996) found that endogenous firm specific 
advantages may induce advantaged firms to wait and force disadvantaged firms to speed to market. 
Therefore, lower performance or higher fatality among first movers could be attributed to the 
inherent quality of the entrants. 
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Finally some studies have found that competitive entry timing may drive out all advantages 
associated with early entry. While this does not necessarily suggest that first mover advantages do 
not exist it does suggest that a competitive market-clearing mechanism eliminates the firm’s ability 
to deriv
rmining factor as to the extent that these can generate 
superio
Size and pre-emption 
The only studies to our knowledge that have addressed the relationship between pioneering 
and performance in multiple international markets have been conducted by Mascarenhas (1992 & 
1997). In his initial study from 1992 he found a positive relationship between pioneering in 
international markets and market share within the offshore drilling product market, yet also noted 
that the effect was considerably smaller when controlling for survival. 
In a subsequent study however Mascarenhas (1997) found that first movers had both on 
average larger market share and a higher probability of survival when correcting for firm specific 
factors. Moreover, Mascarenhas noted that it was the act of moving first rather than the initial 
resource commitment that was the primary source of the performance advantage. The results of his 
study lead him to suggest that firms may advantageously seek first mover advantages in an 
increased number of markets through comparatively smaller resource commitments. 
e superior rent from these advantages. Hence in their study on entry options Miller and Folta 
(2002) question the extent to which early exercise of entry options when they are shared with other 
players can lead to superior performance. 
Therefore even when all the preconditions for first mover advantages exists it is not self 
evident that the advantages can be exploited, it also requires a suitable competitive environment that 
allows firms to take advantage of these opportunities. 
How firms compete over first mover opportunities and the way these opportunities are 
distributed then appears to be a key dete
r returns. 
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This result is interesting especially considering the studies of Folta and O’Brien (2004); 
Rivoli and Salorio (1996) who suggests that a higher degree of reversibility decreases the value of 
the option to defer hence increasing the incentive to move early in the first place. Furthermore an 
empirical study by Gaba, Pan and Ungson (2002) also found that low commitment entry modes 
were positively associated with early entry, although not with performance. Therefore a smaller 
initial investment leads to two potential advantages. Firstly, a relatively small commitment of 
resourc
ithout commitment it may be impossible to 
create 
 secures the first mover advantage. Hence some form of mechanism need to exist 
that allows a small investment to carry with it commitment value. As pointed out by Mills (1988) 
this could be the case when investments are undertaken in a sequence of steps. 
 
id internationalization 
process spearheaded by a sm
Similar to Mascarenhas (1992), this study focuses on foreign entry in a single industry but in 
multiple international markets. The data in this study have been derived from multiple sources. 
es leads to less risk, which again encourages early entry. Secondly, smaller initial resource 
commitments in each individual market leave excess resources to enter more markets. 
However this leaves a basic inconsistency; w
first mover advantages. As an example, Hirokawa and Sasaki (2001) argue that it is not the 
first mover per se that secures a first mover advantage, it is the first firm to commit to a quantity 
sticky output that
EVIDENCE FROM THE BREWING INDUSTRY IN CENTRAL AND 
EASTERN EUROPE 
Over the last two decades the brewing industry has witnessed a rap
all group of brewers. Due to the maturity of the beer market in 
developed economies these brewers have turned to the newly opened and rapidly expanding 
markets in Eastern Europe, Russia and Asia (Larimo, Marinov & Marinova, 2006).  
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Most o
ace 1.1 code 
1596), 
actual types of entry 
ost notably licensing agreements, are subject to potentially abrupt discontinuation caused by 
acquisitions of partner firms by rivals. This is a problem that Carlsberg, in particular, has 
experienced in e.g. Spain. 
Initially, data was obtained for 13 East European owever, some of the countries 
had to 
study due to its 
compar
f the data on ownership and the financial information we use were gathered from Amadeus, a 
database containing information on approximately 7,000,000 firms in Europe. Additional 
information on the acquisition activities within the industry was obtained through Zephur, a 
database containing information on ownership transfers of firms. Furthermore, we have sought 
information from yearly accounts and press releases from the major players in the industry. The 
information we collected was then cross referenced against data collected by another research group 
doing a study of the brewing industry in CEE. 
We consider only subsidiaries engaged in the production of beer (primary N
this definition of our base population is set from a belief that firms in the industry need a 
fairly broad range of products, including medium range products, to acquire a substantial market 
position. Consequently we consider local production essential to compete effectively. 
Comparatively low production costs in Central and Eastern Europe and often restrictive import 
taxation generally also rules out the option to successfully build a strong market presence through 
export based strategies (Larimo, Marinov & Marinova, 2006). Moreover, contr
m
 countries. H
be dropped. Bulgaria was ruled out due to insufficient accounting data for the latest years. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina had no foreign brewers until 2006 and is consequently ruled out. Slovakia 
was dropped due to insufficiently available ownership data and finally, Slovenia was dropped, as no 
foreign brewers are present in the market anymore. Russia was excluded from the 
atively large size which could suggest regionalization issues that could not be account for 
appropriately. 
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Our study identified more than 100 brewers in the nine countries. Of these, a large part was 
relatively small locally owned enterprises and a few were owned by smaller foreign owners. The 
locally owned breweries accounted for apx. 20% of total sales whereas the small foreign owned 
firms accounted for 9%, while the four large players Carlsberg, Heineken, SABMiller and INBEV 
accoun
 note that the empirical material presented in this paper primarily serves as 
ted for more than 70% of total sales for the region. Both SABMiller and INBEV are the 
products of large mergers in 2002 and 2004 respectively; however, there are no indications that the 
firms involved in these mergers had competitive contact in the region prior to the mergers.  
We eliminated all locally owned firms from the population, for the remaining observations 
the financial data was aggregated or when possible the consolidated accounts were used so that for 
each host country all assets held by one foreign parent is pooled together. 
It is important to
Country Market Size. (thousand USD)* N. of large players present in the market 
Poland 2,582,204 3
Czech Republic 867,382 3
Hungary 692,450 3
Romania 656,212 4
Serbia 
Monten
and 
egro    588,550 2
Croatia 275,299 3
Lithuania 177,547 1
Estonia 123,052 1
Latvia 105,755 1
 
*Based on accumulated data from Amadeus 
Table 3.1 Approximate market size and the presence of major competitors 
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explorative evidence of the nature of first mover advantages and structures of post-entry 
competition in the brewing sector.  
Preemption and first mover performance advantages 
We find reasonable support that pre-emption is an important factor in smaller markets. In 
fact we find that in only one of the markets in this survey (Romania) all four major competitors 
were present through direct foreign investments (table 3.1). 
determine the relationship between order of entry and performance we use mean tests 
between order of entry and three measures of market performance. To determine order of entry we 
coded the first firm(s) that entered a market as 1 and all other firms that entered the market were 
coded 0. Below is a short description of the performance variables. 
• Market leadership – the firm with the largest sale in the last year of operation in a given 
country was coded 1, all other firms were coded 0. 
• Market share – we derived the market share of a given firm’s sales in a country relative to 
the total sales by all local and foreign firms in that country. This measure may be slightly 
exaggerated since it ignores imports by firms not registered as brewers and sales by local 
micro breweries too small to be included in Amadeus. 
• Return on sales – a percentage value given by the formula EBIT/sales*100. To increase the 
stability in the values we computed the return of sales as two year average. 
To 
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Of the first movers 64% were market leaders, suggesting a strong positive order of entry 
effect (table 3.2). Similar results where derived from mean tests on market share, first movers on 
average enjoyed close to 20% market share lead over followers. Moreover, whether due to scale 
related efficiencies or marketing advantages, first movers on average enjoyed a 9% higher return on 
sales compared to followers. 
Consequently, first movers appear to derive not only significant market share advantages, 
but are also more able to capitalize on each unit of sales. Overall, the general level of significance 
for the tests is very good, especially considering the small population size. 
y acquisition driven expansion 
(M r
Marino  was though a partial acquisition of an 
 First movers Followers F test 
Acquisition driven international expansion 
The brewing industry is generally characterized by highl
eye  & Tran, 2006; Larimo, Marinov & Marinova, 2006). In their study Larimo, Marinov and 
va (2006) found that the prevailing mode of entry
Market leadership 0.636 0.105 
 (0.505) (0.315) 
Market share 35.461 16.137 
 (11.989) (11.945) 
18.184*** 
Return on sales 15.200 6.482 
 (9.866) (9.179) 
5.953** 
N 30   
12.693*** 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
Table 3.2 Order of entry and performance 
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existing
quisition as the dominant mode of entry may be attributable to 
market
rces that is very difficult 
or costly to duplicate. 
This has important implications from a first mover perspective. Since potential acquisition 
targets are a finite resource, this suggests that early entrants are able to acquire the best available 
resources and consequently either pre-empt or put followers at a disadvantage. Entry and expansion 
opportunities are thus largely dependent on the pool of firms that can be acquired. Moreover, as 
argued by Giovanni (1996) when the cost of time-compression is high, ie an investment in capacity 
quisition of existing capa  effective p strike which the competitors can only 
r act. Hence, valence of a hig uisition driven expansion pattern may, 
i  it self, be a strong indicator resence of first dvantages. 
L es for large fi gh exit rates ll firms 
The study also tends to s of large and small MNEs. The 
four m iller and INBEV account for approximately 70 
percent of the sales in the re d other foreign
sales. 
Of the four large players there is only one reported case of market exit. INBEV sold its share 
 local brewery. In the majority of cases the strategy of the large foreign investors has been 
to acquire multiple local breweries in the individual markets. In a few cases the local subsidiaries 
have been acquired indirectly through the acquisition of the foreign parent itself such as the 
takeover of Brau Union AG by Heineken. 
The prevalence of ac
ing advantages derived from local brands and products that cater to local tastes. Moreover, 
access to existing distribution networks is of crucial importance to foreign entrants. Hence, despite 
their often run down conditions local brewers still offer a bundle of resou
must be gradually undertaken leaving room for competitors to observe the move and counter it, an 
ac city allow an reemptive 
eact to after the f the pre hly acq
n  of the p  mover a
ow exit rat rms, hi for sma
suggest a strong survival bias in term
ajor players Carlsberg, Heineken, SABM
gion an  players account for roughly 8 percent of the 
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in Pivovarna Union dd (Slovenia) to Pivovarna Lasko, Delniska Druzba (Slovenia) in 2005, this 
followed after a bidding contest against the second major shareholder Pivovarna Lasko, Delniska 
Druzba in 2002-2003. The failure to acquire full control of Pivovarna Union dd appeared to be the 
principle motive for the market exit. While INBEV was the only foreign brewer to enter the 
Sloven
of entry. 
 a joint venture between 
Carlsberg and Scottish & Newcastle plc. In yet another case Carlsberg divested a local subsidiary 
Kalnapilis AB in Lithuania to the Danish brewer Bryggerigruppen A/S (Unibrew) in 2001. This was 
part of a settlement with the Lithuanian competition watchdog that had requested this sale. 
Consequently, despite a substantial number of subsidiary exits we in fact only observe one actual 
market exit by the four major players. 
In contrast a relatively large number of smaller foreign firms entered the Central and Eastern 
ian market the case doesn’t quite suggest an increased risk of moving first pr see. Rather the 
case illustrated that the incumbent advantages enjoyed by Pivovarna Lasko were substantial enough 
that even the potentially superior firm specific resources enjoyed by INBEV was insufficient to 
overcome them. It is however illustrative of one of the main risks involved in the use of partial 
acquisitions as a mode 
A key observation from this study relates to the difficulty of operationalizing firm exist at 
the subsidiary level. Internal mergers designed to consolidate the foreign parent’s assets in a market 
in to a single legal entity cause most subsidiary exits. This was a practice undertaken by virtually 
every major player in most markets. Similarly the closing of individual plants tend to be motivated 
by a desire to consolidate production into fewer more efficient plants. 
In other cases the sale of assets may be primarily structural or strategic; following 
Heinekens takeover of Brau Union AG, Brau Union’s Polish assets were transferred to Heinekens 
Polish subsidiary (Zywek) which was subsequently transferred back to Brau Union! Another 
example is the case of Carlsberg’s sale of its Baltic assets to BBH,
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European markets particularly in the early years (Larimo, Marinov & Marinova, 2006). Of these 
many have exited the markets again often through acquisition by other foreign firms or because the 
parent was acquired by a larger firm. 
Summary 
We thus observe a number of strong characteristics for the brewing industry in Eastern 
Europe. Some of the main characteristics are: 
• The opening of Eastern European has created a large pool of new market opportunities 
which the industry has aggressively pursued. 
• The overall market share of the 4 large brewers in the region is very large which suggest that 
the competitive entry game may primarily play out between these large firms. 
•
eans of entry suggest 
? Also the role of entry mode choices and entry by 
smaller
 
 We find strong indicators for the existence of first mover advantages both in terms of market 
share and profits.  
• Moreover the extensive use of partial, staged or full acquisitions as a m
a strong reliance on local assets and this in turn suggest that entry opportunities are limited 
by the availability of these assets. 
• The rate of exit is considerably larger for small foreign firms than for the large multinational 
firms. Moreover, the primary mode of exit for these firms is divestment to a larger 
competitor. 
Our exploratory study raises interesting questions as to how a group of competitors interact 
in a situation where many new market opportunities become available. How are market positions 
distributed between these firms and how does first movers retain a strong performance lead over 
followers even in a highly competitive setting
 foreign actors offers puzzling research questions. 
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MULTI-MARKET COMPETITION; COMPETING FOR MARKETS 
Pursuing first mover advantages in new markets 
How can firms achieve superior performance from moving first in a competitive multi-
g?  The term competition for markets is often associated with industry structures that 
tend to
market is not only dependent on the actions of its 
com t
from ou  Eastern Europe we observe that: 
• aring a basket 
• ire a non trivial resource commitment as firms generally need local 
sically contradictory according to the study by Miller and 
Fol 2
the co
organiz ter a large number of markets simultaneously or near 
simulta
els with the first assuming that resources 
re not restricted and the latter assuming that resources are restricted. 
market settin
wards monopolies, however this need not be the case. In this theoretical analysis we 
presuppose that a firm’s decision to enter a 
pe itors, but also depend on its potential opportunities in other markets. Based on the evidence 
r study of the brewing industry in Central and
• There is a strongly positive order of entry effect. 
Entry competition can be characterized as rivalry between a group of firms sh
of market entry options in the sense that Miller and Folta (2001) suggest. 
Market entry requ
production, access to an extensive local distribution network, a broad range of products and 
brands. 
While these results should be intrin
ta ( 001), we will argue that the emergence of this result is plausible in a multi-market setting on 
ndition that firms are under resource constraints. Firms rarely have the financial or 
ational capabilities to en
neously, therefore we can expect that firms would be forced to make strategic tradeoffs in 
the entry choices they make. Resource scarcity and multi-market opportunities are invariably linked 
together in the sense that a great number of entry opportunities strain a given resource base more 
than if the market opportunities are comparatively few. To see why this have an important impact 
on entry competition we will consider two alternative mod
a
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Entry
To see why resource scarcity is important let us consider a two player-two market game. We 
assume that both the players and the markets are homogeneous and denote the markets A an B and 
players
e payoff YK 
wh  nts the opportunity cost of entering first. 
Sin a
that no K, we shall refer to 
the i
will wa indow of opportunity is between t-1 < t < tK where the payoff Xt > YK. Based on 
backwa
 dynamics without resource constraints 
 Z and P. To avoid the result that both would enter simultaneously we assume that the 
players takes turn, these turns can however be infinitely small hence the assumption of homogeneity 
is not dramatically violated. Furthermore we assume that there is a benefit to waiting hence the 
payoff is an increasing function over time until the point tK after which point the payoff is constant. 
Consequently, the second mover will enter no earlier than tK and achieve the payoff Ya in market A 
or Yb in market B. Since the markets are homogeneous then Ya = Yb we can denote th
ich must take a positive value and therefore represe
ce ny player can always wait and enter second at tK achieving a payoff YK then it would follow 
 player would enter at any t where the payoff denoted Xt is smaller than Y
 po nt where Xt is precisely 1 unit higher than YK as t0. 
Therefore we get the decision rule that at any t < t0 the payoff Xt < YK meaning both players 
it. The w
rd induction we know that the entry time of the first mover will be t0 yielding a payoff X0 
for the first mover, the second mover in turn waits and enters at tK yielding a payoff of YK. Since 
both markets are perfectly identical and resources do not restrict the first mover it will enter at t0 in 
both markets gaining a total payoff 2X0. The second mover in turn will enter both markets at tK 
yielding a combined payoff of 2YK. 
Since competition force the players to rush to capture the first mover advantage the payoff 
for the first mover is thus only very marginally better than for the second mover. Therefore the 
result of this model suggests that it is the opportunity cost that forms the benchmark for the first 
mover’s performance potential. 
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Entry dynamics with resource constraint 
If on the other hand we assume that each player can only take one action per turn due to 
resource restrictions the results are somewhat different. Again no player will enter before t0 
however the decision to enter at t0 is no longer optimal. Let’s assume that player Z gets to move at 
t0. If player Z decides to wait and player P enters market A at t1 then player Z can still enter first in 
market B at t2. Since X2 > X0 player Z should under no circumstance pre-empt at t0. Similarly 
player P will not attempt to pre-empt at t1 as the payoff of entering first in market B at t3 will be X3 
which is larger than X1. Hence as long as the payoff is an increasing function, which it will continue 
to be until tK both players will choose to wait for the other to move first. Since both players will 
enter at tK regardless of the choice of the other player Z maximizes his utility by entering market A 
at his last turn before tK which we take to be tK-2 yielding a payoff of XK-2 and at tK player Z enters 
market B yielding the payoff Yb. Player P in return enters market B at tK-1 yielding a payoff of XK-1 
and at tK player P enters market A for the payoff Ya. The opportunity cost of moving first is no 
longer 
r entry opportunities they have. 
YK but what could have been achieved by entering another market. 
While both games are very crude they do produce an interesting result. As long as there are 
multiple market opportunities that cannot simultaneously be pre-empted the relative performance 
difference between entering first and second in a market does not affect the entry decision of the 
first mover and its corresponding payoff. The level of the entry competition game is moved from 
the individual market to a higher order competition for markets where firms weight the payoff 
potential of entering a specific market against all the othe
With this in mind we can consider a series of market opportunities with declining 
attractiveness, again we denote the pay off for moving first into market A as (Xa) and the payoff of 
being the second mover in market A (Ya). Since the market opportunities have declining 
attractiveness Xa > Xb. 
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Xa > Xb > Xc >>>Xn  
Ya > Yb > Yc >>>Yn
Without resource constraints each market would be treated independently hence the optimal 
entry timing and subsequent performance would be determined exclusively by the second movers 
performance potential in that market, hence Xa = Ya, Xb = Yb…. Xn = Yn. 
With resource constraints however each entry decision dependents on the best available 
opportunity in any market, consequently as long as Xn > Ya then the decision must be between first 
mover alternatives thus the time of entry in market A is determined by Xa = Xb, the entry time in 
market C is determined by Xc = Xd and the entry time in market N is determined by Xn = Ya. 
We can draw several insights from the models. For one, under resource constraint, multi-
market opportunities move the level of competition from the individual market to the group of 
markets, which subsequently leads to an entry behavior that resembles market division. Firms will 
seek to obtain first mover advantages across multiple markets and generally avoid entering markets 
that are contested, up to the point where new uncontested markets becomes relatively unattractive.  
 
irst mover 
advanta
Proposition 1: When multiple international market opportunities exist, firms are more likely to 
compete for markets rather than in markets. 
 
Moreover, this also means that first mover advantages in the individual markets are not 
eroded by competition to the extent that they would otherwise be. Firms will pursue f
ges, but not nearly as aggressively as what is generally suggested. Therefore if we were to 
test for first mover performance advantages in markets that share the characteristics of model one, 
we would generally not expect to find evidence thereof. On the other hand, if we were to do the 
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same for  the characteristics of model two we would indeed expect to find 
strong fir  advantages. Hence we expect that: 
. 
nother 
market
 
nalysis is at the level of the region rather than the country as a whole. Hence: 
Proposition 3: The narr reater the likelihood of 
finding first mover performance advantages. 
  
also effectively eliminate the possibility to secure a more global advantage by turning market entry 
competition into little more than a card trading game. 
the markets that share
st mover performance
 
Proposition 2: When multiple international market opportunities exist, first movers are more likely 
to secure a performance advantage over followers
 
The models also suggest another important practical implication. Player Z, who eventually 
got to move first, did not actually get a greater combined payoff than player P. Player Z merely 
achieved a greater payoff in one market and player P in return achieved a greater payoff in a
. Hence, there is no global first mover advantage only a local advantage. Therefore it 
becomes clear that the market definition can crucially influence the likelihood of finding a 
relationship between early entry and performance. In large geographical areas like China or the US 
that consists of a number of relatively autonomous regional markets the likelihood of finding a 
positive link between early entry and performance is going to be considerably large if the level of
a
 
ower the geographical market definition the g
Resource rationing through small scale/low commitment entry 
How can firms maximize their ability to exploit FMA’s under resource constraints?  While 
we have observed that resource constraints in a multi-market setting has a decidedly positive 
influence on the ability to secure performance advantages from moving first, resource constraints 
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The study by Meyer and Tran (2006) does suggest that firms in the brewery industry engage 
in activities which purpose could be resource rationing. They found that Carlsberg pursued a staged 
entry process where it would enter through a partial or staged acquisition of an existing brewery and 
Marinova (2006) which e predominant mode of 
entry in Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, over time additional breweries would be acquired 
thus fu
h to deter followers 
from carrying out a threat to enter. The argument is that on the condition that leapfrogging isn’t 
pos fer 
the final resource commitm al. Even a small lead 
would be enough to isolate the first mover from competition as long as entry threats are costly to 
lts of hinges on the 
assump
gradually increase its ownership stake over time. A similar result is found in Larimo, Marinov and 
 found clear evidence that partial acquisition was th
rther consolidating its position. This does suggest that first mover advantages might be 
secured without necessarily requiring large initial resource investments to deter further entry. If 
there are alternative market entry options, a player’s entry into a specific market might be enough to 
convince other players not to follow but to pursue market opportunities elsewhere. 
The possibility advanced by Mascarenhas (1997) that firms might seek to ration their 
resources and try to take advantage of first mover opportunities in a greater number of markets 
through limited commitment of resources is consequently quite appealing. Especially since a 
smaller resource commitment also allows firms to move earlier in general (Folta & O’Brien, 2004). 
Mills (1988) found that even an infinitely small cost could be enoug
sible, a first mover can enter early with a small initial commitment of resources and then de
ent to a time that would be individually optim
carry out and the follower can’t leapfrog the leader. Mills (1988) resu
tion that a series of steps must be taken in a specific sequence in order to bring about a 
market entry and that only the first to complete these steps gain any rent (becomes the monopolist). 
While the underlying conditions that Mills (1988) make are relatively strict the insight 
warrants some merit. Ultimately a series of acquisitions would usually be required in order to 
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achieve
Propo
Exercising threats to counter competitors attempt to ration resources 
Why do firms follow in markets that exhibit strong FMA? The logical result of Mascarenhas 
(1997) conclusion is that every player will attempt to skew the market distribution game in their 
favor by pre-empting other players in a large number of markets with small initial commitments of 
resources. The end result consequently changes little. 
However, Miller and Folta (2002) suggest that firms may act strategically to force a 
competitor to forfeit option value, though they do not address when they would be likely to do so or 
if they would willingly do so when it is not costless. While Mills (1988) found that a follower 
would not enter on the provision that it could never win a staged game against a player with a head 
start, the possibility remains that the follower might not need to win. As long as the follower derives 
a strategic benefit from tying up the first mover’s resources and consequently gaining a free hand in 
 market leadership, these are however not necessarily interdependent. Despite that it may 
still be quite difficult for a follower to snatch the market leadership through a rapid series of 
acquisitions. It is doubtful that such an undertaking could succeed without the first mover 
discovering it, especially since the sellers would have every incentive to solicit a competing bid 
from the first mover. Since the first mover will usually be able to respond to an attempt to leapfrog 
it follows that it is not an efficient strategy when other market opportunities are available to the 
follower i.e. opportunity costs are high. 
Hence, as long as market opportunities are amply available pre-emption could be possible 
with limited commitment. 
 
sition 4: When multiple international market opportunities exist, first movers are more likely 
to pursue low commitment/resource modes. 
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other markets it is strategically viable to make strategic investments in rivals markets with the 
object to force them to commit additional resources to defend their first mover position. The first 
mover is then forced to speed up the acquisition and consolidation process or in case no targets are 
immediately available bolster its war chest to prepare for when they do become available. If the 
relative difference in terms of resource commitment between threatening and defending is 
sufficiently large then, even when threats are costly, players may still choose to exercise them to 
bring about a global strategic advantage by tying up the defenders resources.  
ltiple international market opportunities exist, rivals are more likely to 
follow the leader in order to tie up the global resources of the leader, rather than to challenge the 
 
This may also suggest that a potentially viable first mover strategy is to avoid competition 
by targeting smaller or less attractive markets. A fairly well known case is the Wal-Mart chain 
which has consistently target less congested areas where it could pre-empt subsequent entry 
(Ghemawat, 1986). Similarly Carlsberg appears to have avoided entry into comparatively attractive 
beer markets like Hungary and the Czech Republic, instead Carlsberg has build up, through BBH, a 
dominant and highly profitable position in the small Baltic stats. In China, Carlsberg has turned 
towards the less developed Western regions and build a strong market presence in many of these 
regions. Entries into this type of markets may be less likely to be subject to threats therefore they 
can be secured with a smaller commitment of resources.  
 
 
Proposition 5: When mu
leader’s local market position. 
 82
Proposition 6: When multiple international market opportunities exists, firms may pursue first 
mover advantages in a larger number of markets by entry with small commitments of resources in 
comparatively smaller or less attractive markets. 
Small firm entry and exit 
Why do small foreign firms enter when the risk of exit is large? A key issue that arises from 
our study is the motivation and role of small MNCs entry into new markets. Our study indicates a 
comparatively high exit rate for this type of firms. It is thus worth considering what motivates these 
firms to enter and whether there are factors that encourage entry despite low probability of long 
term survival. 
Joaquin and Khanna (2001) modeled an entry situation with a small and large firm 
contemplating an investment project, their results suggested that small firms are more likely to enter 
earlier and exit earlier. In other studies comparatively weak firm specific resources has been linked 
to early entry (Narasimham & Zhang, 2000); Rivoli & Salorio, 1996). Hence, Narasimham & 
Zhang (2000) argue that resource weak firms may enter early in order to offset the advantage of 
better endowed firms. As a result they conclude that high failure rates by early movers could be a 
case of; the least capable of entering first, have to enter first. However, this leaves a fundamental 
question unanswered; why would these small or less well endowed firms engage in business 
ventures with much lower probability of success? In effect it would appear that the decision not to 
enter might be optimal for many of these smaller firms when faced with entry competition from 
stronger rivals. Obviously in industries where the potential pay off from a successful venture can 
cover the costs of several failed ventures this type of risk may be perfectly reasonable, but in more 
mature consumer goods industries the profit margins of successful ventures are unlikely to cover 
multiple business failures.  
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However, it is likely that these firms may be more able to offset some of the risk of entry b
 proportionally lower exit cost. The evidence from the brewing industry does suggest that the
stment to a larger brewery. Hence, in reality the hi
y 
a  
primary exit mode is dive gh exit rates endured by 
these firms masks an active market for this type of assets. In some cases, such as the investment of 
Nomura Investment Bank in the Czech brewing industry, the acquirer might have no long term 
interest in the market (Larimo, Marinov & Marinova, 2006). A strong case can thus be made that 
the relative sunkness of the investments made by smaller MNEs is lower. 
We thus suggest that a key explanation for entry by smaller firms may be that they are able 
to divest their assets to larger firms seeking a way into a market or a means to consolidate their 
position in the market. Hence we propose that: 
 
Proposition 7: A greater propensity in an industry to enter international markets through 
acquisitions reduces the exit barriers and consequently encourages entry by small MNEs into new 
international markets. 
 
Managerial perspective 
From a managerial perspective the key strategic goal in the competition for markets is to 
secure a dominant position in as many markets as possible. The successful rationing and allocation 
of resources and choice of markets is thus the primary means to achieve this goal. 
Firms need to pursue entry strategies that provide a strong enough commitment and head 
start that it induces rivals not to challenge. But at the same time ration resources effectively to 
ensure that the greatest possible number of markets can be reached. Targeting one strategy at the 
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
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expens
ining enough resources to 
pursue 
artial acquisitions, is likely to be an effective means 
to obtain a strong market position with limited resources commitment. One caveat here though is 
discretion 
 
 will often be motivated by reluctant sellers rather than at the explicit request 
f the foreign acquirer. 
Also targeting markets that are less attractive and consequently less likely to be threatened 
may be a way to stretch resources further. 
 new market is an endeavor that offers a proportionally 
small c
it strategy in their 
plannin
e of the others may place a firm at a disadvantage. If a firm were to pursue a strategy of 
targeting many markets with small initial investments as suggested by Mascarenhas (1997) it would 
most likely induce competitors to threaten, hence forcing the firm to protect its markets by 
committing considerable resources to consolidate its position. On the other hand a strategy that 
relies on entry with large investments in consolidating the firm’s position would result in few 
resources available to enter new markets. Firms need to pursue a balanced strategy; they need to 
commit enough resources to minimize the likelihood of threats, while reta
first mover opportunities in new markets. And when the opportunity arises they should 
exercise the option to threaten competitors markets in order to tie up their resources. 
The choice of entry mode, in particular p
that the extensive use of partial acquisition as a mode of entry may not be entirely at the 
of the entrant. Studies by Jakobsen and Meyer (2008); Larimo, Marinov and Marinova (2006) find
that partial acquisitions
o
To many small firms, entry into a
hance of long term sustainability. However, a redeeming factor is that these firms acquire 
scarce assets that are potentially valuable to other players in the industry. Hence, from the very 
beginning of an investment these firms should clearly consider and integrate an ex
g. Hence a local firm’s market positioning, geographical scope and distribution should be 
tailored not only to fit with the strategic objectives of the parent, but also with a keen eye to the 
effect of these on the potential exit value of the local firm. 
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Contributions and suggestions for further research 
The main contribution of this study is to extend the first mover literature to incorporate 
interdependent entry competition across multiple markets. The study offers several important 
insights in regard to entry competition. Above all we argue that the presence of first mover 
advantages can lead to competition for markets. One important implication is that it may in fact be 
possible to retain a performance advantage from early entry if competitors are better off seeking 
alternative market opportunities. Hence, while assuming low opportunity cost offers powerful 
modeling results, these might not be practically applicable; firms do tend to have alternative 
investment options! 
Another implication of the study relates to the notion of competition. We argue that strong 
first mover advantages could effectively lead to market division. While it appears intuitively 
sensible to judge a firm or the level of competition within an industry by its regional or even global 
market share, such crude concepts may be entirely misleading. Competition, in the type of industry 
we concern ourselves with in this study, is inherently local. Regional or even global measures of 
success strictly speaking measure a firm’s relative success in the competition for markets game.  
se to challenge the leader’s position, but rather to 
force t
This study offers a unique view on the reasons to follow in a market. We suggest that firms 
may follow in markets not with the actual purpo
he leader to commit additional resources. A potential implication of this is that the 
performance difference between first movers and followers could in fact be artificially high on the 
grounds that followers may choose to invest just enough resources to trigger a response; hence 
effectively under-investing. This could also suggest that studies can find performance advantages 
associated with early entry even when first mover advantages are not naturally strong. This 
argument can be viewed as an alternative or complementary explanation to the line of research that 
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stress scope economies or the stabilizing effect of cross market retaliation as a motive for following 
(Gimen
r studying order of entry and performance effects using only the segment of 
“winni
se 
destina
While it might have been interesting to observe the relationship between order of entry and 
performance for each investment, this is hindered by the fact that in most cases multiple 
acquisitions are subsequently merged into one organization. 
The acquisition driven entry patterns observed in this study have important implications for 
the conclusions we draw, but of course also set the limitations of the study. The relevance of this 
o & Woo, 1999). 
Another important implication relates to the survival bias issue in performance studies. 
Previous studies have raised the problem that entry order might be affects either positively 
(Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988) or negatively (Narasimham & Zhang, 2000) by the relative 
strength of the firm. Hence, controlling for survival biases is potentially as likely to create 
measurement biases as not doing so. However, it is quite possible that there are a group of “natural” 
winners and losers in foreign market entry. Future studies encompassing multiple geographical 
markets may conside
ng” firms that have successfully entered several foreign markets.   
 We strongly suggest that in order to advance research with in the field more longitudinal 
studies should be conducted that considers both the local competitive and regional or global 
competitive dynamics. It is also worth considering the effect of competition for markets in the 
internationalization literature. Take the example of Carlsberg its investments in the Baltic States and 
Poland, which might be constructed as a case of internationalization towards geographically clo
tions. However then why the Balkan countries and not Hungary or the Czech republic? Why 
Western China? It is quite feasible that firms develop some underlying decision guidelines to decide 
between markets that are dependent on the expected interests of competitors. 
Limitations 
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study is likely to be limited to industries that exhibit a strong multi-domestic structure, where key 
local assets are very difficult to create and build up from scratch. 
Eisenh
siness Studies, 33(1): 
Ghemawat, P. (1986). Wal-Mart Stores, discount operations Working Paper Case No. 0-387-018, 
ics of scope, and firm performance, 
The Academy of Management Journal, 42(3), 239-259. 
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4. Partial Acquisition: The Overlooked Entry Mode 
 
access ter aims to explain the use of PAs 
investm  recent entry mode literature. Theoretical 
argume  (viz wholly-owned subsidiary). 
particu ation effect may override buyers’ informational 
in the expected increase of 
INTRODUCTION 
Multinational enterprises engaging in f reign direct investment (FDI) combine their 
ownership advantages with locational advantages of the host country (Dunning, 1992). They can 
access such locational advantages through different modes of entry. Research on entry modes 
mostly takes a theory driven approach distinguishing modes either by ownership or based on the 
‘build or buy’ decision (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007; Luo, 2002; Meyer, 2001). This approach, 
however, disguises the richness of entry modes  a means to combine ownership and locational 
advantages. Many firms enter by partial acquisition (PA), especially in transition economies. These 
PAs combine elements of joint ventures (JVs), namely shared ownership, and of acquisitions, 
namely taking over an existing operation. Yet, they also have unique features that have been 
ABSTRACT. In certain locations, foreign investors frequently use partial acquisitions (PAs) to 
locational advantages controlled by local firms. This chap
as a mode of entry in emerging economies, based on two unique samples of foreign direct 
ents in transition economies and a review of
considerations and empirical data show that PAs are insufficiently explained by combining 
nts for acquisitions (viz Greenfield) and for joint ventures
We thus challenge some of the assumptions and assertions of recent entry mode research. In 
lar, reverse asymmetric inform
disadvantages. Thus, PAs are often desired by sellers to attain a share 
the firm’s value. 
 
o
as
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ove ernment policy 
makers as they are the seller side of a privatization by ‘partial divestment’.  
PAs are a form of acquisition as the investor acquires an equity stake in existing 
n of the phenomenon. However, this does not hold 
true, as we will argue and demonstrate with empirical data in this paper.  
We review PAs in the context of other modes of entry or expansion, and outline their unique 
characteristics. We present empirical evidence from two recent research projects covering seven 
emergi
rlooked by prior research. The understanding of PAs is also important to gov
organization, yet without obtaining full equity ownership. Hence, the investors lack full control over 
the strategy of the business and thus have limited power to effect organizational change. PAs occur 
in many different facets – in some cases the investor takes over management control and engages 
directly in the strategic management of the firm, in other cases the acquirer acts more like a 
financial investor or venture capitalist, advising and possibly indirectly influencing the 
management, but not taking over direct control.  
What all PAs have in common are two defining characteristics: (1) an existing organization, 
and (2) shared ownership among one or more owners. This definition suggests that a combination of 
the theoretical literatures on respectively joint-versus-wholly-owned and acquisition-versus-
greenfield may provide an appropriate explanatio
ng economies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), Asia and Africa (Meyer & Estrin, 2007; 
Estrin & Meyer, 2004) to investigate when and where foreign entrants use PAs. We find them to be 
fairly common across a wide range of emerging economies, despite the disadvantages of having 
operational responsibilities for an existing firm without carrying full equity control. We then 
proceed to discussing the reasons why both buyers and sellers may prefer a partial acquisition over 
other modes, despite these disadvantages. We conclude by outlining future research agendas to 
investigate not only PAs, but also to address conceptual challenges arising from our discussion for 
the validity of findings of earlier entry strategy research.  
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PARTIAL ACQUISITION AS AN ENTRY MODE 
cal owners, while a PA is 
defined
hold complete equity control. It is the 
Defining partial acquisitions 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is an investment in a company in another country with the 
aim to influence its business strategies (Dunning, 1992). This definition distinguishes FDI from 
portfolio investment, where equity stakes are too low to exert substantive control, and from 
contractual relations that normally do not involve equity participation. We focus on entry modes of 
foreign direct investors. 
Categories of entry modes for foreign direct investors are normally defined by their 
ownership, and whether a new legal entity is created or an existing entity is being taken over. 
Hence, a greenfield operation is a wholly owned new venture, while an acquisition is defined as 
obtaining full ownership control of an existing local firm. A JV is defined as the establishment of a 
new venture owned by one or more foreign owners and one or more lo
 as the acquisition of a substantive stake in an existing local firm. 
We operationalize these definitions as follows: Following common practice, we consider 
investment in equity stakes below 10% as portfolio investment (OECD 1996), which we do not 
consider in our analysis. We draw the boundary between partial and full ownership at 95% foreign 
equity stake. These operationalizations are fairly robust in that few FDI projects would shift into 
other categories if the boundaries change by small increments. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the features of PA shared with other modes of entry. Like a full 
acquisition, a PA relies on an existing business organization with all of the advantages and 
disadvantages associated with this. Much like a JV, the acquirer, however, does not obtain full 
claim to the residual proceeds nor does the acquirer 
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combin
simenko & Rojec, 2001), 
China 
ype II’; Tsang (2003) uses the term 
‘acquis
ation of these primary features that distinguishes the PA from the three other principal 
modes of entry and helps us define what constitutes a partial acquisition. 
 
Challenges to classifying entries 
The formal definition appears fairly clear, yet case evidence suggests that classifying modes 
in practice is not as easy. For instance, studies in CEE (Artisien-Mak
(Tsang, 2003) and Vietnam (Nguyen et al., 2004) show that it is fairly common to transfer 
state assets into a jointly owned new legal entity. Legally, this is a JV because a new legal entity has 
been created. However this type of investment de facto involves the partial transfer of ownership 
rights to an existing organization, hence for strategic purposes it resembles a PA. Following Estrin 
and Meyer (2004) we refer to this type of entry mode as ‘JV T
ition JV’.  
Furthermore, many full acquisitions related to a privatization come with significant 
contractual limitations on what the acquirer is allowed or obliged to do often within a certain time 
period; a type we refer to as “contractually restrained acquisitions”. For example, contracts with 
New 
organization 
Existing 
organization 
Joint Venture 
control 
Figure 4.1 Ownership control and the make or buy decision 
Shared equity 
control 
Greenfield Acquisition 
Partial 
Acquisition 
Full equity 
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privatization agencies often require an investor to commit to employment guarantees or capital 
investment as a condition for the deal to be approved (Meyer, 2002; Uhlenbruck & De Castro, 
998). In other cases, a gove1 t agency may olden share with veto-rights for certain 
strategic decisions. Thus, contrary ity ownership does not always 
provide full control. 
A  obstacle to classifying entries is the instability of the ownership arrangement. 
Many – but not all – partial acquisitions are from the outset planned to be taken over by the foreign 
investor within the foresee re. In m the foreign investor even attained 
management control ahead of acquiring majority equity ownership. In these cases, the shared 
As at the outset. 
ypes of owners 
aries considerably in partial acquisitions and can have a 
crucial
ations across CEE. 
rnmen
 to common perceptions, full equ
retain a g
different
able futu any cases, 
ownership is a temporary phenomenon, called ‘staged acquisitions’ by Meyer and Tran (2006). 
Analysts would however find it hard to distinguish temporary and stable P
T
The identity of the local partner v
 influence on the operation of the PA. In some cases the partner may be a single entity, e.g. 
the state or a large industrial group, while in other cases ownership may be dispersed between large 
numbers of small private owners. 
In transition economies in CEE, the PAs are in particular associated with the transfer of state 
assets into private hands. A number of different privatization methods have been employed, 
including direct sale to foreign owners, transfer of ownership to insiders of the firm, or broader 
transfers into public hands (Estrin, 2002). Thus foreign acquirers are confronted with a diversity of 
ownership constell
If the acquisition occurs directly from the privatization agency or a government ministry, 
foreign acquirers have to deal directly with a state owner. In other cases, new owners (and thus the 
‘sellers’ of the firm) include managers and/or employees of the firm. Some countries experimented 
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with privatization programs designed to spread ownership of formerly state owned enterprises 
(SOE) broadly, usually through voucher-based schemes. However, the recipients of the vouchers 
would often invest them in funds, often indirectly controlled by the state, hence inadvertently 
transferring control rights back into the states sphere. Potential acquirers may thus be negotiating 
with state-backed investment funds.  
e.  
ur discussion, we assume that the acquirer is a multinational firm taking a 
strategi
 introducing new management). Since these investors actively 
influen
later in this paper.  
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
The OLI paradigm (Dunning, 1992) proposes three necessary conditions for FDI to take 
A primary challenge for the acquirer is that these owners pursue different objectives that 
may conflict with the objectives of the acquirer. Particularly, the state or management/employee 
owners are likely to pose special challenges for the acquirer. These types of owners are likely to 
have special interest in the firm and pursue objectives other than solely profit maximization. This 
can be at odds with the interest of the foreign owner and complicates both the initial negotiation 
process and the management of the operation after the investors has assumed its equity stak
In most of o
c interest in the partially acquired firm. This is however not always the case, as a PA may be 
undertaken for a number of other reasons. For example, private equity funds acquire equity stakes 
with the aim of benefiting from increased stock values, while helping management to improve the 
performance of the firm (or even
ce the firm’s strategy and equity stakes typically over 10%, this does not qualify as portfolio 
investment. However, the dynamics of post-acquisition change are quite different than if the 
acquirer is an MNE aiming to integrate the acquired unit with its global operations. This form of 
investment is however of lesser importance in emerging economies and does not contribute much to 
the PAs analyzed in the data presented 
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place. It suggests that a foreign investor must hold ownership (O) advantages that can be exploited 
in the foreign market. Furthermore there must be locational (L) advantages that encourage local 
production. Finally there should be drivers for internalization (I) that encourages internalization of 
the control rights in the hand of the foreign investor. It is particularly the acquisition and 
internalization of these location specific advantages that is essential to understand why firms use PA 
as an e
arket 
failure 
f a different nature than that motivating 
establishment of a JV. 
A small number of studies have considered PAs as a distinct entry mode. Cheng and 
Hennart (2004) suggest an asymmetric information view: An acquirer facing difficulties in 
ntry mode. 
Nonetheless, despite the sheer size of the mode choice literature in general (Brouthers & 
Hennart, 2007), we know surprisingly little about the use of PAs. And what little we do know may 
not be relevant for emerging economies. Why might our current theoretical understanding of partial 
acquisitions fail to capture the motives behind them in emerging economies? 
Transaction cost economists explain the partial internalization in JVs by double m
(Hennart, 1991): The project depends on contributions from two or more partners, yet the 
markets for these contributions from the parents are subject to market failure, i.e. transaction costs 
are high. A JV structure can overcome the inherent opportunism problem by making both parties 
residual claimants and thus aligning their interests. Hence, the method of remunerating the input 
providers is seen as the main motivation for shared ownership. 
Brouthers and Hennart (2007) apply this logic and conclude that JVs and PAs are 
conceptually the same. This argument may be quite useful to explain newly established JVs, yet we 
consider it misguided to apply the same reasoning to explain the choice of PAs. What distinguishes 
a PA is that a share of the ownership of all organizational resources of the local firm is transferred 
to a new owner; hence the market failure appears to be o
 97
valuating the underlying assets would favor a PA over a full acquisition. This would force the seller 
to provide the acquirer with a “hostage”, something the seller would avoid if the underlying asset is 
a “lemon”. It also ensures that the seller continues to act in the best interest of the business.  
In transition economies, the nature and importance of asymmetric information may however 
be different. Evidence suggests that valuations of state enterprises in CEE widely differed between 
potential buyers and sellers, which greatly complicated negotiations processes (Tsang and Yip, 
2007; 
t value of the assets 
better t
s in hold up problems. Hence higher levels of uncertainty should all else 
being 
Meyer, 2002; Antal-Mokos, 1998; Ferris et al., 1995). On the one hand, the greater 
institutional distance between the home and host country would increase asymmetric information 
between the foreign buyer and the local seller. 
Hence, the underlying assumption that sellers understand the marke
han prospective buyers is doubtful at best. In particular, the disparity between the value of 
assets in their current use compared to their first best use would tend to be much higher, due to the 
weaknesses of incumbent management and rapidly changing industry structures. The seller’s 
knowledge about the potential value of the assets of the local firm is thus limited. Consequently, in 
the transition context, the asymmetric information argument may not be applicable in the form 
proposed by Chen and Hennart (2004). 
Another study by Duarte and Gacia-Canal (2004) suggests that in high risk contexts, such as 
emerging economies, firms may prefer to limit their financial exposure by decreasing their equity 
commitment and pursue a partial acquisition. However this argument is fragile at best. For one, 
from a transaction cost perspective (Williamson, 1975) higher levels of uncertainty is likely to lead 
to more frequent and more substantial needs for strategic and operational realignments, with 
corresponding increase
equal lead to a greater drive to internalize, not less. Furthermore, from a financial 
perspective, it is not clear that retaining local shareholder(s) would reduce the cost of capital. Local 
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owners may attach a smaller risk premium to local assets, yet they also face insufficient 
diversification opportunities, inefficient capital markets and weak institutional protection. 
IB scholars may be too accustomed to view the choice of entry mode from the perspective of 
the for
 owner(s) have a vested interest in maximizing the 
combin
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEYS 
CEE survey. These data illustrate the distinct features of PAs, which international business scholars 
eign acquirer. This may be misleading in transition economies, where firms are often 
acquired from the state or from employee owners. Ultimately the host governments decided to 
change the economic system from central planning to a more market based system. Similarly, 
employees in employee-owned firms decide if and when to externalize the management rights and 
the residual claim to that enterprise. 
In state or employee owned firms, the
ed value of both their equity stake and other resources, such as labor, that are tied to the 
firm. Especially the protection of jobs is often a major concern for sellers in transition economies. 
The main motive of PAs is thus not to maximize the economic efficiency of the acquired unit by 
curbing opportunism, but rather to provide protection against harmful (autonomous) adaptation 
(Hayek, 1945; Williamson, 1975). Thus, the choice of entry mode is not a unilateral decision made 
by the acquirer but the result of a negotiated process between two or more parties. 
 
Empirical evidence on PAs in a wide range of emerging economies is available from two 
surveys conducted in emerging economies. The first survey was conducted using a set of countries 
from Asia and Africa, while the second survey was conducted in transition economies in CEE. 
Together, these surveys represent more than 1000 observations in seven countries: India, Vietnam, 
Egypt, South Africa, Hungary, Poland and Lithuania. The data collection process has been 
described in Estrin and Meyer (2004) for the Asian survey and Meyer and Estrin (2007) for the 
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ought to consider when advancing their theories. All the statistical analyses were conducted using 
the SPSS software package. Table 4.1 reports the bivariate association between the included 
variables.  
Location 
Table 4.2 indicates a fairly consistent distribution of PAs across all seven countries with 
investors in India being the least likely to use PAs and those in Poland being the most likely with 
respectively seven and sixteen percent of all entr
represent the true importance of PAs because of deal structures that for practical purposes resembles 
PAs but legally are JVs (Estrin & Meyer, 2004; Tsang, 2003). In the case of Vietnam, no partial 
acquisitions have been captured by the survey, however a large number of foreign entries followed 
the ‘JV type II’ mode which had been listed as a separate option in the Vietnam version of the 
questionnaire (Nguyen et al., 2004), and which we tabulate here as PA.   
In contrast, full acquisitions are rare in Egypt, India and Vietnam compared to the three CEE 
countries and South Africa. An important reason for this factor is related to legal ownership 
  
ies. However, these figures may possibly under 
Table 4.1 Mean, Standard Deviation and Correlation Matrix 
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Subsidiary Size 374,63 2284,13 1       
2 Ln(subsidiary size) 3,37 1,81 0,48** 1      
4 Absolute change in 45,96 226,72 0,87** 0, 46** -0,79** 1    
5 Government influence 2,94 1,24 0,08 0,17** -0,08 0,14** 1   
6 Resource transfer (principal component) 0,00 
3 Change in employment -9,70 231,14 -0,84** -0,34** 1     
employment 
1,00 -0,05 -0,03 0,11* -0,03 0,02 1  
7 Human resource develop. (principal component) 0,00 1,00 0,05 0,12* 0,05 0,07 0,11* 0,39** 1 
Poland, Lithuania and Hungary only, levels of significance: P<0.01 **, P<0.05 *. 
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restrictions in these countries and the liquidity of markets for corporate equity. Hence institutional 
factors are clearly an important determinant in the entry mode choice as MNEs normally expanding 
decision is not very helpful to understand the realities of business in emerging 
Firms need to consider all the available alternatives simultaneously.  
 categories the Eta 
by acquisitions need to find alternative means to access local resources. This suggest that the 
theoretical position of Brouthers and Hennart (2007) to isolate the make or buy viz. full or partial 
ownership 
economies. 
More importantly, our evidence establishes PAs as an important entry mode in its own right 
in emerging economies, especially transition economies. For the remaining empirical analysis, we 
focus on the CEE data set to ensure that meaningful comparisons can be made to full acquisitions. 
Subsidiary size 
Table 4.3 reports the initial mean firm size in terms of number of employees and the natural 
log of the number of employees7 for different entry modes, along with an ANOVA significance test 
of the variation (F) and the Eta measure of association. For a relationship between a continuous 
dependent variable and an independent variable that have a limited number of
                                                 
7 Since the relationship between size and entry mode choice is not expected to be strictly linear and since the type of 
dependent variable has a long tail the natural log tends to provide more robust results. 
s) 
y Mode Hungar Lithuania Poland ypt India South Africa m 
Table 4.2 Distribution of affiliates by entry mode (% of affiliate
Entr y Eg Vietna
Greenfield 43 35 31 56 40 42 46 
Joint Venture 23 19 53 23 32 
25 4 31 2 
9 7 14 111/
20 37 
Acquisition 30 21 5 
Partial Acquisition 11 16 12 
Notes: Colum  total = 100 +/- rounding; 
isitions  def as JV re lo s t r p e e sting o eratio  
 t urce eyer et al., in Me
  n
1/ Vietnam: Partial acqu  were ined  whe cal firm ransfe art of th xi p n
to he newly created JV. So : M yer and Estrin (2007).  
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measure is similar to the correlation coefficient. For each (ANOVA) test the F value and the Eta 
measure of association is calculate. The F value is derived using the formula: 
)1/(
)1/(
−
−=
NSSE
ZF  
(Z – 1) is degree  freedo f the independent variable and (N – 1) is the 
degrees of freedom for the sample. SST, the total sum of squares is calculated by aggregating the 
s and mean 
SST
Where the s of m o
GY . quared difference between Y and the gr
SST = ( )2∑ −YY  G
SSE, the Sum of squares error is then calculated by aggregating the squared difference 
between Y and the treatment mean eYmod  
SSE = ( )2∑ −YY  
Eta =
mod e
Finally the measure of association is derived by the formula: 
SST
 SSESST )( −
tial size of the local enterprise by entry mode 
Entry
Due to the limited number of full acquisitions in the Asia-Africa data set (Table 4.2), we 
Table 4.3 Mean ini
 Mode Subsidiary Size LN(Subsidiary size) 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
Greenfield 38,23 99,54 2,60 1,29 
Joint Venture 66,65 141,16 3,15 1,38 
Partial Acquisition 2665,02 6589,15 5,07 3,38 
Acquisition 275,11 530,65 4,37 1,68 
F 17,60*** 41,92*** 
Eta 0,347 0,496 
Poland, Lithuania and Hungary only, levels of significance: P<0.01 ***, P<0.05 **, P<0.10 *.  
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include only the CEE countries. The results suggest that PAs are on average larger than entries by 
any other mode, including full acquisitions. This suggests that partial acquisitions have a 
comparatively large economic impact on host countries and account for a substantial share of the 
employment of foreign owned firms. Understanding the peculiarities of this entry mode should 
therefore be of great practic
he bsequent empirical analysis. We thus adopt 
a stepwise approach estim ting the marginal contribution of the entry mode using a methodology 
adapted
epe ent variable X which either takes the values of subsidiary 
size if the expected relationship is mathematically conditioned or LN(subsidiary size) if the 
expected relationship is conceptually conditioned. 
Y = a + βX + u 
en collect the residual denoted by r of this regression and use them as the dependent 
variable in a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) test with the entry mode choice as the 
independent variable. The key advantage of this technique over a multivariate OLS regression is 
ntrolled for before conducting the 
ANOVA on the marginal influence of the entry mode choice8. 
G vernmental influences
.4 reports the nship betw vernment influence on a business and entry 
m government influence is  as a 5 poin rt scale variable; see the 
Appendix for a description of this variable. The initial values suggest stronger government 
al concern to both policy makers and business strategists. 
This strong association between size and partial acquisition suggests that it may be 
necessary to control for this influence in some of t  su
a
 from Cantwell and Mudambi (2000). We first regress, using an OLS regression, the 
dependent variable Y against the ind nd
We th
that this method eliminates any multi-collinearity between subsidiary size and entry mode. 
Furthermore it is hierarchical in the sense that the size effect is co
o  
Table 4  relatio een go
ode. The variable measured t Like
                                                 
8 Consider the government influence in the next subsection. If we make the plausible case that governance influence is 
larger in partial acquisitions because they are large then it makes sense to eliminate this proponent first. 
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influences on PAs. However, when correcting for subsidiary size using the two step approach, the 
overall significance of the relationship disappears. Hence the effect of government influence 
appears to be largely derived from the size of the enterprise; in other words the political 
establishment is more likely to interfere the larger the enterprise – but not in PAs per se. 
o important factors that may explain the use of PAs in transition economies: 
First of
2). 
Table 4.5 reports the relationship between entry mode and the transfer of knowledge to the 
ent and the 
Entry Mode Government influence 
This suggests tw
 all, employment is a major concern for governments in transition economies, as suggested 
above when discussing types of owners. Moreover, governments have the means and the incentive 
to indirectly interfere in the operation of firms, regardless of entry mode. Full ownership in it self is 
thus not necessarily sufficient to guaranty complete managerial control. Consequently, foreign 
owners may more willingly accept some form of shared ownership if it provides an element of 
protection against adverse interference by the state (Meyer, 200
Resource transfers 
A common concern about PAs is that investors may be reluctant to transfer resources, 
especially hard to value and intangible assets, to their new affiliate if they do not control the use of 
these transferred resources, and have to share any rents thus generated with a local co-owners.  
affiliate. Two proxies for transfers are used, investment in human resource developm
Table 4.4 Mean influence of local governments by entry mode 
Government influence 
(with control for size) 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
Greenfield 2,76 1,24 -0,06 1,29 
Acquisition 3,05 1,24 0,03 
Joint Venture 2,92 1,25 0,00 1,22 
1,19 
Partia
F 3,78** 0,33 
l Acquisition 3,34 1,07 0,14 1,04 
Eta 0,150 0,051 
Notes: Poland, Lithuania and Hungary only, levels of significance: P<0.01 ***, P<0.05 **, P<0.10 *. 
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foreign subsidiary’s access to resources from the parent company. The human resource measure is a 
principal component based on three 7-point Likert scale variables (see Appendix). The Cronbach’s 
Alpha test yielded a result of (0,801) indicating a good fit. As larger enterprises are more likely to 
have formal human resource development programs we account for this by adopting the two step 
approa
s are less likely than any other 
ent in human capital and also receive comparatively less resources 
from th
m foreign parent 
Hum t 
(
Access to resources from the parent 
Table 4.5 Human resource development and resources access fro
Entry Mode an resource developmenwith control for size) (with control for size) 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
Greenfield 0
-
-
-
3 2  
,16 1,02 0,14 1,01 
Joint Venture 0,08 0,91 -0,20 1,08 
Acquisition 0,06 1,01 0,01 0,80 
Partial Acquisition 0,36 1,11 -0,12 1,01 
F ,425** ,287*
Eta 0,164 0,135 
Notes: Poland, Lithuania and Hungary only, levels of significance: P<0.01 ***, P<0.05 **, P<0.10 *. 
ch regressing the principal component against the LN(subsidiary size). The residual is then 
used as the dependent variable in the ANOVA test. 
The second measure is a principal component based on three 7-point Likert scale measures 
of perceived access to financial, managerial and technological resources from the parent company. 
The Cronbach’s Alpha test yielded a result of (0,797) indicating a good fit. 
Both measures were found to be significantly related to entry mode at the 5 percent and 10 
percent level respectively. The results show that partial acquisition
mode to benefit from investm
e foreign investor. This remarkable finding has substantive implications as it suggests that 
PAs may be at a substantial operational disadvantage compared to other modes. On both items, 
Greenfield projects seem to receive most support from the foreign parent.  
Resources transfers tend to be low in both JVs and PAs, which support the argument that 
shared ownership would reduce investors’ incentives to share knowledge with a new affiliate. 
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Investment in human capital is on average lower in PAs compared to any other mode. This is likely 
to be the consequence of the combination of organisational in  
adverse incentives arising fro
ilar concern arises with respect to foreign investors’ willingness to invest in risky 
e proces they do not h ull control (M  Estrin, 2007). Table 4.6 
nge in employment and entry mode choice, the first is a simple 
means test reporting the mean change in employment per year  viz. the choice of entry mode. The 
ted for initial size. 
quired. A reduction of 
employ
oth positive – but the F-
           
ertia in an inherited organization and
m shared ownership. 
Employment effects 
A sim
organizational chang ses if ave f eyer &
reports the relationship between cha
9
ANOVA test on the difference of means suggests that PAs would tend to destroy jobs. However, 
when controlling for the initial size of the operation, using our two step approach, the results 
change substantially. PAs are no longer associated with employment destruction, but surprisingly 
show a small though insignificant propensity to create or preserve jobs. Finally we investigate the 
absolute value of the change in employment across entry modes. The results again do not indicate 
significant deviation across entry modes when correc
The job destruction in PAs thus arises from the much larger size of PAs at the outset; it is 
not caused by the choice of PA as an entry mode per se. Many state owned firms in CEE employed 
before privatisation a substantially larger work force than what was re
ment in large enterprises may thus be a necessary part of the restructuring (Estrin, 2002), 
and PA is chosen as an organizational form to implement this aim.  
The propensity of PAs to create or destroy jobs after controlling for size is not significantly 
different from other modes. If it was true that local co-owners obstruct restructuring that involves 
lay-offs, we would see a positive coefficient after controlling for size, and a negative coefficient 
when considering the absolute value of the change. The coefficients are b
                                      
9 This variables has been defined as [(employment at the time of survey – employment in first year of operations) / age 
of subsidiary in years].  
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statistic shows that this effect is clearly not statistically significant. 
Thus, the impediments to full control may be offset by countervailing forces. As previously 
suggested, even in full acquisitions, employees or the government could potentially constrain the 
operational flexibility of the foreign owned subsidiary indirectly. 
Another possibility is that there are some intrinsic advantages of partnering with local 
stakeholders. A partnership with local stakeholders may provide the subsidiary with a shield against 
adverse
 uses. 
Summ
modes of entry, which suggest that institutional, location and cultural aspects play an important role 
Table 4.6 Employment effects by entry mode 
Change in employment 
size) 
Absolute change in 
control for size) 
 opportunistic activities by other stakeholders. Hence the operational freedom of a partial 
PA may in fact be comparatively larger. It is also possible that local co-owners may facilitate 
access to new business licences and permits, real estate etc, therefore contributing to new growth 
opportunities. Finally an alternative explanation is that co-ownership with employees could 
encourage smoother redeployment of resources into more productive
ary 
We find that PAs are fairly commonly used across emerging economies, even in relatively 
advanced ones such as South Africa. The propensity for PAs varies across countries as for all 
in the entry mode choice. Furthermore, our data indicate that PAs tend to be larger in terms of 
Entry Mode Change in employment per year per year (with control for employment per year (with 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Greenfield 18,34 
Joint Venture 6,90 
65,70 -1,05 70,54 2,59 61,23 
18,60 -10,05 23,52 0,97 122,24 
Acqui
Partial 
F 8,025*** 0,915 0,345 
sition -2,23 154,64 -1,09 136,08 -9,89 17,34 
Acquisition -171,80 634,67 29,35 296,67 9,38 262,19 
Eta 0,248 0,086 0,053 
Notes: Poland, Lithuania and Hungary only, levels of significance: P<0.01 ***, P<0.05 **, P<0.10 *. 
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employment than other foreign entries. Considering the fairly consistent use across a broad range of 
transition economies and their comparatively large economic impact on the host countries, PAs 
clearly merit sch e  c  
d tinct features. S  these res app he size d ences, whi rs are not:
• ent influence in large ente
 that chose  align st cou terests w t of the investor or 
 aga sible interference. 
• e find lower transfe esources from the  investor and less inve s in human 
es 
more rigid. Retention rates and 
ove
ven though we control for size of 
the affi
e, managerial skills etc. 
 full acquisition we may expect these to reside within the acquired organisation.  
Howev
olarly attention. Our xploratory analysis of the haracteristics of PAs shows
is ome of featu ear to t iffer le othe   
 We find indirect evidence of increased governm rprises pointing to the 
possibility  firms  PAs to  the ho ntries in ith tha
as a shield inst pos  adverse government 
 W rs of r foreign stment
resource development in PAs, pointing to a combination of lower incentive to transfer resourc
and organisational friction or inertia  
• We find no evidence to suggest that PAs are organisationally 
rall organisational change is not significantly affected by the limited control, suggesting a 
series of possible countervailing forces facilitating growth opportunities. 
These results should however be treated as preliminary. E
liate, rigorous analysis would call for multivariate techniques. Our exploratory analysis thus 
mainly services to outline challenges for future research.  
 
MOTIVES: ACQUIRER’S PERSPECTIVE 
What advantages and disadvantages does a PA offer? Unlike a JV, the advantages derived 
from a local co-owner is unlikely to be related directly to market knowledg
Similar to a
er there may still be a unique set of advantages that makes a partial acquisition an attractive 
entry mode. 
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Reduced ex-ante contracting costs 
The process of acquiring a local firm in a transition economy can be a slow and difficult 
exercise (Artisien-Maksimenko & Rojec, 2001) that runs the risk of being hijacked by various 
groups of stakeholders (Antal-Mokos, 1998). As suggested above, ownership of assets in transition 
economies is often in the hands of stakeholders that have other primary interests than profit 
maximization, most notably protecting jobs. Even when stakeholders are not directly involved in 
Me
due
und
wit er & Søn a Norwegian operator in the food retail industry 
cha
are  evidence suggest that 
this has
urdles and thus speed up the negotiation 
process  investor, a partial acquisition may be the fastest way to gain access to a 
market and secure early mover advantages. Thus, Jakobsen (2007) finds that early entry through 
partial acquisition enhances the performance of a new operation. Hence a key advantage of partial 
acquisition
the negotiation process they may still successfully exert indirect pressure. Antal-Mokos (1998) and 
yer (2002) provide several examples of ex-ante negotiations that have failed or been drawn out 
 to intervention by other stakeholders in the process. 
It is also common in transition economies that an acquirer contractually commits to 
ertake a certain level of investment, or, for instance, not to close plants or lay off employees 
hin a certain period. For example, Rieb
acquired Delecta SA, an employee owned firm in Poland, and contractually obliged not to make 
nges within a three year period (Dale, 2006). We have no way of segmenting acquisitions that 
 contractually restricted from acquisitions that are not, however anecdotal
 been fairly frequent. Consequently the relative level of operational freedom enjoyed by full 
acquisitions should not be overestimated. 
Local ownership participation may ease some of h
. For the foreign
s may be to reduce the ex-ante contracting costs. 
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Legitimacy 
hance the legitimacy of the venture in the host country. 
Even in developed market economies, public opinion may perceive the acquisition of a local firm 
by a foreign enterprise with some misgivings (Crystal, 2003). This is particularly important in 
transition economies where governmental agencies often have indirect means to influence the 
prosperity of a business. An ownership stake by the state in the local firm is thus a potential mean to 
align the interests of the foreign partner and the government (Meyer, 2002). Doh et al. (2004) found 
a curvilinear relationship between the level of government sponsored investment hazards and 
private ownership, suggesting that high levels of government sponsored investment hazards induce 
firms to partner with the state to avoid state sponsored rent seeking activities. Our study suggests 
that PAs may enjoy certain advantages in gaining access to new growth opportunities on account of 
local ownership participation. Even when the partner is not a state or employee owner, the presence 
of a local partner may deflect some of the misgivings in the host country. 
rprise’s ability to speedily affect changes consequently 
increa
Weak incentives 
esidual claim this implies reduces 
the attractiveness of finding opportunities for the transfer of resources from the foreign parent to the 
Retaining a local partner may also en
Increased governance cost 
However, there are also disadvantages associated with joint ownership. Retaining a local 
partner raises the governance costs of the venture (Luo, 2002). In uncertain environments that 
require frequent strategic and operational adaptation, the need to negotiate changes with a local 
partner may significantly affect the ente
sing the governance cost. This may especially be a problem when the local partner has 
different objectives which will often be the case with employee or state owners. 
Moreover, the absence of full ownership and the lower r
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local subsidiary. In essence the partial acquisition mode lacks the high powered incentives of a 
wholly
A PA is the outcome of an agreement between an investor and the previous owner(s) of the 
firm. While the entry modes choice literature has largely focused on investors, it is essential to also 
understand the seller’s perspective to explain why PAs emerge as the mutually agreed outcome. 
Retain stakeholder influence 
Possibly the strongest motive for local owners to prefer a partial divestment (a PA seen from 
the seller’s perspective) is the desire to retain some influence in the enterprise. Sellers in transition 
economies often have other stakes in the enterprise apart from their equity stakes. Hence they are 
naturally reluctant to completely turn over control to an outside owner, even when this is 
nal financial, managerial and technological resources. 
gain would suggest 
that the mode choice is motivated by labor concerns. 
Rent appropriation 
Foreign direct investors are motivated by their desire to exploit their ownership advantages 
in another country (Dunning, 1992). They may enter by acquisition if they are confident that they 
 owned subsidiary. Evidence from this study suggests that both the transfer of resources from 
the foreign parent and investments in human resource development may be impaired in PAs. 
 
MOTIVES SELLERS PERSPECTIVE 
necessitated by the need for exter
In order to protect their interests they may turn to contractual provisions. However this type 
of contracting is likely to be extremely cumbersome in high uncertainty environments, like 
transition economies, and in organizations that require extensive restructuring. A partial divestment 
is thus a deal structure that balances the need to protect the interests of the stakeholders while 
ensuring that ex-ante contracting costs stays within acceptable limits. The evidence in this study 
does suggest that partial acquisitions are larger in terms of employment, which a
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can create more value from the acquired organization than the previous owners. In competitive 
markets for corporate governance, we would expect some of this additional value to accrue to the 
seller through the acquisition premium. However local owners in rapidly changing environments 
are often poor at pricing their own assets, let alone estimating their potential value in their first best 
use - a reverse asymmetric information problem (Jakobsen & Meyer, 2007). Local owners may 
therefore prefer to retain a stake in the enterprise to ensure that they get a share of the increased 
value o
ign 
ent horizon, and focus on expanding and consolidating their 
market
Anothe
 FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
ations 
f the firm. 
Incompatible investment time horizons 
There are of course also disadvantages to retaining an ownership stake. Often, fore
investors take a long term investm
 position, which means the free cash flows generated by the enterprise, will usually be 
reinvested in the business. In contrast, local owners may prefer that some of the free cash flow is 
released as dividends. They may also risk that the discrepancy in the investment horizon could lead 
the foreign owner to deliberately depress dividends with the implicit aim of forcing them to sell out.  
Governance concerns 
r potential source of discomfort for a local minority partner is the often poor minority 
shareholder protection offered in transition economies. While low dividend pay outs may strain the 
minority partner, the MNC may pursue business practices that are directly harmful to the minority 
partner. Particularly transfer pricing policies may be a source of contention between the partners. 
 
CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS
Public Policy implic
Policy makers in governments see partial divestment as a means to privatize state-owned 
enterprises. This form of attracting FDI, however, has some unique characteristics, and thus impact 
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on the host economy. Contrary to journalistic opinions, PAs are not associated with the destruction 
of jobs; rather this effect is attributable to the large size of many PAs in transition economies. 
However, we find that PAs are associated with fewer resource transfers from the investor, and less 
investment in human capital in particular. 
Policy makers may consider PAs useful to soften the economic and social impact of the 
transfer of ownership in large firms subject to significant structural changes in the industry. 
However, this softened social impact of necessary economic restructuring may come at the cost of 
f the resources and capabilities of the firm. It would 
thus be
argue that Chen and Hennart’s (2004) asymmetric information view on 
at 
ast in part motivated by the seller’s desire to influence the decisions made by the jointly owned 
economic unit. Evidence to support this argument was found in relation to the employment in PAs. 
This argument provides an alternative view to the remuneration of input providers argument 
hich holds that partial ownership aligns the interests of the owners, 
hence e
slower efficiency gains and delayed upgrading o
 ill advised to pursue such a policy indiscriminately; hence general legislation promoting or 
limiting the choice of entry modes is likely to be economically suboptimal. 
Future directions for the study of partial acquisitions 
Our analysis suggests that the existing literature fails to capture essential aspects of PAs. 
Firstly, we argue that the assertion by Brouthers and Hennart (2007), that the method of 
remunerating the input providers is the main determinant of both JVs and PAs is insufficient to 
explain PAs. Secondly, we 
PAs fails in transition economies because of probably important reverse asymmetric information 
effects. 
We argue that PAs are preferred when the seller wish to protect upstream resources from 
harmful autonomous adaptation (Williamson, 1975). Consequently the preference for a PA is 
le
(Brouthers & Hennart, 2007), w
ffectively eroding the scope for self-serving opportunism. 
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Future research on entry mode choices should therefore take a more nuanced approach. In 
particular, future studies should recognize that mode choices are rarely unilaterally but rather the 
outcome of a bilateral negotiation process. Furthermore, the underlying assumptions of many 
traditional approaches may fail to capture the motives of the entry mode choice in emerging 
econom
racter of this particular 
ut the nature of entry mode that do 
not rep
ent to build explanatory models on these two dimensions only, as PAs are subject to 
influen
ies. Hence, studies in these economies promises to produce results that may broaden our 
understanding of the nature and boundaries of the firm. 
Challenges for theorizing in international business research 
Our analysis of PAs raises major concerns with respect to the dominant avenues for theory 
building in international business research, especially with respect to foreign entry modes (cf. 
Brouthers & Hennart, 2007). In particular, our digging deeper in the cha
mode reveals that theories often make implicit assumptions abo
resent a close depiction of the real world. 
 Firstly, the (often implicit) assumption that decisions on ownership and on 
acquisition-versus-greenfield are independent clearly does not hold. Hence, the assumption that 
decisions are separate, or at least analytically separable, has to be re-examined. There is little 
empirical evidence of such a separation. Hence, Figure 4.1 serves to classify modes, but it is 
insuffici
ces that cannot be explained by combining these two perspectives. Moreover PAs share with 
both JVs and acquisitions the access to resources held by local firms, albeit under different legal 
and organizational arrangements. Since the question of whether or not such local resources are 
needed is a key starting point for planning an FDI project, it is more likely that the initial decision is 
between Greenfield and modes-providing-resource-access, and in the second stage the appropriate 
mode is selected for accessing these resources (Jakobsen & Meyer, 2007; Meyer, Estrin & 
Bhaumik, 2005). 
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s primarily decided by the 
investo
an, 2006), nor does it hold for JVs (Buechel, 2002; 
rch, Journal of Management, 33(3), 395-425. 
Second, the (often implicit) assumption that entry modes are clearly delimitated using 
the logic of Figure 4.1 is challenged by the observation from case research (Meyer & Estrin, 2007; 
Meyer & Tran, 2006; Estrin & Meyer, 2004) that certain projects are in fact hard to classify. 
Specifically, where are the boundaries between (a) JV and PAs in the case of JV Type II, and (b) 
partial and full acquisitions in the case of staged acquisitions or contractually restrained 
acquisitions? 
 Third, the (often implicit) assumption that mode choice i
r based on costs and benefits of alternative arrangements does not hold. Rather, PAs are the 
outcome of a bilateral bargaining process between buyer and seller – and similar bargaining with 
local partners occurs in the case of JVs (Harrigan, 1988) and acquisitions. 
 Fourth, the (often implicit) assumption that initial ownership arrangements are fairly 
stable clearly does not hold for PAs (Meyer & Tr
Harrigan, 1988). Rather, PAs are often transitory arrangement aimed at full acquisitions in form of 
staged acquisitions. Future research thus may need to focus more on dynamic processes of entry and 
the post-entry development, rather than at entry mode as a cross-sectional phenomenon. 
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Appendix: Selected items from the CEE survey instrument 
ment influence 
“In our industry, it is important to maintain close personal contact with key officials at the national 
Three item measure on the following statements (scale: 1 = not at all, 5 = to a large extent) 
firm can readily obtain managerial resources from the parent firm” 
Three item measure on the following statements with respect to the last three years (scale: 1 = not at 
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5. Negotiating entry modes: Partial Acquisitions in 
Transition Economies 
 
emerging econom  
ssesses 
result from stment. We propose a different perspective that is 
olders on the transfer of ownership rights and find that partial 
cquisitions are pr erence.  
 
challenges for multinational enterprises 
5; 
and strategies to take 
ss opportunities in these contexts (Meyer & Tran, 2006; London & Hart, 2004; 
sis 
ennart & 
ark, 1993). Entry modes are commonly segmented into equity based and non-equity based modes 
(Pan & Tse, 2000). The former are considered to be irreversible (Elango & Sambharya, 2004), 
which has important implications for the tra mong other factors, control, 
ABSTRACT. Multinational enterprises often acquire stakes in an existing enterprise when entering 
ies. This paper examines the determinants of entry mode choices with a special
focus on these partial acquisitions, which have received little attention in the scholarly literature.  
Recent research suggests that a buyer prefers partial acquisitions, when a seller po
asymmetric information advantages. However, other studies have suggested that partial acquisition 
 sellers’ preference for partial dive
grounded in the influence of stakeh
a eferred when negotiations are subject to significant stakeholder interf
INTRODUCTION 
Emerging economies create different sorts of 
(MNE) as they adapt their strategies to the local context (Meyer & Peng, 2005; Wright et al., 200
Hoskisson et al., 2000), and indeed develop entirely new business concepts 
advantage of busine
Dawar & Chattopadhay, 2002). 
An important part of the adaptation is the choice of entry mode, which establishes the ba
for the development of the local subsidiary (Meyer, 2001; Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000; H
P
de off between, a
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inv 006). We thus 
investigate these equity based entr y least analyzed form of equity-
based mode, partial acquisition (PA). 
MNEs face two important decisions when they wish to enter with an equity-based mode; the 
studying the choice between a joint venture (JV) 
greenfield (Elango & Sambharya, 2004; Chang & Rosenzweig, 2001; Kogut & Singh, 1988).  
Partial acquisitions in turn hav  attention in the literature, with 
only three empirical studies (C
Vermeulen, 1998). Of these, only Barkema and Vermeulen (1998) model the choice between all 
empirical studies (Chen & Hennart, 2004) and may explain some of the mixed empirical findings. 
By lum
ignored. Similarly, the failure to distinguish between partial acquisitions and JVs ignores the critical 
In previous studies partial acquisitions are found to be associated with more risky and 
estment risk (Luo, 2001) and legitimacy in the host country (Lu & Xu, 2
y modes, in particular the probabl
level of equity control and whether to acquire an existing enterprise or build a new start up 
(Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000). Scholars have analyzed these decisions using a variety of 
conceptual models: Some studies focus on the relationship between control and commitment by 
and full ownership (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007; 
Luo, 2002; Andersen & Gatignon, 1986). Others investigate the make or buy decision inherent in 
the choice between greenfield and acquisition (Harzing, 2002; Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000; 
Hennart & Park, 1993) or the choice between an acquisition and a JV (Hennart & Reddy, 1997). A 
small number of integrative studies simultaneously study the choice between acquisition, JV and 
e received comparatively little
hen & Hennart, 2004; Duarte & Garcia-Canal, 2004; Barkema & 
four equity-based modes; acquisition, greenfield, JV and partial acquisitions. This omission of the 
specific features of partial acquisitions in entry mode research may affect the validity of past 
ping together partial acquisitions and acquisitions the important role of ownership control is 
aspects involved in the choice between building a new venture and acquiring an existing established 
enterprise. 
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culturally distant countries (Duarte & Garcia-Canal, 2004; Barkema & Vermuelen, 1998). We 
therefore investigate PAs, using a unique original survey dataset of foreign entrants in Poland, 
Hungary and Lithuania, taking into consideration the specific contextual issues when developing 
our arg
d the 
asymm
 mode bargaining process. 
uments. 
In particular, recent studies in transition economies suggest that partial acquisitions are an 
important entry mode in its own right (Meyer & Tran, 2006; Tsang, 2003). Partial acquisitions are 
particularly important in these contexts because stakeholders other than owners continue to play an 
important role, and governments continue to interfere in private business affairs in order to serve 
perceived public interests. Therefore, we explicitly considering the mode choice outcome a result of 
a bargaining process rather than an endogenous decision by the foreign entrant, when we seek to 
answer the question; what is the role of partial acquisitions in transition economies? 
Moreover, the study of partial acquisitions may shed new light on an important theoretical 
debate in the entry mode literature, namely the relative merits of the digestibility motive an
etric information motive on entry mode choice (Chen & Hennart, 2004; Hennart & Reddy, 
2000; Reuer & Koza, 2000; Reuer & Koza, 2000b; Hennart & Reddy, 1997; Balakrishnan & Koza, 
1993). We contribute to this debate by exploring the role of asymmetric information in a transition 
economy context; we argue that the nature of the information asymmetry may be different than 
what is assumed in prior empirical research, which leads to different outcomes. We therefore 
suggest that cautious sellers, rather than buyers, motivate partial acquisitions. 
It is our view that a partial acquisition is the response to the contractual difficulties involved 
in protecting the interests of local owners and stakeholder and therefore, the aim of this study is to 
contribute to the existing literature by taking into account the influence of sellers and stakeholders 
on the entry
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Theoretical framework 
For clarity, we define a greenfield operation as a wholly owned new venture (Figure 5.1). 
An acquisition is defined as obtaining full ownership control (>95%) of an existing local firm. A JV 
is defined as the establishment of a new venture between a foreign owner with no less than 10% of 
the equity stake and a local Co-owner, while a partial acquisition is defined as the acquisition of a 
stake in an existing local firm of at least 10% but less than 95% of equity. 
Firms engaging in FDI may have to augment their existing resources and capabilities to the 
needs of the host market (Anand & Delios, 2002; Caves, 1996). This can be done by internally 
developing the resources or capabilities needed, by buying them in factor markets or in the market 
for cor
ities (Anand & Delios, 2002; Teece, 1987) or because factor 
markets are saddled with asymmetric information and opportunism problems (Williamson, 1975), 
porate control. From a resource based view a firm would prefer to enter by greenfield 
operation, when it is possible to develop the necessary resources or capabilities internally or acquire 
them through factor markets. When this is not possible, either because organizational routines 
inhibit the development of new capabil
New 
organization 
Existing 
organization 
Shared equity 
Greenfield 
Joint venture 
Acquisition 
Partial 
control 
control acquisition 
Full equity 
Figure 5.1 Ownership control and the make or buy decision 
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firm
firm
e commingled with a range of 
undesired resources. A full acquisition would burden the acquirer with a bundle of resources that 
may have l the even have ental effect on the acquirer’s 
performance. To overcome this “digestibility” problem, Hennart and Reddy (1997) argue that firms 
could effectively establish a jointly owned new venture with resource contributions from both 
parent companies. This would allow the transfer of desired resources that cannot easily be separated 
ndaries and at the same time create an effective hostage in the form of 
asset sp
 asymmetric information 
and adv
s would use the market for corporate control.  
The most straightforward use of the market for corporate control is to fully acquire another 
 that has the resources required to successfully operate in the host country. However, Hennart 
and Reddy (1997) argue that firms tend to be complex organizations with a broad range of 
resources. Often the acquirer desires only selected resources that ar
ittle value to  acquirer or  a detrim
from the organisational bou
ecific investments to safeguard against opportunistic behaviour. JVs then serve as a vehicle 
to reduce the ex-post integration costs when desired resources are highly commingled with 
undesirable resources. 
An alternative argument by Reuer and Koza (2000); Balakrishnan and Koza (1993) suggest 
that JVs are primarily motivated by ex-ante valuation problems caused by
erse selection between the buyer and the seller. They argue that sellers would be more able 
to estimate the true value of an asset in their possession than potential buyers. However, it is 
difficult for sellers to credibly convey information on the value to a buyer, because they may lack 
incentives to be truthful and conversely the buyer has no reason to trust them (Akerlof, 1970). An 
agreement by the parties to enter into a JV may alleviate the asymmetric information problem. The 
willingness to undertake asset specific investments in the JV serves as a signalling device, 
conveying to the buyer the seller’s commitment and belief in the value of its resources. Moreover, 
JVs "enable the two firms to combine resources in a piecemeal fashion such that the learning that 
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follows allays the adverse selection problem that can arise from initial valuation uncertainties in an 
outrigh
he performance of the acquired firm (Chen & Hennart, 2004). This could be 
done ei
t acquisition" (Reuer & Koza, 2000). Moreover, they suggest that both arguments are valid, 
but they maintain that a preference for JV can exist without indigestibility, but not without 
asymmetric information.  
On the other hand, Hennart and Reddy (2000) suggest that asymmetric information can 
explain the use of partial acquisitions. Moreover, Chen and Hennart (2004) argue that despite 
increased management costs associated with co-ownership and control (Luo, 2002; O'Connor, Luo 
& Lee, 2001) partial acquisitions may be preferred over full acquisition when asymmetric 
information and adverse selection problems leads both seller and buyer to price opportunistically. 
They argue that ex-ante valuation problems may be resolved if the current owner retains a share in 
the firm that effectively functions as a hostage. Only owners that are confident in the future 
prospects of their company would be willing to retain a share. Even if the ex-ante valuation 
problems could be resolved the current owner may engage in ex-post opportunistic behaviour that 
could adversely affect t
ther through neglect e.g. by withholding important information or by engaging in competing 
business. By retaining the seller as a co-owner, the two parties align their interests, thus curbing the 
incentive to act opportunistically.  
Similarly, Meyer (2002) suggests that partial acquisitions may be a means to align the 
interest of an MNE and the host government in acquisitions related to the privatization of state 
enterprises. Governmental agencies often have indirect means to influence the prosperity of a 
business. Aligning their interests with the private sector interests of a foreign investor would thus 
reduce the likelihood of surprise adverse interferences. Thus, partial acquisitions can facilitate the 
trade-offs in markets for corporate control that are plagued by asymmetric information and adverse 
selection problems, and at the same time discourage ex-post opportunistic behaviour by the seller 
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(Chen & Hennart, 2004). 
From these perspectives joint ventures or partial acquisitions substitutes a full acquisition 
either as a consequence of ex-ante valuation problems or ex-post operational problems. Since 
sharing control raises governance costs (Luo, 2002) it is clear that in the absence of digestibility and 
asymm
conomies. These economies typically lack effective market 
mechan
etric information problems, the preferred mode choice would be a full acquisition. While a 
JV may resolve ex-ante valuation problems caused by asymmetric information, this does not 
necessarily make this mode the optimal choice. Without digestibility problems the preferred long-
term solution should be full integration of the companies in question.  
In a partial acquisition, the acquirer takes control of some shares and may, as valuation 
problems are resolved, venture on to fully integrate the acquired firm. Arguably it would be more 
costly to coordinate the two parent companies and a JV operation between them, which may 
develop its own distinct organizational culture. This suggests that a preference for JV may exist 
without asymmetric information, but not without digestibility problems. 
Hence the asymmetric information argument would appear to offer the best available 
explanation for partial acquisitions. Yet, it is not without problems. The notion that local sellers 
understand the value of the assets better than the potential acquirer is tentative. This issue is of 
particular concern in transition e
isms for the transfer of ownership rights, which limits local owners’ ability to gauge the 
value of their assets. Moreover, the local owners only truly know the value of their assets in their 
current use. They may not know the potential value of their brand or product line when placed in its 
first best use and supported by sophisticated marketing techniques. Similarly, the value of a 
dominant market position or an extensive distribution network may be unknown to the owners of an 
inefficient firm. This may particularly be a problem when the seller is a privatization agency. Tsang 
and Yip (2007) argues that local governments and managers may even deliberately under price 
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assets in order to gain personal advantages from a sale, thus accelerating the pricing problem. 
Conseq
by other stakeholders in the 
process
e ex-ante negotiations. By 
opting 
uently, local owners’ concern of selling ‘too cheap’ may motivate partial acquisitions rather 
than the MNE’s fear of paying too much. In other words, the sale of assets may be subject to a 
“reverse” information asymmetry problem, as buyers possess superior information of the value of 
the target firm’s assets. 
A related challenge in transition economies is the influence of stakeholders during the 
negotiation process. Meyer (2002); Antal-Mokos (1998) provide several examples of ex-ante 
negotiations that have failed or been drawn out due to intervention 
. Contractual conditions often include a non-financial component, such as guarantees not to 
close plants or to lay off employees, which may later create impediments to restructuring. 
Moreover, in JV contracts the partners agree in detail the rights and duties of each party to the 
venture, while partial acquisition agreements may be less clear. This can be an advantage in 
situations where powerful rent-seeking stakeholders are able to derail th
for a partial acquisition, sensitive issues may be postponed, thus avoiding prolongation or 
even failure of the negotiations. 
Similarly, partial acquisitions tend to be easier to label as a beneficial arrangement, e.g. 
strategic alliance, which reduces the risk of intervention by rent-seeking stakeholders. This is 
particularly important for project of high public visibility or where a governmental agency is a 
partner to the negotiations because the latter may be subject to political pressures (Antal-Mokos, 
1998). On the other hand, public opinion may perceive a full acquisition by a foreign firm with 
some misgivings, even in developed market economies (Crystal, 2003). Therefore, foreign investors 
may consider partial acquisitions the fastest way to gain access to a market and to secure early 
mover advantages. Thus, Jakobsen (2007) finds that early entry through partial acquisition enhances 
the performance of a new operation. 
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Postponing agreements on critical business aspects allows the parties to settle details when 
uncertainty and information asymmetries have been reduced, which facilitates agreement. Foreign 
investors generally enter transition economies with the expectation that the institutional 
environment will improve over time; hence they expect that future negotiations are conducted in a 
less uncertain environment. Moreover, the interests and bargaining power of stakeholders is 
expecte
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
ncerning the potential contribution of the firm’s resources to 
the buyers operations. The literature has focused on the former effect, yet the latter may also be 
d to change over time. At the same time, foreign investor in a partial acquisition may gain 
legitimacy in the local context and gather allies, which help neutralizing politically motivated 
opposition. 
We therefore proceed to develop our hypothesis based on the view that owners and 
stakeholders seek to protect their interests. Since the transition economy environment is often 
highly uncertain it is costly to protect these interests by means of contractual measures (Williamson, 
1975) and therefore retaining some influence through local ownership would be optimal. 
 
The theoretical discussion above suggests that asymmetric information between buyer and 
seller, and the resulting bilateral bargaining situation, are core to an explanation of why firms 
choose partial acquisitions rather than more conventional modes of investment. Large asymmetries 
of information between buyers and sellers with respect to the value of the assets of the firm can 
inhibit acquisition deals. Alternatively, firms may design specific strategies, such as a partial 
acquisition, to protect their interests.  
In an acquisition, two types of information asymmetries emerge. The seller has superior 
knowledge concerning the actual operations of the firm (Chen & Hennart, 2004). On the other hand, 
the buyer has superior knowledge co
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importa
h the legacy of state-ownership and central planning. While traditionally the market 
mechan
es them a 
stake in the firm’s future revenues, such as a partial or staged sale. Consequently, this reverse 
information asymmetry would lead sellers to prefer partial acquisitions.  
Hence, in the presence of reverse asymmetric information advantages, the acquirer’s past 
comme
rket knowledge is positively associated with entry by partial 
a
nt. If the buyer wants to use the resources of the acquired firm in ways that create higher 
rents than their current usage, e.g. by creating synergies with existing operations, the buyers 
maximum price may be substantially above the sellers minimum price. Thus, a substantial scope for 
negotiation emerges.  
This situation is likely in transition economies, especially if the acquisition is related to the 
privatization process (Meyer, 2002). Foreign investors are often in a better position to assess the 
value of a firm under conditions of a modern market economy than for instance privatization 
agencies wit
ism in advanced economies may be good at capturing rent derived from perceived synergies 
for the existing shareholders through high acquisition premiums, emerging markets lack the 
fundamental market supporting institutions, and hence the sellers must device alternative means to 
secure a share of the rent. Sellers would thus prefer an acquisition arrangement that giv
rcial experiences in the host country does not reduce the asymmetric information problem 
but rather signals to the current owner(s) the acquirer’s superior capacity to value the target, thus 
inducing the current owner(s) or a group of owners not to sell outright, in the hope that they can free 
ride on the acquirer’s efforts. Hence we propose that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Previous host ma
cquisition rather than full acquisition. 
 
For MNEs that have already established foreign investment operation, an additional 
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consideration becomes paramount. Any new operation would normally aim to extend the existing 
one, for instance by increasing market share or by deepening the local supply chain. Therefore, for 
investors undertaking follow-up investments, the interaction between the existing and the new 
operations is essential. 
s, which is easier without 
residua
al acquisitions rather than full acquisitions. 
, 
name  such (rather than specific to a country). Theoretical 
argum enced investors would more often use JVs as means to learn 
interna
If foreign investors obtain full control over new operations, they would be able to proceed 
with the integration of the old and the new operation. If however they have to share control, as in a 
partial acquisition, they would find it considerably more difficult to integrate the two operations. 
Thus, subsequent investments are less likely to be with shared ownership, as found for instance by 
Kogut and Singh (1988).  
Moreover, MNEs often undertake subsequent investments to increase their market share 
with the aim to attain market leadership in previously fragmented markets. They may thus pursue a 
strategy of multiple acquisitions to reach a desired level of market coverage and power (Meyer & 
Tran, 2006) and to realise economies of scale in production, marketing and distribution. Such a 
strategy, however, requires operational integration of the acquired unit
l outside shareholders. Therefore we expect partial acquisitions to be less relevant for 
follow-up investments compared to full acquisitions: 
 
Hypothesis 2: If the foreign parent already has direct investment in the host country, 
subsequent investments are less likely to be parti
 
A different form of international experience has attracted considerable scholarly attention
ly experience in international business as
ents suggest that inexperi
tional business practices, and to access complementary resources. Moreover, a JV provides a 
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local partner who would help to adapt to local conditions and to gain local legitimacy (Lu & Xu, 
2006). While some empirical studies support the notion that less experienced foreign investors 
prefer shared ownership (Meyer, 2001; Gomes-Casseres, 1990), Barkema and Vermuelen (1998) 
found no direct link between international experience and the propensity to choose full acquisition 
over pa
l owners and stakeholders, this learning argument may only apply to JV 
where 
 Greenfield or acquisition. 
ed local 
opera  
and build operations from scratch, which is a time-consuming process. Thus, investors are more 
likely 
                                                
rtial acquisition. In general the overall evidence from this literature is highly inconclusive 
(Harzing 2002).10
In part the mixed evidence may be due to the failure to distinguish between JVs and partial 
acquisitions, which both have shared ownership. Since partial acquisitions may be chiefly motivated 
by the interests of the loca
both partners contribute resources and share the running of the company. Thus we predict:  
 
Hypothesis 3a: The greater the international experience of the parent company the less likely 
it will choose to enter by Joint Venture versus Greenfield or acquisition. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: The international experience of the parent company does not affect the 
propensity to enter via partial acquisition versus
 
Entry strategy research has paid considerable attention to the size of the envisag
tion. Greenfield operations take more time to grow, as foreign investors have to recruit staff
to use acquisitions rather than greenfield entry when aiming to establish large operations 
(Harzing, 2002; Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000; Hennart & Park, 1993) or large plants (Elango & 
Sambharya, 2004).  
 
10 Harzing (2002) provides a thorough review of empirical results on this issue. 
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The acquisition of large targets may be particularly important for investors seeking to build 
a leadership role in local markets, which is a particularly important motive in transition economies 
(Meyer & Tran, 2006; Meyer 2002). Acquisitions offer faster and easier market access than 
greenfield entries (Gil et al., 2006). Large new ventures may experience high costs, as they have to 
invest aggressively in marketing to build volume turnover and to fill production capacities. 
Moreover, leaving behind a large local firm also leaves a window of opportunity for late movers to 
enter t
Full acquisitions of large firms however face distinct obstacles, especially in highly 
politi
impor nsure the long-term 
continuation of the firm. In order to secure a full acquisition a foreign acquirer would often have to 
surren  when 
this is  municipalities or 
the m dia may aim to influence and/or slow the negotiation process (Antal-Mokos, 1998). They 
may in
akeholders would intervene. Consequently, we expect that the larger the local 
firm the more likely the deal will be structured as a partial acquisition. 
he market and gain a substantial market position thereby negating potential first mover 
advantages (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1998). Thus, for multiple reasons, we would expect foreign 
investors aiming for a substantial operation to prefer acquisition or partial acquisition as an entry 
mode. 
cized contexts. Firms owned fully or in part by the state or by employees may attach greater 
tance to employment guaranties, or other commitments that would e
der a significant degree of strategic flexibility through contractual arrangements. Even
 not the case, external stakeholders such as the national government, local
e
sist that a local co-owner retains an equity stake to secure local interests, and thus obstruct 
full acquisitions (Meyer, 2002). In this respect we can also view the legal restriction on full 
acquisitions as the extreme manifestation of a generally held belief, that the transfer of ownership 
and control to a foreign entity carries with it a hazard to the public good. The larger the local firm, 
the higher would be the profile of the takeover negotiations in the host community and the greater 
the likelihood that st
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THE SURVEY AND METHODOLOGY 
iate the survey was translated into local languages. 
s reported that they had less 
than 100 employees in 2001, 31 percent reported between 100 and 1000 and the remaining 7 
Hypothesis 4: The larger the new subsidiary, the more likely is has been established by 
partial acquisitions rather than any other mode of entry. 
 
We use data from a questionnaire survey of foreign owned firms in three transition 
economies: Poland, Hungary and Lithuania. The survey has been conducted as a joint project in 
cooperation with a team of local researchers in each of the three countries in 2003. Where 
appropr
The base population was constructed by combining local databases. The questionnaire was 
then sent to the chief executive of firms where contact information was available, which in most 
cases was followed up by phone contact and personal interviews to achieve a desired rate of 
response. Relative to the base population of all foreign investors, the sample includes 10 percent for 
Poland, 11 percent in Hungary and 22% in Lithuania. After eliminating observations with missing 
values, a total sample of 322 foreign owned subsidiaries remains. 
While common method bias always remains a potential source of problems in a 
questionnaire based studies we employed techniques suggested by Podsakoff et al. (2003) to 
mitigate such biases. In particular, the dependent variable, mode choice, is a factual classification 
that is not sensitive to subjective perceptions as for instance Likert scale data are. 
The firms included were primarily established during the period 1990-2000 and had at least 
10 employees and a foreign ownership participation of no less than 10%. These criterion was 
selected to eliminate administrative or representation offices and ensure that only fully operating 
firms are in the sample. The majority, 62 percent of the local subsidiarie
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percent reported that they had more than 1000 employees. The sample is thus broadly 
repres ge of 
indus gion, namely Germany, the Nordic 
countries, other Western European countries and North America.  
The sample contains a substantial proportion of all four entry modes, which allows 
empirical analysis of the four-way choice: Greenfield operations represent 44 percent of all 
observe
d, studies on China data have observed 
a large
he entry mode variable takes the 
values 
To test hypotheses 1 we include a dummy variable previous . 
not the subsidiary was the parent companies first FDI in the host country. Both dummies are 
To test hypotheses 3a and 3b we include a measure for the international experience of the 
foreign parent firm. Similar to Barkema and Vermeulen (1998), we proxy  
entative for both smaller and larger enterprises. The survey includes firms in a wide ran
tries and reflecting the main countries of origin in the re
d entries, acquisitions 23 percent, JVs 21 percent and partial acquisitions 12 percent. This 
pattern differs from earlier studies of entry mode. Most studies of entry mode choice in the US 
report a dominant share of acquisitions, for instance in the Elango and Sambharya (2004) study 210 
out of 336 observations were acquisitions. On the other han
 majority of shared ownership modes (Luo, 2001 & 2002), though this may have diminished 
in recent years. 
Dependent variables and statistical methods 
To test our hypotheses we model the entry mode choice as a multi nominal logistic 
regression (M-Logit) with entry mode as a dependent variable. T
greenfield, acquisition, JV and partial acquisition respectively. 
Independent variables 
host market knowledge
Similarly, hypotheses 2 is tested by the dummy follow-up investments, which indicate whether or 
derived from yes-no questions in the questionnaire survey. 
international experience
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using the natural logarithm of the number of countries the parent company had affiliates in at the 
time of the investment. A large number of foreign affiliates indicate that the parent has considerable 
experience with foreign market entry. 
Following Kogut and Singh (1988), we proxy subsidiary size by the natural logarithm of the 
numbe
Control variables 
Equity based entry modes other than greenfields are generally associated with augmenting 
, 2002). We therefore include a measure of 
foreign
te on a percentage scale the 
contribution of these resources from various sources e.g. a local partner, the foreign parent or other 
local sources. A weighted measure of the parent’s relative contribution of resources was created, 
attaching the greatest weight to the most important resource and subsequently less importance to 
secondary and tertiary resources. 
 
r of employees. We choose the number of employees for the last year of operation reported, 
to eliminate a potential problem that a new venture might have little or no activities in its first year 
of operation. A simple means test indicate that partial acquisitions on average have been laying off 
employees consistent with restructuring needs, whereas greenfields and JVs tend to have grown 
over time. The last year is thus more useful to measure persistent size differences. This measure is 
used to test hypothesis 4 in the M-Logit analysis. 
the foreign parents resource base (Anand & Delios
 parent resources reliance as a control variable. The respondents where asked to report the 
three most critical resources for the subsidiary success during its first years of operation. This 
question was followed up with another asking the respondent to ra
( ) ( ) ( )∑ ++ 2.0*33.0*25.0*1 rrr  
 
Similarly, firms that pursue efficiency oriented FDI will usually rely on host country factor 
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endowments as well as their own resources in efficient management and production technology. 
They will rarely need country specific resources like local market knowledge or access to 
distribution networks. Furthermore, host governments generally look more favourably on export 
oriente
ices. We divided the home region of the parent 
companies into Nordic countries, Germany, other Western European countries, North America and 
all Other countries. 
Since transition economies are undergoing rapid changes in the institutional environment, it 
Table 5
  
X10 
d FDI, which tend to give efficiency seeking MNE’s greater leverage in the choice of entry 
mode (Luo, 2001). To control for this effect, we coded all firms that received more than 80 percent 
of their revenues from export as export intensive. 
Furthermore, we include control variables for the host country, home region of the parent 
and industry. To avoid singularities in the Hessian matrix we reduced the number of industry 
groups and home regions. The industry of the affiliate is coded as Manufacturing, Utilities and 
mining, Trade, Financial services or Other serv
.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Table 
Mean s.d. X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 
X1 Foreign pare  
rent 
sources 38.43 33.72 1         
X2 Export intensity 0.20 0.40 0.07 1         
X3 SuSize(LN)  
X4 Hokn  
X5 Foinv  
X6 International ex -0.08* 0.14*** 0.12** -0.07 1     
X7 Affiliate age 7.67 3.08 0.09* -0.13*** 0.15*** -0.05 0.12*** 0.06 1    
X8 Poland 0.38 0.49 0.07 -0.13*** 0.24*** 0.08* -0.04 0.21*** 0.08* 1   
X9 Lithuania 0.20 0.40 -0.11** 0.09** -0.07 -0.21*** -0.06 -0.15*** -0.26*** -0.39*** 1  
X10 Hungary 0.42 0.49 0.02 0.05 -0.18*** 0.09** 0.09** -0.10* 0.12*** -0.67*** -0.43*** 1 
bsidiary 0.00 1.65 -0.03 0.02 1       
stmarket 
owledge 0.41 0.49 -0.04 -0.01 -0.00 1      
llow up 
estment 0.26 0.44 -0.07 -0.11** 0.14*** 0.45*** 1     
perience(LN) 0.00 1.32 0.04 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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is to be expected that there may be time trends in the entry mode choice (Estrin, Ionascu & Meyer, 
2004). Moreover, past experiences of other entrants from the same home country might affect the 
MNE’s choice of entry mode. To control for these time effects we interact the number of years 
since the affiliate was established with the host country and the home region of the parent company. 
This procedure generates multiple time trends that control for all other factors that are time or 
country specific. 
Table 5.1 reports descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix of the variables in this 
analysis. The table shows that, with a few exceptions, the pair wise correlations between the 
variables are quite low (<0.3). Since firms with past FDI in the host country is expected to have 
host market knowledge the pair wise correlation between previous host market knowledge and 
follow up investments is relatively high (<0.5). None of the pair wise correlations are so high that 
we would expect a serious multi-collinearity problem though. 
e sign in Table 5.2 indicate a greater likelihood of choosing the entry 
in ques com ed e b ode reenf ld. Th same gression is reproduced in 
.3 wit uis s a  ba se as t xtract inform
viz. acquisitions as well. The overall model fit is good with a pseudo R2 of 0,52. The model 
correctly classified 61.50 percent of the observations. For our hypotheses, it is particularly relevant 
the mode also d a ssi a cq ons  42 percent correctly classified, 
 is more  th m w ou  p  b an d
 
 
RESULTS AND HYPOTHESES TESTS 
The results of the M-logit regression on the determinants of entry mode choice are presented 
in Table 5.2 and 5.3. A positiv
mode tion par to th ase m  G ie e re
Table 5 h acq ition s the se ca such o e  ation on the significance of 
effects 
that l is  goo t cla fying p rtial a uisiti  with
which  than ree ti es that hich c ld be redicted y a r dom choice mo el. 
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In support of hypothesis 1, we find that prior host market knowledge is positively associated 
with entry by partial acquisitions. We argue in hypothesis 1 that buyers may benefit from reverse 
asymmetric information advantages. Sellers in transition economies had little experience with 
valuation of assets and lacked effective market institutions e.g. stock markets. Previous commercial 
experience in the country may signal to the seller that the buyer has a good understanding of the 
 Acquisition Joint venture Partial acquisition
Intercept -4.07*** (0.95) 
-2.69*** 
(1.00) 
-4.91*** 
(1.24) 
Foreign parent resources -0.02*** (0.01) 
-0.03*** 
(0.01) 
-0.03*** 
(0.01) 
Export intensity -0.91* (0.48) 
-1.78*** 
(0.57) 
-1.14* 
(0.66) 
Sub
0.96 
(0.65) 
1.33 
(0.91) 
Industry Dummies** Yes Yes Yes 
Home region Dummies* Yes Yes Yes 
Host country*Affiliate a Yes 
Hom
    
sidiary size 0.67*** (0.14) 
0.21** 
(0.16) 
0.98*** 
(0.18) 
Host market knowledge -0.22 (0.40) 
-1.60*** 
(0.46) 
1.08** 
(0.55) 
Follow up investments 0.92** (0.45) 
1.05* 
(0.54) 
-0.75 
(0.63) 
International experience -0.09 (0.14) 
-0.44*** 
(0.17) 
0.01 
(0.19) 
Hungary 0.99** (0.41) 
-0.06 
(0.45) 
0.53 
(0.56) 
Lithuania 0.99 (0.65) 
ge Yes Yes 
e region*Affiliate age Yes Yes Yes 
N 322 Correct classifications 61.50 
Chi Square 211.78 Nagelkerke R2 0.52 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
Table 5.2 Multinominal logit with Greenfield as the base
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 Greenfield Joint venture Partial acquisition
Intercept 4.07*** (0.95) 
1.38 
(1.09) 
-0.84 
(1.23) 
Foreign parent resources 0.02*** (0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Export intensity 0.91* (0.48) 
-0.87 
(0.60) 
-0.23 
(0.65) 
Subsidiary size -0.67*** -0.46*** 
-1.38*** 1
-0.92** -1.67*** 
-0.99** -1.04** -
(0.14) (0.15) 
0.31** 
(0.16) 
Host market knowledge 0.22 (0.40) (0.49) 
.30** 
(0.55) 
0.13 Follow up investments (0.45) (0.52) (0.60) 
0.09 -0.34** 0.10 International experience (0.14) (0.18) (0.19) 
0.45 Hungary (0.41) (0.50) (0.57) 
-0.99 -0.02 0.34 Lithuania (0.65) (0.69) (0.89) 
Industry Dummies** Yes Yes Yes
Home region Dummies* Yes Yes Yes
Host country*Affiliate age Yes Yes Yes
Home region*Affiliate age Yes Yes Yes
    
C
classification
orrect 
s
 R2
N 322 61.50
Chi Square 211.78 Nagelkerke 0.52
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
Table 5.3 Multinomial logit with Acquisition as the base 
true value of the asset. Consequently, the seller(s) will be more reluctant to divest its entire stake in 
the firm preferring to wait and see how things develop. An alternative or complementary argument 
for the observed effect could be that foreign firms with local experience are more likely to 
recognize the potential for ex-ante conflicts and may be more willing to accept partial ownership.  
On the other hand, prior host market knowledge is found to be negatively associated with 
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JVs. In line with the digestibility argument, this suggests that firms enter by JV when they desire 
 management of business activities in 
the local context, without being burdened by undesirable resources that would be obtained through 
a fu .  
 that follow tments are le by partial acquisition, 
thus supporting hypothesis 2. As expected, firms are less willi cept partial control when they 
eng ent acquisitions. Subsequent acquisitions e motivated by a desire to 
strengthen and consolidate a market pos the host cou presence of o ers in 
the s complicates the foreign parent’s ab integrate activ t 
cou cope for posit ergies. Furthe e local owners e more 
willing to sell their holdings when faced nsifying for petitive pressur
nd that internationally expe  firms were less likely to enter by JV compared to 
any thus supporting hyp sis 3a. On the other hand, in line with hypothesis 3b 
international experience did not affect the likelihood of firm oosing partial acq ion over 
Greenfield or full acquisition. Therefore, the results also suggest a fundamental difference in the 
underlying motivation for the choice of JV and partial acquisitio s. Whereas the choice of a JV is 
motivated by the desire to gain a local pa help com he foreign pa  lack of 
international experience, this is not the e for partia s. The choice of partial 
acquisition is thus not motivated by a deficiency within the MNC in terms of resources or 
l 
acquisi
access to local market knowledge and resources related to the
ll merger
The results indicate up inves ss likely to be 
ng to ac
age in subsequ  t  bend to
ition in n e try. Th t nher ow
individual subsidiarie ility to it he hosies in t
ntry, thus limiting the s ive syn rmore, th  may b
 with inte eign com e. 
We fi rienced
 other entry mode, othe
s ch uisit
n
rtner to pensate for t rent’s
 cas l acquisition
capabilities, but rather by deficiencies in the contracting environment. 
As predicted in hypothesis 4, subsidiary size is strongly positively associated with partial 
acquisitions. As expected, both acquisitions and partial acquisitions are on average significantly 
larger than Greenfield projects (Table 5.2) and in addition partial acquisitions are larger than ful
tions (Table 5.3). Our study thus presents strong evidence that firms prefer to acquire large 
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enterprises rather than to build them from scratch. The process of building a large organization 
from scratch may be to slow and difficult for many investors. It tends to be easier to buy into a new 
market, particularly when local assets are available for sale, which was mostly the case due to the 
extensive privatization campaigns undertaken by the host countries in the period. 
icant. For the home region 
dummi
Moreover the positive relationship between subsidiary size and partial acquisition we link to 
a tendency by stakeholders such as the state, municipal government and employees to intervene 
with the object of derailing, slowing down or otherwise affecting the outcome of ex-ante ownership 
transfer negotiations (Meyer, 2002). The probability of stakeholder intervention is greater the larger 
their perceived interest, which would often be closely connected to the number of jobs involved. In 
such cases foreign firms may have a clear interest in limiting ex-ante negotiations and postponing 
negotiations on sensitive issues like layoffs. 
The pattern of control variables is in line with our expectations. We find that the relative 
resource contribution of the parent company is positively and significantly associated with 
greenfield operations. Similarly, exporters were more likely to enter by greenfield operations. This 
generally supports the resource-based view that firms will seek to utilise or develop resources in-
house and to the extent that this is not possible they will pursue complementary (local) resources 
through acquisition or a partnership with a local firm. Contrary to the WOS versus JV/PA division 
argued by Brouthers and Hennart (2007) this suggests that a more appropriate segmentation would 
be between greenfields and resource seeking modes. 
Overall the joint effects of the time trends were not signif
es (not reported) North America stands out with a rather clear aversion against partial 
ownership. This result is generally similar to previous findings that have studied the impact of 
culture on the choice of entry mode. 
 
 140
DISCUSSION 
This study offers several contributions to the literature. It is one of the first studies to 
empirically investigate the factors that determine the choice to enter by partial acquisitions, and 
thus establishes that partial acquisitions have distinct features. Moreover, this study considers the 
influen
ect of international experience on shared versus full 
owners
m scratch. A division between wholly owned 
and pa
artial acquisitions. 
hus, our study suggests a clear distinction in the underlying pattern of entry mode choice, 
ce of local owners and stakeholders in shaping the entry mode decision. These influences 
have important implications for the factors that govern the choice to enter by partial acquisition in 
transition economies, but also the direction of these. Consequently, we argue that information 
asymmetries may run counter to that which has previously been suggested (Chen & Hennart, 2004). 
Our results support this by showing that better informed foreign acquirer’s does not contribute to 
reducing information asymmetries problems, but rather enhance them. We also explain the 
previously inconclusive evidence of the eff
hip. The theoretically expected effect applies only to joint ventures, and empirical studies 
that muddle the difference between partial acquisitions and joint ventures may thus fail to identify 
this effect.  
It is one of the first studies in transition economies that simultaneously examine the factors 
that determine the choice of ownership level and the decision to make or buy. We demonstrate that 
it is fruitful to consider the choice of entry mode as a simultaneous choice along multiple 
dimensions. It is important to distinguish between not only levels of ownership control, but also 
whether the subsidiary should be acquired or build fro
rtially owned subsidiaries fails to capture the choice between acquiring existing assets and 
building new assets. Similarly a failure to separate acquisitions and partial acquisitions ignores the 
important issue of control and governance. Yet, even combining the two sets of arguments may be 
insufficient to explain the choice of p
T
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which is perhaps particularly important b res and partial acquisitions. We see that 
the lac
 of the results may be specific to transition economies and cannot be generalized. The 
reverse
icular, we propose to investigate a 
similar
etween joint ventu
k of context specific “host market knowledge” and general business experience in an 
international context are key drivers for the choice of JV. Thus, JVs are primarily motivated by the 
operational concerns of the foreign investors regarding their ability to manage a cross border 
subsidiary in the specific host country context. Yet partial acquisitions are not driven by the same 
factors. They appear to be formed on the basis of comparative strength, i.e. the foreign investors in 
partial acquisitions are more likely to have previous host market. It is thus not the operational 
aspect that governs the choice of a partial acquisition, but rather partial acquisition emerges as a 
means to acquire a bundle of resources when there are forces at work that resists the transfer of 
these resources. 
The study has some important limitations. Some entry mode choices may not be relevant in 
other countries because of legal constraints on e.g. full acquisition. In these regions, it may be 
especially important to distinguish between partial acquisitions and JV greenfields. 
Some
 asymmetric information motive might be particularly strong in transition economies. 
Likewise, if a positive relationship between size and partial acquisitions is mainly attributable to a 
desire to avoid or postpone negotiations on non-financial contractual clauses, then this would be of 
less importance in more advanced economies where these are less common. Hence the transition 
economy context might explain the difference in the results between this study and the study by 
Barkema and Vermuelen (1998), which found that JVs were on average larger than full acquisitions 
and that the parents had greater international experience.  
Future research is hoped to provide a more differentiated treatment of entry modes, 
recognizing the unique features of partial acquisitions. In part
 set of hypotheses on different countries. A further possibility for future research may be to 
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re-estimate bimodal Logit regression equations presented in the literature on the same data, but 
replacing the Logit with an M-Logit model that incorporates partial acquisitions as a separate 
option. Another line of inquiry may investigate whether buyers or sellers are the principal 
motivators for the choice of partial acquisitions. 
 
A partial acquisition is the outcome of a negotiation between an acquirer and a group of 
seller(s) and stakeholders that seek to retain some influence on the future of the enterprise. The 
main implication
CONCLUSION 
s for managers are that they should not confuse the motives for establishing a JV 
and tho
ans to enhance 
operati
Akerlof, G. A. (1970). The market for lemons; qualitative uncertainty and the market mechanism. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), 488-500. 
se for establishing a partial acquisition. Firms can advantageously choose a joint venture 
greenfield operation with a local partner, when they need to upgrade their capabilities to conduct 
business in the local context. On the other hand, a partial acquisition is not a me
onal efficiency by joining up with a partner that possesses superior context specific 
managerial capabilities. For all practical purposes these capabilities reside at the level of the 
acquired subsidiary’s management, not its owners. Rather, the key purpose of a partial acquisition 
is to facilitate an acquisition deal in situations where powerful stakeholders resist turning over full 
managerial flexibility to the acquirer. By pursuing, or perhaps more appropriately accepting, a 
partial acquisition the acquirer can limit the ex-ante negotiations and avoid or reduce the severity of 
long-term concessions. 
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6. Conclusion 
the use ting.  
manage blems in this respect is the 
account e a sample of 
behavior on account of (1) the geographical and cultural proximity to many of the large foreign 
number aim, with a certain degree of confidence, that this 
perform n competitive foreign market entry. In line with previous literature (VanderWerf & 
Mahorn, 1998), support is found for a market share advantage, but this advantage does not translate 
into superior overall performance. Some support is found for a more general early mover 
advantage; however, this advantage is highly conditional on country and industry factors, and even 
mode choices. Therefore, we must conclude that the ability to derive performance advantages from 
moving first in competitive foreign market entry is largely situational. 
Nonetheless, it is equally clear and puzzling that even some highly competitive industries do 
offer first movers substantial performance rewards. One such industry is the brewing industry, for 
which we find both substantial market share and financial performance advantages from moving 
first. In this dissertation it is suggested that the ability to command rent from moving first depends 
The object of this study has been to investigate the role of entry timing on firm performance, 
of partial acquisitions and the relationship between these in a transition economy set
From a firm strategy perspective we would want to be able to provide some form of concrete 
rial recommendations in regard to entry timing. One of the pro
possible interrelatedness of entry timing, firm resources and performance. This study seeks to 
 for this endogeneity issue through several means. Most importantly, I us
Central and Eastern European firms which I reason is most likely to exhibit competitive entry 
investor countries in Europe and (2) the scope of the structural changes in terms of the sheer 
 of industries effected. I will therefore cl
dissertation offer one of the best available studies of competitive entry timing effects. 
Overall, this dissertation does not find support for a general order of entry effect on 
ance i
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crucially on the competitive environment and how this environment is shaped by first mover 
advantages. Hence, I argue that the combination of multi-market opportunities and strong first 
mover 
ve 
environ
int ventures, 
acquisi
cal owners with that of the 
foreign
advantages lead competitors to shy away from confrontation and pursue alternative markets, 
effectively creating a state of competition for markets. It is not new that the market and competiti
ment affect a firm’s ability to derive rent from first mover advantages (Nakatar & 
Sivakumar, 1997); however, we need also consider how the existence of first mover advantages 
indirectly shapes this environment. 
In regard to the use of partial acquisitions in transition economies, in this dissertation, I 
ultimately view the choice of entry mode in terms of the source of the resources that is needed to 
effectively undertake a business activity in a given host country. In this sense a Greenfield operation 
is a mode that relies predominantly on critical resource transferred from the parent company to the 
subsidiary. In contrast, firms enter by means of a Joint Venture, Acquisition or Partial Acquisition 
for the purpose of accessing a bundle of locally held resources. Effectively, Jo
tions and partial acquisitions serve as three organizationally and contractually different 
resource acquiring modes. As noted by Williamson (2005) “the upshot is that there is a place for 
each generic mode of organization, yet each should be kept in its place”, hence the critical question 
is what is the place of each of these modes of organization and contracting? 
This dissertation contributes by analyzing the factors that promote the use of partial 
acquisitions. In contrast to the remuneration perspective that sees the role of shared ownership 
predominantly from the perspective of aligning the interest of the lo
 partner, I advance the view that the ability to influence decisions is core to explaining the 
role of partial acquisitions in transition economies. Owners, governmental organizations, 
employees, local communities and other stakeholders will have vested interests in the operation of 
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the business unit which they will seek to protect from possible adverse unilateral adaptations by the 
foreign acquirer. 
Seen from the perspective of these stakeholders, retaining influence through equity 
ownership, either directly or indirectly though other friendly stakeholders, offers some measure of 
protection against potentially harmful unilateral actions by the foreign investor. On the other hand, 
for the foreign acquirer a partial acquisition may offer the best or only alternative to a full 
acquisition of the assets when it is too difficult or costly to alleviate these concerns through 
contrac
e of brownfield entries 
(Meyer
implications. This suggests that partial acquisitions are predominantly a tool to acquire 
tual agreements. 
It is particularly employment concerns that are likely to spark resistance to a takeover by a 
foreign company and thus we find that partial acquisitions are on average larger than other foreign 
owned subsidiaries in terms of number of employees. 
This dissertation also advances the notion of a reverse asymmetric information problem. It is 
commonly assumed that the seller of an asset has the best knowledge of its true value. However, 
foreign acquirers typically seek specific asset that can be used to leverage their own ownership 
advantages. It is thus the synergies between the ownership advantages of the foreign parent and 
some of the local firm’s assets that create value to the transaction, rather than the assets per se. In 
some cases only a single or few core assets have any value such as the cas
 & Estrin, 2001). Consequently, the foreign acquirer may be in a much better position to 
estimate the true value of these synergies and correspondingly possess an information advantage 
over the seller; hence, promoting reluctance to fully divest by the seller. 
A key observation that emerges from the overall dissertation is that I do not find a decrease 
in the likelihood of entering by means of a partial acquisition over time. What I do however find is 
that there are strong indicators that early entry through partial acquisitions has positive performance 
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complementary local assets early in an institutional environment that does not support for instance 
contractual safe guards. The failure to use partial acquisitions in this capacity is thus likely to 
produc
to gain any conclusive results. Most pertinent will be the “quantification of 
implied
l I feel that it does provide some implications 
that co
ard is not the pursuit of the 
perfect
e excessive governance costs.  
 
Implications for future research
One of the key challenges for the timing and performance literature will be to effectively 
incorporate survival. However, there are some major empirical and technical constraints that need 
to be overcome in order 
 failure”; firms simply exit markets for too many reasons and with to many degrees of 
relative failure for a simple binary variable to meaningfully capture this. While the primary 
objective of this study has not been to address surviva
uld be of relevance to the study of entry timing and business failure. The implications of the 
chapter “Competition for Markets vs. Competition in Markets: The case of the brewing industry in 
Central and Eastern Europe” is that it is quite possible firms can be divided into “natural winners” 
and “losers” for lack of a more appropriate term. We may need to study the relationship between 
entry timing and performance separately for these groups. Or in other words, we probably need to 
consider entrepreneurial activity and strategic entry timing as two completely separate concepts 
especially in foreign market entry. 
In terms of the pursuit of a conclusion to the general performance advantage question many 
methods have been applied with varying results. Possibly, the way forw
 method, but rather the perfect data (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988 & 1998). However 
until we understand the role of the underlying competitive mechanism that exists in cross boarder 
entry better, I would suggest that the most likely way forward within the study of order of entry and 
performance effects in foreign market is to aim for more comprehensive industry studies with a 
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stronger focus on identifying how the environmental and competitive dynamics affect the ability to 
derive rent from moving first. 
Finally, just as VanderWerf and Mahorn (1997) noted an industry selection bias effect, it is 
also worth noting that the study of foreign entry timing and performance is strongly biased in favor 
untries, most notably China. The field could truly need some 
compar
e entry mode decision a choice 
betwee
of certain comparatively successful co
ative studies from economies that have experienced shock effects such as South Korea, 
Russia and Mexico.  
How to enter is not strictly a strategic choice by the foreign parent. Basically, a joint venture 
or a full/partial acquisition is the negotiated outcome between two or more parties. As such, it is 
important to understand the motivation that lead to the choice of one over the other from a broader 
perspective. We need to understand both the motivations of the acquirer and the seller. The entry 
mode literature has so far predominantly viewed the choice from the perspective of an acquirer; I 
suggest that scholars interested in the study of mode choices could advantageously focus on the 
influence of the seller on the mode outcome. 
Another important implication of this study is that the ownership dimension alone is 
insufficient to explain mode choices. Consequently, the partial versus full ownership debate lack the 
richness to truly expand our knowledge of entry mode choices. If we are to broaden our 
understanding of mode choice, future studies should consider th
n multiple alternatives. 
 
LIMITATIONS 
The primary limitation of this study is grounded in the availability of suitable empirical 
material. For three of these studies I use a data set consisting of primary survey data collected in 
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Hungary, Poland and Lithuania by a team of researches headed by Klaus Meyer (Meyer & Estrin, 
2007). This data set has some clear advantages in terms of size and the richness of material. 
s increasingly considered problematic to use a single source of data and as 
such th
data on breweries in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Subsid
e of the material that the data provides are virtually unrivaled by any 
tudy I have thus fare encountered within the entry timing and mode choice literature. 
In terms of the brewing industr  have been very useful to include the 
emergi
empirical problems of its own. It would have given the study a stronger and richer empirical 
However, it also has some clear weaknesses. The respondents are at the subsidiary level 
which does impact on the quality of data describing the parent company. Some of the typical 
control variables like advertising and R&D intensity or the international experience of the parent 
company suffer from large number of missing observations. 
Moreover, it i
e overall quality of the data and consequently the results would have been greatly improved, 
had we been able to combine the primary survey data with secondary data sources; Amadeus being 
the most likely candidate. 
I did make an attempt to combine the survey data with data from Amadeus; however this 
attempt was abandoned after it became clear that we were unlikely to obtain a reasonable sample 
size. Firm names are neither a persistent nor distinct feature of a subsidiary. This was also a lesson 
that was made clear when I gathered the 
iaries are frequently merged together or change names typically from a local name to some 
derivate of the parents global name and as such offer a poor measure to track firms. 
While, I must recognize these shortcomings of the empirical basis of the dissertation, the 
choice to go with it anyway was a pragmatic one. The number of observations, the multi-country 
nature of the study and the scop
s
y data I feel it could
ng markets of Asia in the study. Although it is not without problems, as argued by the paper 
we can almost certainly expect a regionalization of the Chinese market which might provide 
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foundation. However, this would have required different sources of data which Copenhagen 
Business School does not have access to.  
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